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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of my thesis is to investigate the reason for why and how the language and concept of civil 
society was used to enhance positions of power by reformists in Iran.  In particular, this thesis 
examines how reformist public intellectuals used civil society to craft their vision of Iran’s socio-
political future. Special focus is placed upon reformist public intellectuals as agents of change, due to 
their particular role in introducing new ideas to a wider public audience.  Their role as critical thinkers 
and figures affiliated with a political movement for reform provided them with a unique position on 
the boundaries between civil and political society.  In contrast to reformists, this thesis also examines 
how conservative figures with different underlying values appropriated the language and concept of 
civil society for their own ends.  Ultimately, it is argued that although civil society is a politically 
charged concept that can be employed to serve different objectives, it leaves behind a residue of 
pluralism and an opening up of the public sphere.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The events that followed Iran’s contested June 2009 presidential elections garnered 
the world’s attention.  However, what made international headlines in the immediate 
aftermath was not commonly a detailed analysis of regional and global implications 
of political instability and power struggles inside the country.  Rather, the focus was 
on the overwhelming mass mobilization of citizens who took to the streets (Addis, 
2009).  The pictures that emerged from these rallies revealed that class, gender and 
age were irrelevant and what unified these individuals was a demand to have their 
voices heard by government powers as they expressed their frustrations with the 
country’s current state of affairs1. Western media consistently featured news of the 
election results and the ensuing protests on behalf of reformist candidates alongside 
campaigns by conservative factions of the state to suppress dissent through means 
that included, at minimum, intimidation and imprisonment.  However, as stories 
about women, youth and the elderly defying guards and plainclothes police officers 
faded, the focus inevitably shifted to talks of Iran’s special role in the region and 
beyond.  Moreover, Iran’s nuclear programme was once again presented as an issue 
of global security by Western media and policymakers.  The political infighting and 
citizen dissatisfaction, as expressed through the mobilization of various forms of 
protest, strengthened the voices of Iranian activists; at the same time, politicians in 
the West who opposed the Islamic Republic increased their assertion that the 
country’s political instability makes its nuclear energy programme a key global 
concern that must be mitigated.  Along those lines, regime change and international 
‘pro-democracy’ support for dissidents intensified among both Western governments 
and non-governmental forums abroad.   
           
However, while the events that followed the 2009 summer elections represent a 
critical point in a nation’s struggle against repressive rule, it is vital to understand the 
reality of a country with a complex and diverse make-up of people and viewpoints.  
These post-election events should not be considered in a vacuum given Iran’s rich 
history of social movements (Hashemi, 2010).  Rather, they need to be understood as 
part of a dynamic process of social, political and economic development.  It is now 
                                                 
1
 For analysis of the diverse range of women participating in these protests, see (Tahmasebi-Birgani, 
2010). 
8 
 
more necessary than ever to examine the people, ideas and events that shape a 
country that is so often mentioned in the world’s media but remains largely 
misunderstood.  The civil society protests that attracted the Western media’s 
attention in 2009 were not one-off or new; they were part of a broader social 
movement pre-dating the emergence of reform in the Islamic Republic.  Moreover, 
cursory or outside observations fail to grasp a holistic understanding of civil 
society’s demands and the actors who compose it. 
  
Though the study of Iran in Western institutions is not new, particularly given the 
rise of Iranian Studies in university settings and undertakings by independent think-
tanks and government-sponsored programmes, there is still a major gap in the 
academic analysis obtained through primary sources and fieldwork, particularly on 
topics that do not necessarily capture popular attention.  One of the issues explored 
by the media in the weeks leading up to and in the aftermath of the June 2009 
elections was Iran’s vibrant citizen-based activism.  This was depicted in countless 
photographs and videos posted on news and social networking sites that showed 
individuals participating in rallies.  What garnered less attention was reflection on the 
reality that such vibrant social expression was not new to Iran.  In fact, the notion of 
civil society in Iran has roots that arguably began at the start of the twentieth century 
with the Constitutional Revolution and continued in waves to the present day.  More 
specifically, the proponents of reform who challenged the incumbent conservative 
president and lost in the disputed 2009 election were at the heart of an eight-year 
period in modern Iranian history, from 1997 to 2005, that made the development of 
civil society a core state project.  This thesis examines that timeframe and the actors 
and ideas surrounding reform of the Islamic Republic.  
 
The core of this thesis analyses the role of reformist public intellectuals in the 
development of the concept of civil society, or Jame’e-ye Madani in Persian, during 
the presidency of Mohammad Khatami and the ensuing civil society building that 
took place.  Civil society building refers to a dedicated drive to cultivate social and 
political spaces independent of the state structure that is favourable to citizen 
engagement in formal and informal organisations and movements.  However, the 
view of civil society as an independent third sector limited to organisations is also 
rejected.  In the words of Neera Chandhoke, “Civil society is not an institution it is 
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rather a process whereby the inhabitants of the sphere constantly monitor both the 
state and the monopoly of power in civil society” (2001, p. 22).  This thesis explores 
how people use civil society language and concepts for different purposes, engaging 
with the questions of what ideas about civil society mean and their effects.   
 
Though Khatami’s election in 1997 initially signalled a shift towards democratisation 
in the Islamic regime, conservative factions regained political power by the end of 
Khatami’s second term in 2005 and reinforced a restrictive interpretation of the 
Islamic Republic’s constitution.  However, the complex nature of Iran’s political 
structure and the consequences of the reform movement did not allow for a total 
defeat of the principles introduced in the reform period.  Ray Takeyh, a leading 
scholar of contemporary Iranian politics who has served as a senior advisor in the 
U.S. Department of State, writes in his book Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the 
Islamic Republic (2006, p. 3): 
Despite all the sensational setbacks of Muhammad Khatami’s reform 
movement, the one enduring legacy of its electoral triumphs in 1997 and 
2001 has been to make it impossible for Iran to become a rigid authoritarian 
state.  The call for representation and the rule-of-law, for accountability and 
equality, have transformed the average Iranian from a passive observer of 
clerical politics into an active agent of change.     
   
The concept of civil society was at the forefront of the reform movement’s attempt to 
bring about their contentious calls for a state based on features including rule-of-law 
and accountability.  This thesis identifies and analyses how reformist intellectuals 
and leading figures of the reform movement during the two-term presidency of 
Mohammad Khatami, from 1997 to 2005, envisioned the role of civil society in 
transforming the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The research considers whether civil 
society promotion, by internal actors such as public intellectuals, is relevant to states 
not based on liberal-democratic norms.  The answer to this question can also have 
bearing on the role of civil society promotion by external agents, such as foreign 
states or international aid agencies.  Specifically, the research question posed is why, 
how and to what effect was the language and concept of civil society used to enhance 
positions of power during the period of reform, circa 1997-2005, by political and 
social actors in Iran.  Furthermore, this thesis addresses the appropriation of civil 
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society language and structures by figures in the regime opposed to the reform 
movement following the reformists’ loss of political office.   
 
Civil society, a concept emerging from the Scottish Enlightenment in the late 
eighteenth century, appeared to have disappeared from intellectual discourse 
throughout the early twentieth century (Keane, 1988).  However, with the end of the 
Cold War, it resurfaced as a leading force for change and in the 1990s and early 
2000s and was frequently considered a panacea to political and social 
underdevelopment. Local and international actors have used resources for the various 
institutions that embody civil society as a tool to establish the governments and 
social settings that most benefit their end goals.  Nonetheless, it remains a contested 
topic, with scholars debating its theoretical and practical applications.  Therefore, it 
becomes ever more important to fully grasp the nature and potential of civil society 
in different settings. 
 
On a theoretical level, this thesis strengthens the notion that civil society “…has 
become ‘useful to think with’ in the sense that it has a striking capacity to inspire” 
(Lewis, 2002, p. 583).  Rather than evaluating civil society according to the 
establishment of organizations, more value is given to the role of civil society in 
instigating change.  This is in contrast to theoretical and empirical studies of civil 
society that focus on the organisational aspects of civil society and evaluate its 
strength based on quantitative measures of civil society institutions such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  As a point of reference, donor agencies 
focused on utilising the potential of civil society have embraced institution- and 
capacity-building, partnerships and  coalitions and financial sustainability as ways to 
support and strengthen civil society (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 102).  In essence, 
donor agencies have placed a high burden on the ability of organisations and the 
projects they undertake as vehicles for achieving what they perceive as civil society’s 
rewards.  As a result, the informal aspects of civil society are ignored alongside 
actors calling for civil society development outside donor-recipient contexts.  
 
Moreover, this thesis attempts to break away from a propensity to examine modern 
Iranian history as a binary conflict between state and society, as “This binary outlook 
does not adequately explain the complex ways in which state goals and social ideals 
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converge in order to produce certain political outcomes, or more generally to define 
continuities and changes in national debates” (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, p. 8).  This 
thesis also differs by rejecting an organisational approach to civil society.  The study 
examines public intellectuals and political figures that, in this case-study of Iran, 
often have overlapping roles.  The aim is to obtain data on how public intellectuals, 
broadly defined as individuals engaging in critical thought within the public sphere, 
working with or within the state can inspire the development and direction of civil 
society.  While public intellectuals exist outside the state structure, often times in 
opposition to the state, the focus of this thesis is on public intellectuals affiliated with 
the Khatami administration, and therefore in some way affiliated with the state.  Thus 
far, little attention has been paid to the role of public intellectuals and political 
leaders in the literature on civil society. 
 
1.1  The Civil Society-Democracy Connection 
 
Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, the discourse of civil society was the 
central theme in solutions to most development concerns.  In the 1980s, the concept 
was ‘reinvented’ in Eastern Europe and Latin America and “A ‘blueprint’ model of 
civil society based on the construction or support of certain organizational forms can 
be observed throughout the world” (Glasius, Lewis, & Seckinelgin, 2004, p. 6).  
Civil society re-emerged as a universal solution to political, social and economic 
underdevelopment in both the North and South2.  “[I]n the late 1980s civil society 
came to be seen as an alternative to the sphere of organised politics and formal 
representation” (Chandhoke, 2007, p. 53, emphasis in original).  This was largely in 
response to authoritarian rule in Eastern and Central Europe.  Though academics, 
policymakers and development practitioners, in areas stretching from economic 
development, democratization and social inequality, paid particularly close attention 
to civil society for two decades, the topic appears to have slipped to the background.  
Studies have indicated that civil society development programmes are not always 
able to produce the dramatic results promised by various practitioners and theorists.  
The elusive term began to lose its favoured position as the politics around civil 
society began to change.  Reasons for this backlash included questioning of the 
                                                 
2
 A detailed account of the history of civil society as a concept from its emergence during the 
Enlightenment through the 20th century will be provided in Chapter Two.    
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legitimacy of Northern NGOs representing the needs of populations in the South, the 
professionalisation and de-radicalisation of NGOs, and finally the growing climate of 
fear that emerged as a result of the Global War on Terror (Howell, Ishkanian, 
Obadare, Seckinelgin, & Glasius, 2008; Howell & Lind, 2009a, 2010).      
 
However, the dramatic impact the surge of this term produced in the last decades of 
the twentieth century is hard to ignore.  In fact, it is vital to examine why and how 
this long-dating and contested concept re-emerged with such force in various 
geographic and ideological spheres in the late 20th century.  More importantly, it is 
critical to examine how a concept elaborated by the European enlightenment was 
appropriated and adapted to fit diverse contexts, even those often labelled as 
incompatible with liberal democratic ideals.  In the neoconservative and liberal 
pluralist understanding of civil society, civil society organisations are considered as 
regulators of state powers3 (Macdonald, 1994).  Furthermore, civil society remains a 
widely used concept by international and domestic agencies and policymakers as a 
benign indicator or agent of liberalisation.  “As within the comparative politics 
literature, liberal writers are primarily distinguished by their assertion of the analytic 
separation of civil society from the state, their view of civil society as a sphere of 
freedom, and by their lack of attention to class relations” (Macdonald, 1994, p. 274).  
This thesis seeks to problematize the dominant neoconservative and benign liberal 
views of civil society as a concept in both literature and practice; similar to Howell 
and Pearce (2001), it challenges the normative assumptions about civil society used 
to guide action.  The politics of civil society is discussed further in Chapter Two.           
 
A principle foundation of this thesis is that while civil society has the potential to 
support democracy it does not inherently endorse or entail it.  It agrees with the 
critical theory approach that questions the overtly positive or benign view of civil 
society, and “…highlights the multiple forms of oppression within civil society…” 
(Macdonald, 1994, p. 268).  As argued by Neera Chandhoke, while the organs of 
civil society, such as nongovernmental organisations, “…may be in the business of 
democracy, they are not in the business of being representative of the popular will, or 
                                                 
3
 According to Laura Macdonald, the neoconservative and liberal pluralist views of civil society see it 
“…as harmonious spheres of free association” (Macdonald, 1994, p. 268).  In this thesis, the 
neoconservative and liberal pluralist approaches are broadly referred to as the ‘liberal approach’.  The 
‘benign’ approach is generally linked to this liberal approach.    
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accountable to the people for their acts of omission and commission.  Nor do they 
have any necessary link with the sphere of participative politics” (2007, p. 50).  She 
explains that civil society groups can enhance, or ‘deepen’, democracy by widening 
the political agenda, but these organisations or the actors in them are not necessarily 
accountable or representative of popular will (Ibid).  Therefore, the question remains 
as to how civil society and democratisation are linked?                 
 
The emergence of the term civil society in the public and political discourse on Iran’s 
social and political development in the 1990s is not surprising given the global surge 
of the term.  Following political, social and economic transitions across the globe, 
particularly Eastern Europe, the concept of civil society and its actors emerged as the 
champion of democracy.  As a panacea for populations facing dictatorship, social 
inequality and economic underdevelopment, civil society captured the attention of 
individuals involved in foreign aid as well as those working on domestic reform.  
Following a revolution, eight-year war and a short period of re-development (all in 
less than two decades), the country was prepared for and receptive to new ideas.  As 
a result, the concept of civil society entered Iran’s political and social sphere with 
relative ease.  This openness to new ideas can be attributed to what Diane Stone calls 
‘soft’ forms of transfer.  She emphasises the importance of: 
... ‘soft’ forms of transfer – such as the spread of norms and knowledge – as a 
necessary complement to the hard transfer of policy tools, structures and 
practices. Learning can make the difference between successful transfers as 
opposed to inappropriate, uninformed or incomplete transfer. (Stone, 2004, p. 
546).   
Civil society as a modern concept entered the socio-political consciousness of Iran as 
a result of work by both non-state and state actors, such as women’s rights activists 
and public intellectuals and political figures who produced the reform movement.    
 
The notion of civil society, as an analytical tool for social and political enquiry, has 
strong roots in the intellectual discourse of the mid-1990s, particularly among groups 
of religious intellectuals who had begun discussions on the future of the Islamic 
state.  Broadly speaking, these individuals are identified as writers and academics 
that directly or indirectly supported what became the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 
1979 and later re-evaluated the dominant state ideologies and sought to reform them.  
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However, it was not until the presidential elections of 1997 that the notion of reform 
entered mainstream Iranian society when a cleric who was little before seen on the 
central political stage captured some seventy per cent of votes in an election that 
gave recognition to the reform movement.  The public face of this reform, 
Mohammad Khatami, used the rhetoric of rule-of-law and civil society as central 
themes to his presidential campaign in 1997, themes that continued for eight years 
through his two-term presidency.  This thesis examines the crossing of these two 
paradigms, that of the emergence of reformist intellectuals and the vigorous attention 
given to civil society during the eight years of Khatami’s presidency from 1997 to 
2005.  
 
From an international perspective, a study of how political and social transformation 
takes place provides vital data for public diplomacy.  With the end of Cold War 
politics, conflict in the Middle East has come to play a central role in the 
international arena, with the Islamic Republic of Iran considered a leading player in 
the region and its conflicts.  Broad-based theories, such as Samuel Huntington’s 
famous Clash of Civilizations, have often overshadowed other aspects of study and 
policy related to the greater Middle East, with the role of Islam becoming a key 
focus.  Aside from this, much of the work carried out under the label of ‘civil 
society’ in Iran has focused on organizations with less examining of the role of 
human agency4.  This mirrors the broader trend in civil society studies that focuses 
on organisations and their behaviour with less attention to actors such as public 
intellectuals.  The trajectory of academic studies of NGOs is partially in response to 
what has been referred to as the ‘NGOisation’ of various movements, such as the 
women’s movement (Alvarez, 2009), by agencies and foreign donors that actively 
promote particular organisational forms and practices.  With intellectuals playing a 
prominent role in the development of Iran’s reform agenda, it is reasonable to 
consider their role, particularly those who became a symbol of change through a new 
and less restricted press.  This research looks specifically at the role played by such 
leading intellectuals and reformist figures in the development of Iranian civil society 
by looking at how their notion of civil society developed and ultimately influenced 
decision makers and civil society activists. 
                                                 
4
 For example, the work of the Hamyaran Iran NGO Resource Centre and Iran CSOs Training & 
Research Center (ICTRC), which were both active during the Khatami administration.   
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1.2  The Role of Agency 
 
This thesis brings to the forefront the role of agency in social change by exploring 
the functions of individuals in positions of authority or power.  As noted by Zhand 
Shakibi (2010, p. 16), “The notion of agency implies more than mere political action 
or conduct.  In particular, it implies a sense of free will, choice and autonomy”.  
Ontologically, this thesis considers what motivates individuals and their 
interpretations of concepts and contexts in relation to civil society.  Their motivations 
and interpretations are constructed by history and experience and reflected in the 
actions of these agents.  This is in contrast to views that depict organisations, markets 
or ideologies as the basis of civil society and development, the study of which can 
overshadow the role of individual agency.  In terms of the types of agents, both civil 
society and political actors are key ingredients in democracy and civil society 
building.  In his comparative study of Gorbachev and Khatami, Shakibi challenges 
the theories of democratisation and transition that devalue the role of human agency, 
arguing that: 
The reformist periods under Gorbachev and Khatami can rightly be 
considered challenges to these theories for, if anything, they emerged to 
positions of power in polities in which according to common logic serious 
reform from above would not take place and the elites would ensure the 
maintenance of the status quo.  (2010, pp. 16-17) 
On the whole, the notion of patrimonialism, with power at the behest of a ruler, is a 
key concept in Iranian politics.  As argued by Ali Ansari (2000, p. 20):  
Certainly, when considering traditional forms of legitimacy, Weber’s notions 
of partimonialism and charismatic leadership capture facets of Iran’s political 
and social structures, for example, the ulema, while also allowing for an 
explanation of the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini as the quintessential 
‘charismatic’ ruler.  [Emphasis in original]   
Based on this explanation, the concept of agency in the building up of civil society 
takes on an increasingly significant role.  In order for new ideas and change to be 
injected in this society, the leader takes centre stage.     
 
Separately, as argued by Chandhoke (2007, p. 56), there is a need to strengthen the 
link between civil society agents and political representatives in order for public 
opinion to feed into policy, “This really means bringing the sphere of participative 
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and democratic politics closer to the domain of policy making via the 
representative”.  However, the way in which these two spheres are linked is complex 
and difficult to formulate both theoretically and in practice.  Ultimately, these 
individuals have access to power, whether in government or public opinion, which 
allows them to guide the direction of civil society growth.  Similar to the “polity-
centred’ approach introduced by Lavalle, Acharya and Houtzager in their study of 
Sao Paulo, Brazil, citizen participation requires engagement by organisational and 
individual citizens, while those in the best position to represent interests of individual 
citizens have connections to democratic representatives (2005, p. 959).  The 
empirical subjects of this thesis, public intellectuals and civil society building in Iran, 
were chosen as platforms for the study of agency as a factor in structural change.     
 
1.3  What Iran Offers as a Case-study  
 
A study of Iran can apply to the practice of international diplomacy and also shed 
light on the theoretical understandings of democratization, civil society and the role 
of intellectuals in political reform.  The realities of international sanctions and 
domestic restrictions have played a role in not only isolating the country but also 
limiting the role of direct foreign influence in areas of civil society development 
through monetary incentives.  As a result, Iran provides a unique setting to study 
civil society building efforts that are based less on international aid and more on 
domestic initiatives.  Although the intellectuals, politicians and social activists in Iran 
were not immune to the global fascination with civil society and were subject to 
some external influences, this influence was not at the same level as that found in 
countries where civil society development was under the full or partial control of 
Western donor states.  Therefore, a study of civil society building in Iran can both 
enhance an understanding of social and political development of Iran and identify 
broader theoretical issues related to the advancement of civil society in authoritarian 
and illiberal contexts that are relatively distanced from Western hegemony.   
 
The overwhelming image of Iran that filters through international mass media is that 
of a repressive state, dominated by Islam and sponsoring terrorism.  Since the 1979 
revolution which was closely followed by the taking of American hostages on 4 
November 1979, diplomatic ties between Iran and the United States have been 
17 
 
severed with strained and inconsistent relations with other global powers.   
Consequently, the Iranian state has remained a common fixture on news outlets that 
often focus on the country’s de-stabilizing role in the region and its oppressive 
domestic policies.  The country that in 1977 was deemed by then American president 
Jimmy Carter as ‘an island of stability’ in an otherwise conflict-ridden region, 
became the face of state-sponsored terrorism, an image that was further solidified by 
President George W. Bush’s naming of Iran as a member of the ‘axis of evil’.     
 
The current impasse in Iran’s diplomatic relationship with the United States and 
Europe, or simply the West, has not been a result of historical animosity between 
heads of state on either side.  Though not completely representative of reality even 
then, President Carter’s declaration, mentioned above, during a state dinner with the 
Shah of Iran, is just one example of the special status Iran held in the eyes of the 
West.  Iran’s wealth of natural resources, including the world’s third largest oil 
reserves, has made the country’s domestic politics a topic of interest for energy 
dependent countries in the West. The Iranian state, on the other hand, relies on 
foreign markets to purchase its resources.  This structure of mutually beneficial 
exchange made Iranian and Western relations, up to 1979, rather amicable.  While 
western countries enjoyed generous concessions and access to Iran’s natural 
resources, the West offered the ruling elite of Iran financial as well as political 
support.  To this day, the 1953 CIA-backed coup against elected Prime Minister 
Mohammad Mossadeq in favour of the Shah is referred to by some members of the 
Iranian public and political figures as key evidence for distrusting good-will 
statements and gestures towards Iran by Western states, particularly the United 
States.  The relationship between Western powers and the Iranian state disintegrated 
swiftly after the 1979 replacement of the same Shah who had been brought back to 
power in 1953. The rising clerical regime based its popularity with the masses on an 
anti-Western stance.  For the Iranian public, the appeal of this position was not in 
large part an expression of opposition to Western lifestyle but rather to the corruption 
and elitism that former Iranian heads of state shared with Western leaders at the 
expense of Iranian citizens.   
 
Since 1979, the Iranian state has come to be largely ostracized by the international 
community, led by the United States and Western European powers.  Faced with 
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economic sanctions and political pressure, leading conservative figures in Iran 
continue to target the United States for what they consider the Western power’s 
injustice towards the downtrodden.  This anger is embodied in bold anti-American 
speech and support for states, groups and individuals fighting against American 
interests.  Currently, Iran is at the centre of a dispute over its nuclear power 
programme and debates on this topic often lead to discussions of further economic 
sanctions and military strikes that could lead to a regime change.  While the 
disadvantages to these options are plenty for both those inside Iran and the 
international community, they are never ‘off the table’ by those keen to see 
leadership change in Iran.   
 
However, before irreversible decisions are made with regard to Iran, it is vital to 
better understand Iran’s history and people, particularly the how and why certain 
events have unfolded in the country since the start of the twentieth century.  Of 
special importance are the numerous examples of mass mobilization, civil activism 
and calls for democratic change.  Historically, highlights include the Constitutional 
Revolution of the early twentieth century, the democratic election of Prime Minister 
Mossadeq in 1951 and the accompanying movement for nationalization of oil and the 
activities that led to the 1979 revolution.  When it comes to contemporary studies of 
Iran, citizen-led action that has taken place for social and political change since the 
1979 revolution offers not only a vastly different view of Iran than what is usually 
seen by those outside of Iran, it also offers rich lessons on issues related to civil 
society development and activism.       
 
Modern references to Iran in Western media are often focused on foreign policy 
issues5.  References to the internal situation reflect upon the repressive role of the 
state, including issues of human rights abuse.  It is generally left to the more 
specialized research centres and researchers6 to study and address internal activities 
                                                 
5
 The takeover of the American embassy in 1979 by supporters of the revolution and holding of 52 
American hostages for a total of 444 days continues to provide a reference point in accounting for the 
hostile relationship between Iran and the US.  The Iran-Iraq war and subsequent enmity between the 
countries, tensions with the Taliban in Afghanistan and the role of Western powers in the region have 
all played out on the international stage.   In addition, the influence and role of Iran in countries such 
as Lebanon and its antagonistic rhetoric against the state of Israel have dominated discussions of Iran 
in Western media.  
6
 For example, Prof Ali Ansari, based at the University of St. Andrews in the UK, is one of the leading 
scholars on Iranian history and contemporary developments and is Director of the Institute for Iranian 
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and achievements made in the areas of economic, social and political development.  
Therefore, dynamic movements taking place in this diverse society, which has sought 
various levels of change and development since the start of the twentieth century, are 
often missed by outsiders.  However, even studies emerging outside of Iran from the 
latter perspective suffer from a lack of sufficient fieldwork, due in part to difficulties 
with access, and understanding of the historic, cultural and religious nuances that 
characterize Iran’s distinct situation in the region.  As tensions in Iran mount, it 
becomes increasingly important for policymakers in countries with a vested interest 
in regional and international politics to have an accurate understanding of the reality 
of Iranian society, the problems it faces and the domestic actions directed towards 
reform.   
 
The 1997 election of Mohammad Khatami as the Islamic Republic of Iran’s fifth 
President is recognized as a dramatic step on the path to reform the Iranian regime 
that emerged after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  Khatami, a cleric who had received 
limited public attention for his roles in government and public service, campaigned 
under the banner of reform, with democracy, rule-of-law and development of civil 
society taking a front seat through his two successive and successful campaigns for 
presidency.  During his eight years in office, there was much speculation about the 
extent of change possible in a government where final authority rests in the hands of 
an unelected Supreme Leader, or Velayat-e Faqih.  Numerous academic and popular 
journal articles are available on the initial changes that took place and prospects for 
Iran’s future following Khatami’s initial election (i.e. Abdo, 2000; Roy, 1998).  
Reformist refers to individuals and a loose coalition of political groups considered as 
the opposition by conservative-run factions of the state.  Since the Revolution, 
conservatives have dominated government posts that include, the Office of the 
Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC)7.   Reformists were in control of key positions, including the office of the 
president and seats in newly formed local councils, for the eight years of Khatami’s 
                                                                                                                                          
Studies at the University of St. Andrews, which was launched in 2006.  In the US, Abbas Milani is 
research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution, Stanford 
University.  Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, is another high profile expert referred to in discussions on 
democracy and women in Iran.   
7
 Additional details about the relationship between conservative factions and the electorate and the 
internal divide amongst conservatives will be explored in Chapter Six.   
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presidency, 1997-2005, and parliament for four of those eight years.  The primary 
slogans of Khatami and his supporters focused on the promotion of civil society and 
rule-of-law.  However, it is only after Khatami’s presidency came to an end in 2005 
and the reform movement seemingly lost its momentum with losses in parliamentary 
and presidential elections that we can fully investigate the political and social 
ramifications of the eight years from 1997 to 2005.  This period represents the time 
in which Iran appeared to be on the road towards democratic reform after centuries 
of monarchy and over twenty-five years under a so-called Islamic regime. 
 
It was with Khatami’s election that the discourse in which intellectuals and political 
figures had been engaging, in narrow circles, came into the national spotlight.  
However, despite the optimism, energy and support that surrounded them, the 
reformists slowly lost momentum and power as a result of the country’s political 
structure that allowed the positions held by reformists to be over-ruled by the 
Supreme Leader who influences a host of other social, economic and political issues.  
The eight years of reform efforts culminated in the election of a conservative and 
populist candidate who promised economic incentives and a belief that the reform 
movement had failed.  However, as recent events show, the reform movement should 
not be discounted.  In fact, now that there is a sense a re-birth of the momentum that 
began with Khatami’s first election victory, it is important to look back at the vision 
and strategies that governed policy and thought during those critical eight years and 
ask whether reform is even possible given Iran’s political structure.   
 
As mentioned above, civil society formed one of the core issues of Khatami’s eight-
year presidency.  As one scholar has noted, after two decades in power, the ideology 
of “Islamism” which gained control of Iran’s social and political structure after the 
1979 revolution had run its course and reform appeared to be the only way forward 
to maintain the Islamic state  (Banuazizi, 1999).  This reform included references to 
the concepts of democracy, rule-of-law, dialogue between civilizations and civil 
society (Gheissari & Nasr, 2004).  But, the true nature of what has been referred to as 
a civil society project is a contested one, with analysts observing the level of Western 
interest in, and influence on, its development (Chaichian, 2003, p. 19).  While some 
may consider Iranian civil society discourse as a potential turning away from the 
current political structure towards Western ideals (Boroumand & Boroumand, 2000), 
21 
 
others can look at the possibilities of indigenization of civil society in practice 
(Kamrava, 2001).  Either way, it is vital that the speculations on Iran’s future 
development, both socially and politically, consider the actual events as well as the 
visions held by people whose lives are most affected by any change, Iranians 
themselves.   
 
Iran provides an exemplary case study of a social and political movement that injects 
the concept of civil society in a country dominated by the state in all aspects of life, 
from the economy to the personal.  However, this domestic movement, at times 
pushed by external forces, did not have a detailed plan or even a fully open space to 
debate the values and attributes that make up a civil society.  There was a dramatic 
increase in civil society organisations, particularly nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs), at the same time that the reform movement gained momentum.  For 
example, a UNDP-Iran document reports that in 1997, 15 environmental NGOs 
existed, but after Khatami’s election and at the time of the paper’s publication in 
2000, 150 registered and unregistered NGOs from the field of environment were in 
existence (Namazi, 2000, p. 47).   Between 1995 and 2003, there was a 512 per cent 
increase in the number of women’s NGOs, from 55 to 337 (Baba Moradi, 2005, p. 
36).   However, many of these organisations lacked essential resources and led a 
vulnerable existence, with many either disbanding after a short period or only ever 
existing on paper.  Moreover, organisations are only one aspect of civil society.  In 
fact, Chandhoke refers to civil societies in the plural, asserting that it is a sphere 
encompassed by different languages and agents engaged in different projects (2007).  
Civil society is a complex and dynamic sphere and concept, a notion that becomes 
apparent in the way it is conceived and applied by different actors.  This thesis looks 
at how civil society was employed by actors in positions of power.      
 
 
1.4  Research Design: The research questions 
 
The following section details the research problem and questions.  The research 
problem stems from the premise that strengthening civil society was considered vital 
to Iran’s social, economic and political development by reformists and civil society 
actors immediately leading up to and during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami.  
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However, this premise, and the potential power of civil society in creating 
democratic change, can be contested.  Despite a partial opening-up of the social, 
economic and political spheres by Khatami’s government, no significant structural 
changes pertaining to civil society were instated and conservative forces reclaimed 
the legislative and executive branches of government in 2004 and 2005, respectively.  
As a result, political reform through civil society empowerment does not appear to 
have succeeded according to reformists and observers of Iranian politics.  The 
problem is, both the meaning of success and analysis of outcomes pertaining to civil 
society promotion were vague and varied according to the perspectives of each 
observer or player.  As a result, there are few objective accounts of how the concept 
of civil society impacted Iran at the height of the reform movement.  Moreover, 
insufficient studies are available on the relationship between civil society and the 
public intellectuals who established the concept as part of the reformist vocabulary.     
   
The main questions guiding this doctoral research are as follows: 
• Does civil society promotion, i.e. discourse and action endorsing the concept 
of civil society as a public good, by elite voices contribute to social and 
political change in non-liberal states?   
• In the context of Iran, why, how and to what effect was the language and 
concept of civil society used to enhance positions of power during the period 
of reform, circa 1997-2005, by political and social actors? 
 
Subsidiary Research Questions: 
• What is the role of public intellectuals and political figures in strengthening 
civil society?   
• Specifically, how did the public intellectuals affiliated with Iran’s reform 
movement [attempt to] impact the evolution of contemporary Iranian civil 
society and, potentially, encourage a turn away from a theocracy to a liberal 
democracy?  Did the activities of these individuals establish a formal (i.e. 
institutional) or informal public sphere that allowed citizens to articulate their 
demands to the state?  
 
23 
 
1.5  Research Methods  
 
This section focuses on the methodology used for the collection and analysis of data.  
Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted predominantly in Tehran in 
late summer and early fall of 2008, the key source of data, representing direct 
accounts of public intellectuals and individuals involved in arenas where the 
language of civil society was applied, such as government sectors, print media and 
the social sphere.  Other sources include literature on the state of Iranian civil 
society, written inside and outside of Iran, and legal texts that pertain to action in or 
by components of civil society spaces.  Informal discussions were also conducted 
with knowledgeable informants before, during and after my travels.  In addition, I 
attended forums, such as the election meeting for a major journalist association in 
August 2008, where I could obtain background information and speak with activists 
in the reform movement and civil society.  The section on data collection is followed 
by explanations about how the data was analysed.  In addition, more detailed 
accounts of the data collection process such as limitations and complexities are 
included, given the sensitivities around studies of Iran, particularly those involving 
fieldwork. 
 
Qualitative interviews 
 
With regard to data, the main goal was to gather and employ unique primary sources 
from Iran, namely face-to-face, in-depth interviews.  The objective behind the use of 
interviews is to gain better insight into the vision and underlying intentions of the 
respondents.  It is the preconception and perceptions of public intellectuals, reform 
leaders and members of civil society that the interviews explore.  A majority of the 
aforementioned individuals encompass a select group of influential actors, i.e. the 
elite, as opposed to a broader sample of the general Iranian population.  The purpose 
of interviewing elites, as opposed to relying on literature analysis, is to gain insight 
into those individual’s theoretical positions, perceptions and beliefs; in other words, 
the elite interviews aim to grant “…insight into the mind-set of the actor/s who have 
played a role in shaping the society in which we live and an interviewee’s subject 
analysis of a particular episode or situation” (Richards, 1996, p. 200).  Interviewing 
was deemed preferable over other methods, such as surveys, because they allow a 
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more nuanced and detailed set of data to be captured (details of how this data was 
analysed will be discussed later in this chapter).        
 
As can be expected, there is no comprehensive inventory of Iranian intellectuals, 
who are a central component of this thesis.  However, there are a number of partial 
references available, particularly with regard to religious intellectuals working during 
the 1997-2005 period who were involved in some aspect of the reform movement.  
Therefore, a sample frame was created based on available data.  In order to create a 
feasible list of public intellectuals who would meet the criteria for this research, an 
initial list of Iranian intellectuals was compiled using various academic papers and 
news articles on the topic of Iranian intellectuals and reform during the Khatami era.  
This list was narrowed down to include those who fit the category of ‘public 
intellectual’.  The determination of whether an individual is a public intellectual was 
made by considering their popularity, citations in general articles (not aimed at 
specialists) appearing in print or on the web, acknowledgment in various publications 
as having sway over the general public, or citations for giving significant public 
lecture(s) that attracted wide attention (i.e. high attendance).  A relevant point to 
mention is that most individuals who appear on this list fit the category of ‘religious’ 
intellectual.  However, this is not an indication of the religious-secular breakdown of 
Iranian intellectuals.  Rather, intellectuals who have chosen to follow the route of 
reform within the Islamic regime rather than its absolute overhaul are more likely to 
have had an opportunity to give voice to their views, even if it is stifled at times, than 
those who completely oppose the basis of the government.  Most individuals who fall 
in the latter category are either censored within Iran or live in exile.  The theoretical 
underpinning of the definition of public intellectual used is discussed in Chapter 
Two.     
 
In total, over forty in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted in person, 
over a three month period.  Most interviews lasted one hour, with a few taking less 
time and a significant portion lasting over ninety minutes.  Fieldwork took place 
from August through October 2008 in Tehran, Iran.  A list of potential interview 
subjects was prepared, as described above, before embarking on the fieldwork.  
However, upon arrival in Tehran, the list was re-evaluated and discussed with key 
contacts on the ground.  The original contacts on the ground were based on 
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individuals met through former volunteer work with Iranian organizations and 
references made by individuals contacted during the first phases of research.  Based 
on information and suggestions from these contacts, a first set of individuals were 
contacted for interviews.  The remaining interview subjects were chosen and reached 
through a growing network of contacts, i.e. snowball or chain referral sampling.   
  
After an informal introduction by other contacts or direct communication with a 
potential interview subject, individuals were largely open to being interviewed and a 
meeting was subsequently arranged.  When meeting with academics, members of 
research institutes or political parties, members of government institutes and leaders 
of civil society organizations, interviews were generally arranged at their personal 
office or that of their organization.  Students were met either at university campuses, 
even if they were no longer studying there, or, in several instances, in coffee shops.  
Journalists were met at the offices of the newspaper.  When necessary, other 
arrangements were made, such as meetings in private offices.  Further details on the 
issue of interview location will be provided in in the section on case complexities.  In 
general, it was up to the interviewee to decide where meetings took place.   
 
Upon contacting a potential interview subject, I introduced myself as a doctoral 
candidate, based at the London School of Economics, conducting research on civil 
society development during the Khatami administration and the role of public 
intellectuals.  My background was also typically raised at the start of an interview 
where I would mention that I was born in Iran but raised in the United States.  Also 
addressed was my previous education at the University of California, Berkeley in the 
field of political economy.  A discussion of my background was part of a process to 
build rapport with the interviewee and allow them to ask questions that may make 
them more comfortable once the interview began.  By emphasising my academic 
credentials and interest in Iran, I attempted to encourage the interview subject to feel 
comfortable and not obliged to provide sound bites, which is more commonly the 
case in interviews with journalists.  The emphasis on my role as a social scientist, not 
a political activist, was an attempt to discourage engaging in ideological debates.  
Moreover, the importance of providing my background was part of a broader effort 
to acknowledge and mitigate factors that may degrade research quality.  Though my 
experiences as a dual national of two countries with a hostile relationship may bear 
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on how I approach the issue of Iranian politics, measures were taken to minimise the 
effect.  During interviews, the two main ways in which potentially negative 
consequences arising from my background were mitigated include the design of the 
questions used in the semi-structured interview process and a conscious effort to 
maintain focus on the personal experiences of the interview subject.  The above 
notions are important due to the concept of reflexivity in qualitative research.  
Reflexivity refers to how our understanding of a social reality both describes and 
creates that reality at the same time; in other words, our understanding of a social 
reality is intimately connected with the objects, persons or circumstances we refer to 
and the language we use (Miller & Fox, 2004, p. 36).  While my connection with 
Iran, as both an outsider and insider, had the potential to create bias in the data 
collected, the notion of reflexivity was taken into account and encouraged the 
importance of acknowledging my background in all stages of the research process.                              
 
As a semi-structured interview method was employed, the design of opening 
questions and interview techniques were given careful consideration.  The rationale 
behind the use of semi-structured interview is that it has the right balance to capture 
the needed information while allowing an opportunity to amass information on 
processes and garner depth.  Opening questions were used to direct the interviewee 
towards topics that should be covered, such as personal objectives in the reform 
movement and visions of civil society, while providing enough space for the 
interviewee to intervene and expand upon the issues he or she finds significant.  
Interviews were undertaken with the assumption that interaction itself constructs data 
and knowledge (Mason, 2002, pp. 62-63), adding to the insight gained from written 
script.  The opening questions ensure that all key points of the research are addressed 
in some manner by the interviewee.  Semi-structured interviews are intended “…to 
reveal existing knowledge in a way that can be expressed in the form of answers and 
so become accessible to interpretation” (Flick, 2002, p. 84).  This goal would not be 
as effectively reached if the interview method used was the unstructured or 
exploratory one.  On the other hand, a strictly structured interview, whereby very 
specific questions are provided alongside a set of response categories, would be 
useful if the aim was to test a specific hypothesis or acquire a basic set of 
information from a large set of respondents (Chadwick, Bahr, & Albrecht, 1984, pp. 
104-105).  Such a structured interview format would limit the potential to extract 
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revealing and valuable data based on the interviewees’ individual perspectives or 
experiences.  As the interviews for this research were primarily conducted in person 
on a one-to-one basis, the semi-structured interview format provided an exceptional 
opportunity to delve into a subject with a rich sample of high profile participants in 
the Iranian political and social sphere.   As described below, over forty interviews 
were carried out, almost all exclusively in the Persian language.  
 
Research assistant and documentation of interviews 
 
A majority of interviews were conducted along with a research assistant whose role 
was to provide support during interviews as necessary.  Several factors prompted the 
decision to take a research assistant along to these interviews. As a female researcher 
born after the 1979 revolution and travelling from abroad, I felt that attending 
meetings, particularly with former government officials, accompanied by another 
individual with better familiarity of local social norms and political sensitivities 
could help eliminate potential obstacles.  In addition, the assistant would provide 
language support as needed.  
 
My research assistant, a trusted acquaintance, is a female, within the age bracket of 
30-35, who works in the private sector with undergraduate education in graphic 
design.  During the timeframe that the research examines, she was not a member of 
any particular social or political group which would cause tension in interviews.  
However, having lived most of her life in Tehran, she is an active member of society, 
with interest in the arts.  She closely followed the country’s social and political 
changes and read three to four reformist newspapers a day during the Khatami 
administration when press formed a key aspect of the reformist movement.  While 
she is clearly knowledgeable about the issues at hand, it was helpful that she was not 
herself a member of any particular social or political organization that may have 
contributed any particular bias to the interview.  Her presence was conducive to 
preventing a standstill in interviews when language issues arose.  In addition, there 
were times when an interviewee felt more comfortable addressing someone with 
more experience of life in Iran, as opposed to an individual coming from abroad.  In 
these cases, her understanding of the situation on the ground helped put the 
interviewee at ease in addressing sensitive issues raised by the interview questions.  
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She was briefed on the thesis topic and questions, as well as the background of the 
interviewees, beforehand.   
 
During the interview, I asked pre-defined questions and any follow-up questions 
based on the answers received.  However, under special circumstances, the research 
assistant would contribute to the interview by elaborating upon or re-phrasing the 
questions and areas of discussion in order to overcome any standstills in the 
interview process.  Another reason for choosing to attend interviews with a research 
assistant was for the purpose of taking additional notes.  Throughout the interviews, 
we would both take hand-written notes which were consolidated into one transcript 
subsequent to the interview.  Using this method, it was possible to document 
information in greater detail without the aid of a tape recorder.  A tape recorder was 
used in some sessions but not in the bulk of the interviews.  While interviewees did 
not object to its use in general, it was felt that the tape recorder was not conducive to 
creating a comfortable atmosphere for discussion given the sensitivity of the topics 
covered.  The presence of a recorder has the potential to create a situation in which 
interviewees guard or hedge responses (Peabody et al., 1990, p. 454).  Without the 
device, more topics could be covered in a candid manner while the presence of an 
assistant assured a detailed transcript.     
 
Categories of informants 
 
A discrete classification of interview subjects is not necessarily informative as 
individuals take on numerous, and at times overlapping, roles that can be categorised 
in different ways.  However, for the purposes of this research, the following general 
categories have been formulated, with individuals being placed in the category that 
best reflects their role with reference to Iran’s social and political arrangements while 
taking into account self-identification.  The main categories are: reformist public 
intellectuals and actors, civil society actors and conservatives.  To easily identify 
each informant, while maintaining anonymity, each informant is labelled by a letter 
or letters and a number (the issue of anonymity will be discussed in a later section).  
The lettered prefix refers to the category to which they belong and the number 
demarcates each individual.  Reformist public intellectuals are demarcated by the 
abbreviation ‘INT’, followed by a number.  Reformist actors who do not fit the 
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category of public intellectual are demarcated by the letter “R” and a number.  
Students are identified by the letter “S”, women’s rights actors by the letter “W”, 
journalists by the letter “J” and other civil society actors by the label “CS”, all 
followed by a number.  Finally, conservative actors are identified by the letter “C” 
and a number.  A full list of informants in each category with descriptions and codes 
is provided in Appendix I.   
 
1. Reformist public intellectuals and political actors 
 
The bulk of Chapter Four is dedicated to interviews with reformist public 
intellectuals and political figures.  ‘Reformist’ refers to individuals affiliated with 
what is by and large considered the ‘reform movement’, in reference to the coalition 
of groups and individuals who called for change in the existing government order 
and ultimately supported Mohammad Khatami’s bid for presidency in 1997.  The 
reform movement is also called the ‘2nd of Khordad movement’, which signifies the 
date of Khatami’s first election in 1997 in the Iranian calendar (2 Khordad 1376, 
corresponding to 23 May 1997).  The ideas behind reform predated Khatami’s 
election and their development is central to interviews with intellectuals, as will be 
evaluated in Chapter Four.  The label of ‘public’ intellectual has connotations beyond 
a profession or form of activity; the specific definition of intellectual used is 
discussed in Chapter Two.  For this section, the point of relevance is that reformist 
public intellectuals were identified due to their affiliation with the reform movement 
as individuals who either served as advisors to political leaders or who themselves 
filled a role in the reformist government at one point.  In addition to public 
intellectuals, a number of reformist political actors who worked in government posts 
that directly engaged with civil society organisations and actors were interviewed.  
The main point of differentiation between the public intellectual and reformist 
political actors referred to here is that the reformist political actor may not 
necessarily have the same role in creating or disseminating ideas in relation to civil 
society as the public intellectual.  The simple ‘reformist’ label in this research 
indicates the individual’s political affiliation to the reformist movement as a 
politician, political advisor, government worker or supporter (either through the 
electoral process or self-identification as a reformist).    
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2. Civil Society Actors 
 
Women’s rights activists, student group leaders, and others  
 
In addition to the public intellectuals interviewed, civil society actors typically 
affiliated with the reformist political movement are also included in the study to 
better understand how they were affected by and responded to the civil society vision 
and language expressed by public intellectuals and reformist political figures.  The 
civil society activists interviewed fall into a variety of categories.  In order to best 
control the study, a focus was placed on civil society activists working on issues 
pertaining to women and students, as two of the leading issues upheld by civil 
society actors at the time.  However, individuals working on other areas of civil 
society were also interviewed for further anecdotal evidence; this included NGO 
activists in fields such as poverty reduction, the environment and education.     
 
Journalists 
 
Seven interviews were conducted with journalists and other figures associated with 
print media, specifically reformist newspapers.  A number of other respondents not 
included in this category also identified themselves as journalists; however, as their 
fulltime occupation was not in this field, they were included in the category with 
which they had the strongest link.  The names of newspapers are withheld for 
security reasons.  Newspapers were a critical medium for conveying the thoughts of 
the reform movement and were at the centre of the struggle between reformists and 
conservative elements of the government.  In tune with other laws dealing with the 
public sphere, the Iranian press law is complex and includes both formal and 
informal boundaries.  Formally, newspapers and other published works must obtain a 
permit from the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance.  Moreover, to receive and 
maintain permission, the work must not contravene Islamic thought and values as 
judged by the state.  Newspapers came to represent a battle for freedom of expression 
that was previously resisted by the state.  The respondents were mainly journalists 
active before, during and after the 1997-2005 time period.  In addition, interviews 
included one newspaper editor, as well as a leading board member of the main 
newspaper writers’ association.   
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Reformist dailies have included Salaam, Jame-eh and Neshat.  However, individual 
paper titles are of less relevance than their founders or publishers due to the adaptive 
practices of journalists responding to persistent state interventions. As various 
conservative entities ordered one newspaper to be shut down, individuals who ran the 
paper would immediately apply for another permit under a different title in order to 
continue their work until they would be imprisoned or receive a court ruling barring 
them from working in the press.  These newspapers are different from those aligned 
with conservative factions, generally under the control of the office of the Supreme 
Leader, which rarely take on issues or writings in opposition to the state.     
 
3. Conservatives 
 
Due to the nature of the subject, it was not possible to conduct a significant number 
of interviews with conservative leaders.  First, it must be pointed out that the 
conservative stream is not a unified body in and of itself.  There are hard-line figures, 
such as Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, once considered Ahmadinejad’s 
mentor.  Other figures such as Ali Larijani, who has served as chairman of 
parliament representing the conservative faction, have deviated from traditional 
conservative thought by leaning towards pragmatism in areas such as international 
relations.  Figures associated with conservatives have at various points expressed 
ideologies and beliefs similar to those within the reformist camp.  The dividing 
boundaries between conservatives and reformists, however, have to do with the way 
conservatives seek to employ power and the extent to which they want to allow 
pluralism and opposition to be expressed by the public.  One of the most obvious 
examples is the conservative faction’s history of using, or at least approving the use 
of, physical violence against dissenters.  
 
Since the conservatives were in power during the time of fieldwork, individuals 
falling within this category and considered for interviews were often serving public 
posts.  As a result, interviews with them would have required clearances with the risk 
of attracting further attention as a foreign researcher.  After taking the current 
political and social climate into consideration and having discussed the matter with 
individuals knowledgeable of the situation, it was agreed that this exposure was not 
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advised.  Applying for additional clearance would lead to questions and scrutiny by 
security forces that could halt the research project all together.  Where possible, 
however, individuals with links to conservative movements were interviewed.  This 
included a leading conservative intellectual, who had previously served as editor of a 
key conservative newspaper.  Other academics with links to conservative factions, 
including the head of a public, government affiliated research institute, were 
interviewed.   
 
At one point, an interview was prepared for and arranged with the then Minister of 
Labour and Social Affairs.  However, this was during a time of heightened security 
and, following the arrest of another foreign researcher, it was decided this interview 
would be postponed and, ultimately, did not take place. 
 
Secondary sources 
 
Document analysis was conducted on primary and secondary literature.  Primary 
references included legal texts, such as the constitution and the Civil Code.  A 
number of studies and surveys were carried out by Khatami’s government; one in 
particular, on social behaviour, was reviewed as a source of reference on citizen 
engagement with the public sphere.  Newspaper articles dating back to the reformist 
period were read and analysed to gain insight into the ideas being written about in the 
public forum during Khatami’s presidency.  Literature by reformist intellectuals and 
conservatives was read to enhance the data collected and analysis of interviews.  In 
addition, brochures and printed newsletters of civil society organisations, such as 
NGOs, were examined for information on the types of activities in which they were 
engaged during the period being studied.  Document analysis was used to verify or 
compare evidence obtained during interviews.  Comparing findings from more than 
one research method, triangulation, is used in qualitative research to verify results.  
While triangulation may be considered controversial as a test of validity, it can 
support inclusiveness and reflexivity (Mays & Pope, 2000, p. 51).      
 
In Chapter Five, the Iranian constitution will be briefly addressed in order to provide 
the context in which the Khatami administration was operating.  Sections pertaining 
to civil society and the rights of citizens are discussed to show the discrepancies and 
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complexities in the original vision of the Islamic Republic as it was codified in the 
constitution.  To simply consider the state a fundamentalist autocracy is 
unconstructive.  Rather, the constitution serves as an example of the importance of 
looking at the intricacies and nuances of the Islamic Republic.  This thesis does not 
further delve into laws, regulations and policies as that would fall outside the scope 
of the research.  Instead, the focus is on individual actors in positions of power and 
how they interpreted and applied the concept of civil society.  
 
Method of analysis 
 
Qualitative analysis was carried out on the collected data, namely interview notes 
and transcriptions, in an iterative manner through coding.  Coding refers to the 
procedure of conceptualising and reducing data, elaborating categories and relating 
claims (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12).  In other words, coding infers a 
categorisation of data.  The codes are the identifying label of each category.  As 
described by Kathy Charmaz, “Qualitative codes take segments of data apart, name 
them in concise terms, and propose an analytic handle to develop abstract ideas for 
interpreting each segment of data” (2006, p. 45).  However, it is important to note 
that coding is not a precursor to analysis but rather an integral component of it 
(Weston et al., 2001, p. 382).  As the data is examined and codes are proposed, new 
and potentially alternative perspectives are revealed.  Essentially, coding is a process 
used to identify key themes within a case, for example, an interview, and determine 
patterns across data sources, for example within and across informant categories.    
 
Although a first round of coding was done manually on print-outs of interview notes 
and transcriptions, the coding process was ultimately carried out electronically 
through the use of NVivo 8 software.  The reason for the switch was because the 
software tool allowed several rounds of coding to take place in a more organised and 
precise manner.  Before coding commenced, interview notes were separated based on 
the above informant categories.  Next, each interview was read with the aim of 
gaining general understanding of the main concepts revealed from that source.  In 
this round, significant events, organisations and individuals were noted and were 
later researched further and included in the writing-up phase.  A second round of a 
priori coding was carried out to identify sentences or sections based on concepts and 
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questions that make up this thesis’s theoretical frameworks, each section received a 
‘code’ or label called ‘nodes’ in NVivo.  A priori code categories were supplemented 
by grounded codes that surfaced in examination of the interview notes independent 
of assumptions made in hypothesis.  Analysis was supplemented by axial coding, 
where principal categories are related to subcategories in order to enhance the 
explanatory power of a concept (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, pp. 124-125).  The NVivo 
software helped this task as nodes, the term used for codes, were categorised and 
ordered as ‘Tree Nodes’.  The different rounds of coding provide answers to 
theoretical and case-based questions and clarify relationships between concepts and 
informant categories.  Analysis, writing up of results and revisions were carried out 
concurrently, in an iterative and reflective manner.        
 
Guiding the analysis was the notion of framing, taken from social movement 
theories, which will be further discussed in Chapter Two.  In the initial stages of 
research, the civil society frame itself was central.  In other words, the focus was on 
how civil society as a concept shaped individuals, movements and socio-political 
development.  However, over a period of time that included in-depth literature 
review and fieldwork, the focus of analysis shifted from the frame to the process of 
framing.  This shift was largely guided by the work of Robert Benford and David 
Snow.  Framing represents (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614): 
…an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at 
the level of reality construction…It entails agency in the sense that what is 
evolving is the work of social movement organizations or movement 
activists.  And it is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of 
interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also 
challenge them.  
 
From this perspective, a more revealing account of Iranian society was garnered, 
stemming from the reality that in the same way that individuals grow and change, so 
do their ideas and beliefs.  Analysis focused on individuals viewpoints of civil 
society, how their understanding and beliefs took shape and the resulting implication 
for practice.   
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Limitations to data collection 
 
Clearly, numerous other individuals, reformist and conservative, not interviewed 
could have potentially contributed to the research.  However, they were not included 
for a variety of reasons.  One significant obstacle was access.  While the best efforts 
were made to contact key individuals, there were instances when an interview 
meeting was not feasible due to circumstances that included the individual’s schedule 
or, in some cases, unwillingness to speak with a researcher from a foreign institution 
regarding a sensitive political matter.  In addition, there were instances when the 
individual sought was, at the time, imprisoned as a result of their activism.  Some of 
these issues will be further discussed in a dedicated section on fieldwork 
complications.  
 
Fieldwork interviews were limited to individuals based in Tehran, although these 
individuals may have held posts or worked in other cities and regions.  This limited 
geographic reach is not expected to weaken the general outcome of the research.  
First, Tehran has leading Iranian universities and other types of research institutions 
that house many of the intellectuals whom I sought to interview.  As the capital city, 
key social and political actors often reside there, making it an ideal setting for 
contacting them.  Many of the individuals who have come to reside in Tehran have 
previously lived, worked or served political posts in other regions of the country in 
the past.  This experience contributes to their understanding of the country as a whole 
and, where possible, this issue was touched upon in interviews.  Second, as the 
capital city of the country, Tehran sets an example for various social and political 
activities that take place throughout the country.  Key political parties and 
nongovernmental organizations are also based there.  Finally, in terms of 
practicalities, my knowledge and previous contacts in Tehran made it a much more 
feasible space for research.  As a large and diverse city, there are fewer challenges 
for an independent, female researcher than those potentially present in other smaller 
cities where my movements may have come under greater scrutiny.   
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1.6  Case Study Complexities and Impediments 
 
Almost all research initiatives, including the social sciences, present their own 
obstacles and ethical considerations, regardless of the issue or context being 
examined.  However, there are certain topics and environments that present the 
researcher with additional challenges that, if not dealt with accordingly, can control 
the direction or results of the research.  These include, but are not limited to, the 
availability of interview subjects and the subsequent validity of responses, the extent 
to which probing, sensitive questions can be asked from interview subjects, the 
accessibility of documents and legislation and, finally, the ability to maintain a 
balanced outlook in a volatile setting. 
 
Interview response 
 
Research methods that depend upon interview responses must consider the extent to 
which the responses given reflect the actual views of the respondent or are affected 
by outside factors.  If a respondent mistrusts or feels uncomfortable with the 
interviewer, they may alter their responses to reflect this dynamic.  This issue arises 
often in cases dealing with matters of political or social sensitivity, and is particularly 
significant in environments where controversial responses may lead to social, 
political or even legal repercussions.  For the researcher, it is not possible to decide 
what a respondent ‘meant’ to say or interpret a response in a way that does not reflect 
what was actually stated.  However, it is possible, and often necessary, to make note 
of issues that may have moderated interview responses.  In addition, other details 
may be used to corroborate a response.  However, it is not usually possible to negate 
a response unless mitigating circumstances are present. 
 
In the interviews conducted for this research, one way of obtaining accurate 
responses was by seeking responses to the same topic from different angles and 
through follow-up questions when time and other circumstances permitted.  Where 
possible, themes emerging from interviews were crosschecked with available 
literature by interviewees to determine issues such as: does the intellectuals’ public 
voice match personal accounts?  Have the intellectuals’ views, presented in past 
literature, sustained the test of time according to interviews?  Examining similar 
themes across categories of interviewees and documents serves to cross-check data 
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and add to the study of individuals’ commitment to ideas of civil society and the 
impact of time and environment, i.e. triangulation.   
 
Interview location 
 
The physical location of interviews presented a challenge on several occasions.  
Obstacles were present in cases where the interviewee did not have access to an 
office or space for a meeting as well as in cases where the individual’s office was 
located in a public building, such as a university, where visitors, particularly those 
with foreign identification, were required to obtain special permission or submit their 
details to a central security office.  If the interviewee had his or her own private 
office in a non-public building, or access to one, a meeting was generally arranged at 
that location.  This was the case for several individuals who also worked within the 
private sector.  Individuals who worked in public sector research institutes, not based 
in larger universities, also arranged meetings at their offices.  In these instances, the 
offices were generally located in buildings where the entrance was not under strict 
security control and entering the building without official letters or identification did 
not present a major obstacle.   
 
As discussed, a number of reformist leaders and intellectuals were, at the time of 
interviews, academics at leading universities in Tehran.  To enter the university 
campus, an identification card was required, which was held by security personnel 
for the duration of the stay on the campus.  In the instance that the individual 
provided a foreign identification card, such as a university ID belonging to a foreign 
university, the front security staff was required to provide this information to a 
central security office affiliated with the government.  In some cases, university 
security asked that formal security clearance be obtained before allowing visitors to 
enter the university campus.  The same circumstances applied when entering 
buildings for state run newspapers.  The use of foreign identification was avoided in 
most cases in order to limit future obstacles.   
 
In one instance when meeting a respondent in the main building of the Ministry of 
Interior, an official security clearance was required.  After discussions with an expert 
researcher, it was advised to cancel the meeting as it could potentially lead to further 
scrutiny and hamper future research efforts, given recent arrests that had taken place.  
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One meeting with a senior figure serving in the Ministry of Interior office for civil 
society affairs took place in a section of the Ministry of Interior that did not require 
security clearance.  The respondent played a key role during the reform period in 
developing civil society programmes and establishing local city councils.  However, 
after the interview, the subject advised that further meetings with individuals 
currently affiliated with the government not be arranged, with the advice being to 
look back on documents rather than focusing on speaking with individuals.  The 
underlying tone suggested that security forces were monitoring these meetings. 
 
Several meetings, particularly with student leaders and civil society activists, such as 
members of NGOs where an office was not available, were arranged at local coffee 
shops.  However, it was soon discovered that such public meetings presented their 
own security risks for all parties involved and were therefore not frequently used.  
Specifically, after one meeting at a popular coffee shop, the owner approached my 
research assistant and myself, advising us that all owners and managers of similar 
facilities have been contacted by security officials and asked to report any meetings 
of this nature, i.e. where an interview is taking place.  Failure to report such meetings 
could lead to problems for store owners and revoking of their license of operation.  
Furthermore, it was pointed out that such meetings could be easily monitored.    
 
Of course, the above issues raise ethical questions as to why I declined to obtain 
official security clearance in cases where such clearance would allow the interview 
to proceed or take place at the interviewee’s place of work.  However, these issues 
were discussed with the research assistant in a transparent manner and guidance was 
sought from other researchers.  The overwhelming advice was that in order to best 
carry out interviews without creating unnecessary and avoidable exposure, it was 
best to limit state attention to the research project. Considering the academic nature 
of the research and attempts to seek unbiased opinions on non-security related 
subject matter, occasions to create public scrutiny that would hinder the research 
goals were avoided. 
 
Post-election crisis 
 
The events following the disputed June 2009 elections presented their own 
challenges to the research.  Follow-up fieldwork was cancelled as a result of the 
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domestic situation and additional scrutiny placed on foreign researchers.  More 
importantly, a large number of individuals interviewed during fieldwork were taken 
into custody and imprisoned for various lengths of time.  First, the risk that these 
individuals chose to take by expressing their ideas must be noted.  Although a 
number of individuals stated they did not mind their interview statements being 
attributed to them during the time of the interview, considering the current situation, 
it has been decided that all interviewees will remain anonymous.  It is no longer 
possible to verify and follow up on the interviews.  Even in situations where the 
interviewee is free and not in prison, they will not be contacted due to the potential 
security risk involved for them.   
 
Following the election protests and trials, a number of foreign academics, including 
those working on the issue of civil society, have been cited by government officials 
as agents of foreign governments attempting regime change.  For example, Jurgen 
Habermas, John Keane and other scholars were accused by the Iranian government 
of causing unrest in the country (Kurzman, 2009).  Therefore, the topic of this thesis 
became an unintended subject of political tension.  As a researcher, it has been a 
great challenge to maintain the integrity of academic research and neutrality without 
having the issues presented be misconstrued by political factions.  Therefore, it has 
been necessary to leave certain issues unwritten and to shift the focus of the writing 
at times.  However, this should be viewed not as a lack of academic rigour but rather 
considered in light of the current situation and indicative of a strong commitment to 
ethical research.  
 
Translation and transliteration 
 
Translation of quotes and paraphrasing of Persian language sources has been carried 
out by me, and decisions have been made to provide the most accurate representation 
of the original document.  In contrast to the more formal format used by the 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, the format used for original terms and 
names as well as transliteration is similar to that outlined by (Mir-Hosseini & 
Tapper, 2006, p. vii) and used by many other authors in the field of Iranian studies.  
Therefore, standard English spelling is used for terms and names, such as Shia and 
Khatami; Persian terms and names have been transliterated “for ease of reading”.  
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1.7  Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis consists of seven chapters which are divided as follows.  Chapter One: 
Introduction introduces the research problem and presents the methodology used.  It 
also addresses conceptual and practical challenges to this thesis.  Chapter Two: 
Theories of Civil Society focuses on the theories relevant to the research, including 
the transformation of civil society as a concept and the role of public intellectuals.  
Chapter Three: Exploring the Iran Case Through Literature provides an historical 
overview of the Iranian context along with analysis of the shortcomings of literature 
on the reform movement and civil society in Iran.  Chapter Four: Public 
Intellectuals of the Reform Movement is one of three substantive chapters and based 
on interviews with reformist public intellectuals affiliated with the reform movement.  
One of the findings that emerge in this chapter is that theories that impact political 
and social development are created by intellectuals who are themselves shaped by, 
and a product of, personal experiences and society.  The second substantive chapter, 
Chapter Five: The ‘Practitioners’ of Modern Iranian Civil Society, explores civil 
society from the viewpoint of practitioners and players, such as women’s rights and 
student activists.  The findings reveal the ways in which these actors coped with and 
developed as a result of their experiences during Khatami’s eight-year presidency.  
Chapter Six: Adopting and Adapting a Liberal Concept – Conservatives and Civil 
Society presents the way in which the use of civil society language and structures can 
be misappropriated by opposition forces.  In the case of Iran, the conservative faction 
Iran has its own model of ‘civil society’ structures while simultaneously challenging 
the idea of civil society presented by reformists as a Western ideal that is detrimental 
to the Islamic Republic.  The key argument in this chapter is that civil society 
language, even when introduced by domestic actors, as opposed to foreign donors, is 
not necessarily benign or conducive to the provision of democratic values.  The 
concluding chapter provides final remarks on policy implications and future work.  
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Chapter 2: Theories of Civil Society 
 
The overarching concept underpinning this thesis is that of civil society and the 
agents who construct it.  The key issue initially driving the research was the structure 
of contemporary Iranian civil society and the role it played, as both a concept and in 
practice, in the reform movement of 1997-2005.   While the theoretical literature on 
civil society was the first point of reference, additional concepts and theoretical tools 
came to light allowing for new and complementary perspectives to be taken into 
consideration.  Rather than a static entity composed of organisations, civil society is 
better understood as a political and dynamic construct which generates and is 
generated by discourse among a heterogeneous group of individuals.  Social 
movement theories helped explain Iranian civil society and the reform movement at 
the macro-level, as social movements are considered in this thesis to be components 
of civil society.  Finally, the role of intellectual leadership, namely as transmitted by 
public intellectuals, makes a significant contribution to the theoretical and empirical 
development of this thesis.  The following chapter critically addresses civil society, 
from its liberal roots to its contemporary applications, theories pertaining to the role 
of public intellectuals and individual agency and relevant elements of social 
movement theories.  In particular, attention is directed at the concept of framing, 
which forms part of the structure of analysis. Specifically, this thesis explores the 
process of framing civil society as it was generated by social and political reformists 
and their opponents, who were embedded in the state structure during the presidency 
of Mohammad Khatami, in the Islamic Republic of Iran.       
 
In the early 21st century, policy makers and institutions dealing with the political and 
economic spheres continue to acknowledge the role of civil society.  However, the 
nature of civil society does not naturally provide it with an equal place alongside the 
market and state as a separate, independent sector responsive to individual policy 
agendas.  While this is in part due to the diverse nature of civil society organisations 
and spheres, it also results, in part, from the way theorists and practitioners recognize 
civil society. Specifically, civil society is characterised as a domain that is marginal 
to the more influential political and economic institutions that appear to have greatest 
power in establishing social rules and regulations.  A deeper awareness of civil 
society and its various components, can, however, reveal that civil society is itself a 
42 
 
driving force for change in both developing and developed countries, a notion that 
can enhance its scope of influence through better understanding and improved 
policy.  Moreover, the actors involved in social movements, a key component of civil 
society, are themselves “…agents actively engaged in the production and 
maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” 
(Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613, first cited in Snow & Benford 1988).  Movement 
actors play a significant role in shaping the movement, its concepts and how they are 
perceived.  Framing, as will be further discussed in this chapter, is how actors 
achieve the task of creating meaning.  Iranian reformists and their opponents alike 
used civil society as a frame to pursue their social and political visions.    
 
In this thesis, Sidney Tarrow’s theory of contentious politics in social movements is 
used to look at the period of Khatami’s presidency, the height of Iran’s reform 
movement.  Tarrow defines social movements as “…collective challenges, based on 
common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 4, emphasis in original).  Described in 
another way, social movement refers to “…sequences of contentious politics that are 
based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and 
which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful 
opponents” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 2).   Using this definition, the reform movement can be 
identified as a social movement that gave a platform to a number of sectors, allowing 
them to make their voices heard.  Contentious politics, as argued by Tarrow, “…is 
triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for 
social actors who lack resources on their own” (Ibid).  The reform movement fits this 
model, particularly when taking into account the challenges to the state by actors 
such as intellectuals and academics, political figures, women’s rights activists, 
student leaders and other human rights advocates. These individuals and groups 
raised their collective voices against oppressive measures taken by conservative state 
factions before, after and during Khatami’s presidency.  Most importantly, while 
Khatami and his colleagues in political office were unable to make substantial 
statutory changes, they provided political opportunities by creating a more open 
space in which civil society actors could engage, as explained in Chapter Five.   
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The term ‘reformist’ is used to denote a broad coalition of actors who labelled 
themselves as such and adhered to a political group, or supported individuals or ideas 
that encompassed Khatami’s presidential campaign and presidency.  As a social 
movement, reformists brought the concept of civil society into the mainstream of 
Iranian society.  Movements have historically been central to the institutionalisation 
of civil society, as asserted by Jean Cohen (cited in Buechler, 1995, p. 450), with 
civil society standing for “… a sphere that is both differentiated from and connected 
to the state and that gives social actors the space to translate lifeworld concerns into 
systemic priorities for change”.  The reform movement not only intentionally 
promoted civil society by emphasising its organisational aspects but also 
inadvertently encouraged civil society’s development by creating a space for critical 
dialogue and active engagement by actors from different sectors of society.  In this 
sense, social movements are themselves a component of civil society.   
 
Another critical concept is that of the ‘public sphere’, which, similar to civil society, 
emerged alongside capitalism in Western society.  The most prominent scholar of the 
public sphere, Jürgen Habermas, firmly differentiates between the public sphere and 
the ‘public’.  His reasoning is similar to the notion that civil society is not the same 
as ‘society’ (it is also inaccurate to equate civil society with the public sphere).  
These differentiations are central to analytic scholarship that considers concepts of 
the public sphere and civil society as ones bearing ideological or political 
implications, particularly as they relate to democratic states and processes of 
democratisation.  For Habermas, the modern public sphere is the space for battle 
between the state and society (Habermas, Bürger, & Kert, 1992).  “In this public 
sphere, practical reason was institutionalized through norms of reasoned discourse in 
which arguments, not statuses or traditions, were to be decisive” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 
2).  Essentially, the public sphere is the space for political discourse that is based on 
reason and rationality and comprises a key component of civil society.8  However, it 
is important to appreciate that the public sphere is a normative concept, which Nancy 
Fraser argues requires the elimination of inequality at different levels in society 
                                                 
8
 It should be noted that the difference between the concepts of civil society and public sphere is not a 
definitive one, particularly due to the diverse definitions of civil society.  In the case of this thesis, the 
distinction between the two concepts is particularly fluid as the definition of civil society used is less 
concerned with organisations and more concerned with formal and informal associations, action and 
agency.   
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(Fraser, 1990).  Therefore, attention should not be limited to the existence of this 
space (i.e. public sphere) but should also be directed to observe the opportunities 
provided within it for all voices.       
              
The argument made in this thesis is that analysis of civil society by scholars and 
practitioners should go beyond definitions of civil society that focus solely on 
organisations.  A more comprehensive understanding of civil society and 
appreciation for a public sphere that allows different voices and ideas is needed.  The 
capacity for critical dialogue and engagement is a significant legacy of the reform 
movement that endured electoral losses and played a role in the 2009 presidential 
election and its contentious aftermath.  This chapter will first examine the modern 
roots of civil society, paying particular attention to theories that shaped the 
contemporary understanding of the term.  Then, the role of actors as agents of change 
will be explored by examining the role of public intellectuals in social science 
theory.  The main argument presented is that a more inclusive and integrated 
approach is needed regarding civil society theory and practice. Such an approach 
should move away from an emphasis on organisations in civil society and 
acknowledge civil society as a space in which a constant process of transformation is 
taking place, where deliberation, organisation and action continually occur.  This 
view addresses the problem of looking at civil society as an independent third sector, 
as argued by Chandhoke (Chandhoke, 2001) and discussed in Chapter One.  How we 
conceptualise civil society influences our expectations of it and how we attempt to 
shape it.  At the same time, the limitations of civil society as a tool for 
democratisation and liberal reform must be taken into account as notions such as 
civil society have been granted unmerited status as a panacea for socio-political 
problems.  
 
2.1  The Role of History on Contemporary Understanding 
 
One of the first challenges a researcher faces when dealing with the topic of civil 
society is that of defining civil society.  The contrast is not limited to differences in 
characterisation between those using civil society in practice and those writing about 
civil society at the theoretical level.  Rather, it is often the case that each individual 
theorist, practitioner or researcher takes on her own view of what civil society does 
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or should constitute.  These differences range from the very specific, which define 
exactly what type of organization or aspect of society are deemed to be a part of civil 
society, to very generalized and ambiguous definitions that appear to offer little value 
in explaining what gives civil society merit to be considered as a distinct component 
of society.  Rather than providing a list of all definitions, a selection of definitions 
that typify those found more generally in contemporary literature is provided.  These 
definitions are of most relevance to the case of Iran during the reform.  To provide 
context, the following section will present a historical account of civil society that 
offers the basis from which contemporary perspectives arise.    
 
The historical section examines several key texts and thinkers to trace the changing 
nature of civil society from both historic and theoretical perspectives.  Rather than 
providing a complete historic overview of civil society, the selected literature and 
thinkers represent a series of phases in which historic events and influential thinkers 
have altered the ways in which social and political actors view and apply the term 
civil society.  While definitions of and influences upon civil society often overlap, 
each text provides a unique perspective from which the term is examined, providing 
a wide-range debate on the complexity of civil society and, just as importantly, how 
the definition of a term can manipulate social and political action and outcomes.  By 
looking at the emergence and evolution of civil society, we can gauge the value of 
perception and examine civil society’s current effects and potential for future 
transformations in social, political and economic spheres.   
 
Ferguson and the origins of a “civil society”     
 
Civil society as a modern phenomenon has been an evolving concept with which 
academics and political activists have come to associate in varying degrees of 
significance.  Although diverse understandings of civil society as a concept can be 
traced to classical thinkers, the term really began to take shape in the eighteenth 
century and the Enlightenment.  Of particular influence is Adam Ferguson, who was 
one of the first to use ‘civil society’ as a distinct term in An Essay on the History of 
Civil Society.  Ferguson first used the word ‘civilisation’ in English as a term to 
denote the elimination of violence from human affairs and where “‘civil society’ is 
understood as a ‘polished’ and ‘refined’ form of society with ‘regular government 
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and political subordination’” (Keane, 1998, pp. 117-118).  The legacy of associating 
civil society with ‘civilised’ societies free from aggression and brutality remains 
today, particularly as the development of civil society is linked with development 
and modernity.  
 
However, as Keane points out, a weakness of interpreting non-violence as civil 
society, as done by Ferguson and his contemporaries in the eighteenth century, “…is 
its secret commitment to an evolutionary or teleological understanding of history as a 
process of transformation from ‘rude’ societies to ‘civilized’ societies” (Keane, 1998, 
p. 118).   With the level of violence still witnessed in contemporary society, this 
linear approach does not offer a comprehensive stepping stone for understanding 
civil society.  Moreover, the relationship between the individual, community and 
ruling elite, has from the onset been a key factor in civil society debates.  Of 
particular relevance are the questions: what is the role of the individual and what 
obligations does she owe to society’s greater good?  Ferguson writes, “If this follow 
from the relation of a part to its whole, and if the public good be the principal object 
with individuals, it is likewise true, that the happiness of individuals is the great end 
of civil society: for in what sense can a public enjoy any good, if its members, 
considered apart, be unhappy?” (Ferguson & Oz-Salzberger, 1995, p. 59).  The 
objective of a ‘public good’ is a tenuous assumption without guidelines as to                                                                           
who or what defines that good.  On the whole, Ferguson’s introduction of civil 
society into the language heralds a new era in the study of societies by opening 
dialogue on the role of the state and the citizen without a clear path forward.  
However, the relationship between the individual and the ruling elite or the public 
good remains unclear. 
 
What Ferguson does unmistakeably shed light on is the precarious nature of an 
industrialised, commercial society.  Ferguson warns readers that a more active 
marketplace and, in effect, an increased desire for a life of luxury, leads to the loss of 
a public spirit and potential decline into corruption.  He (Ferguson, 1768, pp. 402-
403) writes: 
On the contrary, when wealth is accumulated only in the hands of the miser, 
and runs to waste from those of the prodigal; when heirs of family find 
themselves straitened and poor, in the midst of affluence; when the cravings 
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of luxury silence even the voice of party and faction; when the hopes of 
meriting the rewards of compliance, Or the fear of losing what is held at 
discretion, keep men in a state of suspense and anxiety; when fortune, in 
short, instead of being considered as the instrument of a vigorous spirit, 
becomes the idol of a covetous or a profuse, of a rapacious or a timorous 
mind; the foundation on which freedom was built, may serve to support a 
tyranny; and what, in one age, raised the pretensions, and fostered the 
confidence of the subject, may, in another, incline him to servility, and 
furnish the price to be paid for his prostitutions.   
 
In simpler terms, the accumulation of wealth in the hands of some, occurring at the 
same time as the impoverishment of others, coincides with the gaining of public 
voice for one sector at the expense of another.  The pursuit of material goods stifles 
the quest for political and social variety and discourse.  Ferguson’s concern for the 
public spirit, as embodied by civil society, with the growth of manufacturing and 
commerce, continues to bear relevance to advanced industrial and post-industrial 
societies. 
 
Hegel, de Tocqueville and the complexities of the political and social sphere  
 
As civil society became more entrenched in Western intellectual thought, the 
relationships between families, the state and market were debated.  Another key 
historic contribution to civil society debates is the work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, who was the first thinker to adeptly expose the complexity of civil society as 
a theory (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 91).  According to Hegel, “Civil society is the 
[stage of] difference which intervenes between the family and the state, even if its 
formation follows later in time than that of the state, because, as [the stage of] 
difference, it presupposes the state; to subsist itself, it must have the state before its 
eyes as something self-subsistent” (Hegel & Knox, 1952, p. 266).  Hegel’s 
explanation sheds light on the complex relationship between the state and civil 
society, where the state must exist before civil society can materialize such that the 
state mediates within civil society where necessary.     
 
In addition, the topic of individual freedom plays a significant role in Hegel’s 
discussion of civil society.  He writes (Hegel & Knox, 1952, p. 267):  
In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is nothing to 
him.  But except in contact with others he cannot attain the whole compass of 
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his ends, and therefore these others are means to the end of the particular 
member.  A particular end, however, assumes the form of universality 
through this relation to other people, and it is attained in the simultaneous 
attainment of the welfare of others… Particularity, restricted by universality, 
is the only standard whereby each particular member promotes his welfare.  
 
While civil society signifies a collective idea, space or organisation, Hegel 
emphasises that individual autonomy remains at its centre, reflecting processes of 
capitalist development.  Stillman, in examining Hegel’s theories, describes how the 
individual’s participation in the social sphere is initially based on impulse, but in this 
process comes to the realization that this participation holds rational roots which add 
value to both the individual and members of the community (1980, p. 627).  This 
reinforces the idea that social actions and institutions must be regarded in the context 
of what or who enriches them.     
 
In terms of how civil society comes into existence, Hegel diverged from the notion 
that civil society is a natural condition of human freedom and “…understood civil 
society as a historically produced sphere of ethical life which comprises the 
economy, social classes, corporations and institutions concerned with the 
administration of welfare and civil law” (Keane, 1998, p. 50).  Civil society is not a 
natural occurrence but rather an outcome of changes which take place over a period 
of time.  In addition to this, Hegel understood modern civil society as a battlefield of 
potentially conflicting interests such that “…the exuberant development of one part 
of civil society may, and often does, impede or oppress its other parts, which is why 
civil society cannot remain or become ‘civil’ unless it is ordered politically” (Ibid).  
Hegel’s two points are, in summary, that civil society is a product of human history 
and that a constructive civil society requires a degree of regulation.  
 
If Hegel’s stance on civil society is undertaken, we are left with a number of 
implications for how to view and, more importantly, facilitate the growth of modern 
civil society.  One potentially important implication is the degree of freedom 
afforded within civil society.  For example, taking Hegel’s account, it will be 
difficult to justify what Isaiah Berlin terms as a negative account of freedom, where 
freedom means non-interference.  Here, a free civil society, using the definition of 
negative freedom, is left to mature and transform on its own.  However, if, as Hegel 
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stated, political order is required, freedom must be sacrificed to prevent conflict.  
With Hegel’s definition, we can also infer that regulation and active participation are 
required features of civil society as a mere hands-off approach will not lead to an 
effective civil society.  Ultimately, the form and extent of interference remain 
unclear, particularly for proponents of civil society enrichment.   
 
Another key thinker in the historical understanding of civil society is Alexis de 
Tocqueville.  Whitehead summarises the characterisation of civil society by de 
Tocqueville succinctly (1997, p. 98):   
Tocqueville was perhaps the first major theorist to present civil society as the 
indispensable counterpart to a stable and vital democracy, rather than as an 
alternative to it. But the voluntary associations which constituted the core of 
his notion of “civil society” were quite distinct from the self-defence 
compacts envisaged by Hobbes, or the corporate enterprises envisioned by 
Hegel or the bourgeois class in Marx. Indeed, whereas the pursuit of material 
self-interest was what distinguished civil society in the minds of these two 
German theorists, it was the containment of such materialism within the 
confines of benevolent voluntary institutions (which could be viewed as 
extensions of the family, or as practical applications of religious faith) that 
inspired the French liberal.  
 
Modern works on civil society continue to reference De Toqueville, particularly in 
Western contexts, as his approach to civil society allows for the sphere of civil 
society to co-exist with the state in relative harmony.  This notion fits in with a 
broader agenda of global democratisation by the United States and its Western allies.  
His version of civil society is most aptly applied to contexts where a democratic state 
is already in place.  This is in contrast to more contemporary accounts of civil 
society, such as those that consider civil society independent from the state, such that 
they are able to develop as a force of resistance to tyrannical regimes found in 
Eastern Europe in the 1990s (Foley & Edwards, 1996).  As indicated in sections 
below, the view of civil society as benevolent voluntary institutions receives wider 
support by actors and institutions that advance an organisational characterisation of 
civil society.  However, before this organisational approach gained popularity, other 
theorists provided more nuanced approaches to our understanding of civil society. 
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Gramsci and the politicisation of civil society in the 20th Century 
 
One of the leading thinkers of civil society in its twentieth century revival is Antonio 
Gramsci who, according to Norberto Bobbio, draws his theories of civil society from 
Hegel (Keane, 1988, p. 84).  Writing in the early 20th century, it was not until the 
1970s and 1980 that he became influential (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 33).  As 
Gramsci does not provide a direct definition of civil society, Roger Simon offers a 
valuable summary of what civil society entails for Gramsci based on selections from 
the Prison Notebook, a key source of Gramsci’s thoughts (Simon, 1982, pp. 79-80): 
Civil society is the sphere where capitalists, workers and others engage in 
political and ideological struggles and where political parties, trade unions, 
religious bodies and a great variety of other organisations come into 
existence.  It is not only the sphere of class struggles; it is also the sphere of 
all the popular-democratic struggles which arise out of the different ways in 
which people are grouped together—by sex, race, generation, local 
community, region, nation and so on.  Thus it is in civil society that the 
struggle for hegemony between the two fundamental classes takes place.   
 
Based on the above description, two key principles can be ascertained: first, the 
entities that constitute civil society, and second, the purpose of civil society as a 
distinct sphere.  The organisations and associations that make up civil society are 
those that fall outside the realm of the market, i.e. process of production, and 
institutions of the state.  Moreover, civil society is about the particular relations that 
form these organisations or institutions.  In contrast to civil society, political society 
is used by Gramsci in reference to coercive relations that exist in certain bodies of 
the state (though Gramsci does not infer that all institutions of the state are about 
coercion) (Simon, 1982, pp. 80-81).  The two distinct forms of relations help us 
better understand the role of civil society according to Gramsci, although it should be 
noted that a particular organisation can consist of both types of relations.   
 
Crucially, civil society serves as a space for contestation.  For Gramsci, civil society 
provided “a strategic arena against efforts to reproduce capitalist values and ideas 
among the exploited” (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 34).  This vision of civil society 
offers one of many examples of how civil society can be used as a tool against 
coercive powers of an existing state structure.  In other words, Gramsci’s “…civil 
society is the arena, separate from state and market, in which ideological hegemony 
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is contested, implying that civil society contains a wide range of different 
organisations and ideologies which both challenge and uphold the existing order” 
(Lewis, 2002, p. 572).   Alternatively, according to one scholar, Gramsci’s vision 
illustrates that the quest of civil society goes further than a dual state-civil society 
clash.  It is contested that for Gramsci, the state consists of political as well as civil 
society (Kumar, 1993, p. 382).  In this regard, civil society is not the antithesis or 
alternative to the state, rather it is where ideas, including hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic ideas, are contested rather than imposed through coercion.  Separating the 
coercive from non-coercive relations to identify political and civil society, 
respectively, is particularly relevant to how Iranian intellectuals characterised civil 
society to include various institutions of the state, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Four.            
 
2.2  Contemporary Discourse  
 
While Ferguson initiated the notion of a civil society in the eighteenth century and 
thinkers such as Hegel, and later Gramsci, contributed to its theoretical basis, the 
concept was largely ignored in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.  
However, since the mid-twentieth century, civil society has witnessed a revival as 
discussed in this section.  This revival can be broken down into several phases with 
loose associations to both historic events as well as the emergence of literature by 
influential thinkers.   According to Keane (1998), this renaissance, as he calls it, 
occurred in three phases.  A look at each phase provides a better understanding of 
civil society’s trajectory in the mid-to-late twentieth century and offers insight into 
key attributes affiliated with it.  The first phase, which is also the most short-lived 
and least influential, can be attributed to the emergence of the Civil Society School 
of Japanese Marxism during the second half of the 1960s.  The key argument here 
was that a weak civil society, and therefore unobstructed political and economic 
control from above, paves the way for the growth of capitalism. This principle was 
applied to countries such as Spain.  It can be contended that Spain’s free-market 
economic system was able to develop in the late 1950s only through reforms 
enforced by an undemocratic state.  However, the argument made by this School 
disregards the nuanced social development that took place alongside the growth of a 
capitalist economic.  Regarding this wave of ideas, Keane states, “Insofar as it was 
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ultimately driven by the reverie of abolishing civil society by means of civil society, 
the Civil Society School of Japanese Marxism was undermined by its deep 
dependence upon the Gramscian approach, which emphasizes the tactical importance 
of non-market, non-state institutions in the struggle against the exploitative power of 
capitalist society” (Keane, 1998, p. 14).  The shortcoming of this phase was its over-
reliance on framing civil society as an opponent of itself, signifying a contestation 
between different interests in civil society, as cited by Keane, which fails to give 
sufficient attention to the political sphere and the relationship between the different 
realms of society.    
 
The next two phases were ones with the most links to the outlook of civil society that 
have carried through to present day.  The second phase of civil society’s renaissance, 
according to Keane, had its roots in the central-eastern half of Europe during the 
1970s, when civil society was considered the struggling voice against despotism in 
favour of democratic political and social order that broke ranks with the values of 
Marxism.  During this time, the state moved to obliterate the effects of the civil 
society movement by placing it under its own control.  Nonetheless, “…the language 
of civil society functioned as an effective moral and political utopia in central and 
eastern Europe” (Keane, 1998, p. 21).  Following the trail of this phase, the third 
phase of civil society’s renaissance took place in the 1990s, with the language of 
civil society moving beyond Europe in unprecedented regions of the globe, including 
Latin America, East Asia and Arab states. In this phase the language of civil society 
took on its most diverse range of applications and definitions.  The ideas emerging 
from the second and third phases are theoretically and practically relevant for the 
case of Iran in the 1990s and early 2000s and will therefore be discussed in further 
detail below.  The following sections will examine the path of civil society from an 
academic theory into a policy tool, particularly in the sphere of development.   
 
Civil Society as a liberal project 
 
Following the social and political changes of the 1980s and 1990s, social scientists, 
policy makers and practitioners have come to rely on civil society as a sphere that 
works with, or counter to, the state and market as a third sector.  Definitions or 
understandings of civil society are based on assumptions and ideology, with liberal 
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thought serving as a key driver.  Civil society as a check on state power has played a 
central role in liberal political thought.  According to thinkers such as Francis 
Fukuyama, the role of civil society is to, “…balance the power of the state and to 
protect individuals from the state’s power” (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 11).  This is 
particularly true of neoconservative theorists of civil society, for whom the 
organisations of civil society, such as nongovernmental organisations, moderate the 
powers of the state (Macdonald, 1994).  “In the neoconservative vision, civil society 
exists as a sphere autonomous from, and morally superior to, the state.  Part of the 
contemporary neoconservative attack on the state then, includes a championing of 
the democratic potential of civil society in both the Third World and the West” 
(Macdonald, 1994, p. 270).      
 
In order to achieve the aspirations of curtailing state power as set out above, civil 
society has commonly come to represent a set of voluntary organisations separate 
from the market and state, often used in reference to democracy-promoting 
programmes.  For example, in a paper on Middle East democracy published by the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, civil society is defined as a term 
referring to “the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations 
but separate from the state and the market” (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 5).  More 
specifically, civil society entails “nonprofit organizations, religious organizations, 
labour unions, business associations, interest and advocacy groups, societies, clubs 
and research institutions, as well as more informal political, social, and religious 
movements…” (Ibid).  The end notes of the paper further notes that state political 
parties are excluded from civil society because of their objective to seek public 
office; although it is acknowledged that civil society groups may strive to influence 
the political process, they do not seek public office (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 22).  The 
definition of civil society is further expanded in the notes by maintaining that media 
is not a component of civil society because it is market-based and its “role as a 
vehicle for public communication differ from civil society’s voluntary character and 
role as a vehicle for citizen association and collective activity.  However, political 
parties and independent media are often closely intertwined with civil society, in that 
civil society organizations can share their philosophy, political agenda, and 
membership” (Ibid).  The advantage of this definition to others is its inclusion of 
non-formal associations, such as informal movements, in the realm of civil society.  
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Nevertheless, the definition contains some weaknesses.  For one, its exclusion of 
media is problematic because it is often difficult to differentiate whether media is a 
tool for civil society or if the dialogue that takes place in media constitutes a 
component of the less formal, non-institution based civil society itself.  Moreover, it 
does not address new forms of communication, including Internet-based media 
sources, which are not market-based but rather rely on independent users.    
 
Exemplifying this liberal perspective is the work of Ernest Gellner for whom modern 
civil society presents an idea which counters the consequences of communism.  His 
interpretation of civil society is “…that set of diverse non-governmental institutions 
which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state 
from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, 
can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society” 
(Gellner, 1994, p. 5).  However, he adds to this description by insisting that civil 
society requires individual autonomy, in contrast to “…the segmentary community 
[that] avoids central tyranny by firmly turning the individual into an integral part of 
the social sub-unit” (Gellner, 1994, p. 8).  Gellner’s definition, therefore, restricts 
civil society to a particular domain where individual autonomy supersedes any 
collective autonomy.  While this definition is suited in theory for liberal 
democracies, it is less relevant to practice, particularly in socio-political contexts in 
which liberalism does not prevail.   
 
One main shortcoming with liberal definitions in line with Gellner’s view is the 
assumption that the role of civil society is carried out by ‘nongovernmental 
institutions.’ These definitions do not address the possibility of informal networks 
and associations that take on the same roles and may still be considered part of civil 
society.  Moreover, the definitions focus on the state-civil society relationship and do 
not address other factors that affect civil society, such as market forces and familial 
or tribal ties, among many others.  For example, scholars have not reassessed 
theories of civil society from a gender perspective after examining the role of gender 
relations (Howell, 2007, pp. 416-417).  Others, such as Cohen and Arato (1992), 
discuss the issue of free markets versus the welfare state in civil society, offering a 
supplementary dimension for analysis.  Overall, the liberal definitions mentioned 
above are a useful starting point from which different political and social schools of 
55 
 
thought can make additions in order to fit their vision and understanding of civil 
society. 
  
The ideological angle from which civil society is perceived here creates a backdrop 
to views on how it can be developed or enhanced in different contexts.  As an 
example, Gellner makes the following statement in the conclusion to his analysis of 
Adam Ferguson, “…the splendid thing about Civil Society is that even the absent-
minded, or those preoccupied with their private concerns or for any other reason ill-
suited to the exercise of eternal and intimidating vigilance, can look forward to 
enjoying their liberty” (Gellner, 1994, p. 80).  While seemingly straightforward, the 
statement contains preconceived notions of a society’s political nature, namely the 
dominance of liberty.  His argument makes the assumption that there will be a sector 
in society that will ensure the positive outcomes of civil society for those not so 
inclined.  Furthermore, Gellner’s view does not address the issue of potential conflict 
that can arise in civil society and how it should be regulated.  Promoting civil society 
without this recognition can prove problematic, particularly in contexts where ideas 
such as liberty are not practiced.  Therefore, getting a clear understanding of the 
differing definitions of civil society and the historic context from which they are 
derived becomes even more important.    
 
Keane is one of the most prolific writers on the topic and underscored the significant 
role of civil society even before it reached its peak level of popularity after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. He has used the term in a way that highlights the institutionalised 
or organisational aspect of civil society, while leaving space for interpreting the 
specific nature of the organisations.  Keane describes civil society as:  
…an ideal-typical category that both describes and envisages a complex and 
dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that 
tend to be non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive, and permanently in 
tension with each other and with the state institutions that ‘frame’, constrict 
and enable their activities. (Keane, 1998, p. 6)   
 
What constitutes civil society is the actual set of organisations that meet the criteria 
he sets out and their role, relative to the state, is a dynamic, mutually dependent one.  
Keane’s definition provides a sense of both the general nature of civil society and 
how the different attributes associated with it can have extreme bearing on its 
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relationship with other sectors of society, namely the state.  However, by limiting 
civil society to organisations, this definition leaves out social movements and 
activism that do not take place in an institutional setting.  In order to study civil 
society activity in a diverse range of contexts, a more nuanced definition of civil 
society is required.  Even the nongovernmental organisations that have come to 
represent civil society fail to meet the standards associated with them.  As Asef 
Bayat points out in reference to Middle Eastern NGOs, “Apart from cultural and 
structural reasons—such as clientelism and hierarchy—the problem is that very often 
NGOs are attributed with development qualities and abilities that they do not 
possess” (Bayat, 2000, p. iv).    
 
When defining civil society in the late 20th century, a normative approach is often 
taken when relating its traits (Howell & Pearce, 2001).  Rather than detailing what 
civil society entails, definitions are geared to what components a civil society should 
demand.  While for all intents, certain definitions or interpretations of civil society 
attempt to provide the concept with an even-handed and neutral characteristic, civil 
society is also used in a manner that seeks to encourage a liberal outcome.  Put 
another way, the usage of civil society language is connected to “efforts to calculate 
the tactical means of achieving or preserving certain ends” (Keane 1998: 41, 
emphasis in original).  Civil society was considered an instrument by which state 
control and despotic power could be curtailed.  The origins of this strategic use of the 
term can be found in the eighteenth century and sources such as Thomas Paine’s 
Common Sense which outlines ways of challenging despotic power through civil 
society (Keane, 1998, p. 41).  This linkage reveals that the normative usage of civil 
society should not be simply assumed as part of the modern re-interpretation of civil 
society in the late 20th century.    
 
Putting the issue of power at the forefront of the debate, however, has proven to be 
problematic.  Keane, for example, takes issue with what he considers modern 
political philosophy’s penchant to focus on capturing power or curbing state power 
in his theory of the politics of retreat (Keane, 1998, p. 42).   What this theory 
highlights is the role of politicians whose aim is not to capture power but rather do 
away with despotism and allow for the growth of civil society (Keane, 1998, pp. 43-
44).  Ultimately, the result for politicians of retreat is as follows: 
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In disarming the Leviathan, the politicians of retreat encourage the growth of 
self-organizing civil society, whose chattering, conflicts and rebellions 
unnerves them.  …For all these reasons, the politicians of retreat typically 
sow the seeds of their own downfall.  In the end they usually prove no match 
for the political and social forces which they help to unleash.  They become 
victims of their own success.  Sometimes their experiments in reform breed 
revolutions. (Keane, 1990, p. 343)   
 
The politics of retreat can be a useful tool in the study of modern Iranian politics and 
the reform movement that ran on platforms of rule of law and civil society during the 
1997 presidential elections, as is discussed in later chapters.  In one sense, the 
pluralism that reformists promoted was what they practised politically, leading to 
divisions amongst reformist political groups and multiple candidates splitting the 
reformist vote, which can be cited as a factor in their electoral losses in subsequent 
elections9.  Thus far, what has maintained the Islamic regime in Iran has been the 
ability of conservative forces to continue their domination of the state.  It is unclear 
how the regime, or reformists, would have fared if the reformist calls for limits to 
state power had taken strong root.  Reformists in the spotlight during Khatami’s 
presidency would have required a strong platform of offering for society (i.e. social 
and economic development), if they wanted to survive after having pushed back the 
power of the state and generated civil society activity.  Ultimately, the politics of 
retreat provides evidence that placing limitations on state power while strengthening 
civil society should not be considered an end in itself but rather the start of a process 
for redeveloping a political structure.  In this light, civil society building as a liberal 
project needs to be re-evaluated.                                   
 
Civil society and Islam 
 
When looking at ‘Islamic’ countries, Islam as a theory of political rule is a main 
factor that leads to questioning its compatibility with civil society, “Analysing civil 
society in Muslim countries requires that we recognize Islam not only as a religion, 
but also as a political theory and the major source of a legitimization of political 
power” (Kamali, 2001, p. 457).  Gellner is prominent among thinkers who find Islam 
incompatible with the conditions of civil society.  In the first instance, Gellner 
imagines that “…Civil Society is an a-moral order” (1994, p. 137, capitals in 
                                                 
9
 For example, Mehdi Karroubi and Mostafa Moin both ran as reformists in the 2005 Presidential 
Elections, splitting the vote.  At the same time, other reformists called for a boycott of the elections.      
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original).  With this seemingly ‘neutral’ view of civil society, it becomes difficult to 
reconcile it with a religious order.  Moreover, Gellner argues that Islam lacks the 
space for divergent political institutions, sufficient individuals and intellectual 
pluralism (1994, p. 29).  As a result of these limitations, Gellner believes Islam and 
civil society are incompatible.  Amyn Sajoo summarizes various thinkers challenges 
about the application of civil society to Islam by stating: “…its adherents inhabit a 
lifeworld that is tied inextricably to a religious discourse” (Sajoo, 2002, p. 7).  
Therefore, the inability to disassociate Islam from the social and political aspects of 
society due to its comprehensive rules of personal and social conduct have led to 
questions regarding the compatibility of civil society with the Muslim world.  
However, Sajoo calls attention to the fact that such challenges do not properly factor 
in the “…diverse ethno-cultural, historical and political realities of the Muslim 
world” (2002, p. 8).  The application of civil society to the Iranian context is a direct 
example of civil society theory and practice in a non-Western, Islamic setting.   
 
Civil society’s relationship with development 
 
The revival of civil society as a concept has come to play a major role in theoretical 
and practical views on development.  Civil society development emerged as part of 
the donor agenda in the 1990s, having been taken up by the United States 
government, bilateral donors, international institutions and private American, 
European and Japanese foundations, mainly in connection with democracy 
promotion (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000, p. 3).  To examine civil society through the 
lens of development, it is necessary to consider the various methods used to judge 
what constitutes civil society, how these views have been formed and how the push 
for civil society capacity building has affected the development process.  Each 
approach describes a unique attitude towards social, political and economic 
development.  The “mainstream approach” considers civil society by evaluating the 
role of the individual, the state and society from a liberal perspective.  In this 
instance, individuals are free from kinship ties and “[are] deemed to have been born 
with rights; political society or the state [is] the expression of their social needs, 
regulating interactions that might otherwise stay in permanent conflict” (as described 
by Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 18).  This approach is based on a number of 
assumptions regarding how stability and order can be achieved, including the belief 
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that, “Societies develop and commerce flourishes when individuals abandon the 
notion of freedom as autonomy in favour of freedom as security grounded in law.  
Civil law and civility itself distinguishes more developed from less developed 
societies” (Howell & Pearce, 2001, p. 30).  Statements such as this are an example of 
the way assumptions regarding basic notions like autonomy can have far reaching 
consequences on the development of political structures.  Based on this assumption, 
it is not surprising that the value of a ‘vibrant’ civil society as a positive force for 
democracy has come to represent an undisputable fact that necessitates civil society 
development for democracy-building (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000, p. 4).  Alternative 
approaches to the mainstream are those which, according to Howell and Pearce, do 
not emphasize values associated with the rise of capitalism and therefore, “…shift 
the meaning of the concept away from its liberal, eighteenth-century roots to a 
distinct and new normative content by the end of the twentieth century” (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001, p. 31).  However, it is also noted that this approach is, on the whole, 
under-theorized and implicit.  
 
Irrespective of the approach, the demarcation of civil society by donor agencies and 
other parties involved in development work is significant, particularly with respect to 
the dividing line between civil and political society.  Unfortunately, in practice, the 
boundaries between the two are often blurred leading to potentially arbitrary or 
constructed boundaries.  The reason for insistence on segregation is to support a 
claim by donors that they can support democracy without interfering in a country’s 
domestic politics (Ottaway & Carothers, 2000, pp. 10-11).  With this assumption, 
donors support voluntary organisations that they judge to fit within their model.  
Donor agencies are also more exact in defining the nature of what they consider civil 
society for operationalization purposes.  In order to accomplish the task of 
developing and strengthening civil society, donor agencies are compelled to come up 
with a description of civil society that is generally a range of organisations that are 
not-for-profit and, unlike the state, nonauthoritative (Howell & Pearce, 2001, pp. 
111-112).  Donors need a working definition when it comes to implementing their 
agendas, something that is not required in theoretical work on civil society which can 
take on a more ambiguous understanding.  As a result, civil society from the vantage 
of donor agencies becomes limited to a type of entity with which they can interact, 
often a particular form of organisation.  However, once this belief is carried forward 
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by actors interested in civil society building in isolation from international donor 
agencies, the entire elaboration of the concept can take a different turn.   
 
As seen in following chapters, donor agencies had less direct involvement in Iran 
leading up to the Khatami presidency than in some other developing countries.  
However, the case will show that definitions favoured by donors, namely civil 
society based on organisations, was the description maintained in the analysis of 
Iranian civil society development by practitioners and scholars.  As a result, 
important aspects of civil society building, taking in a broader perspective, were 
missed.  Therefore, it is useful to accept Jean-Francois Bayart’s argument that 
‘actually existing civil societies’ should be recognised in favour of normative models 
as they provide a realistic understanding of associational life in a given context; 
based on this assumption and in the context of Africa, Bayart extends the argument 
to acknowledge that expansion of a civil society without democratic ideals will not 
necessarily imply political democratisation (cited in White, 2003, pp. 10-11).   
 
Flawed assumptions 
 
Although civil society building is cried out by many as a solution to most social, 
political and economic challenges in a fast-changing society, there are a great deal of 
assumptions about the current meaning and potential of civil society, without taking 
into account theoretical and empirical evidence about the realities of what ‘civil 
society’ represents to different actors in diverse contexts.  Civil society has come to 
be defined in three broad categories, namely as a space for critical discourse, the 
space where individuals negotiate with political and economic control centres and a 
collective of formal nongovernmental institutions with particular characteristics, such 
as peaceful and self-organising (Ishkanian, 2008, pp. 12-13).  While each of these 
three visions of civil society addresses an important component, the reality of civil 
society is much more complex and intertwined.  Civil society has a different meaning 
depending on the historical and cultural context in which it is used.  Moreover, the 
expectations of, or agenda behind, the use or study of civil society also influences the 
definition applied at a particular time.     
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Thomas Carothers (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, p. 21) presents a useful overview in 
“Civil Society” of the flawed assumptions of many activists, policy makers and other 
individuals when making claims about policies towards and the potential impact of 
civil society.  Of course the article (Carothers & Barndt, 1999), found in the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace published Foreign Policy Magazine, does have 
its own limitations.  Written in a manner to attract a diverse and wide-ranging 
audience, it does not rely on in-depth theoretical explanations or ample references for 
its claims.  Despite these drawbacks, it offers sufficient evidence that individuals 
involved in the study or promotion of civil society must maintain an objective 
outlook on the complexities of civil society, and, more importantly, not make the 
critical mistake of assuming that civil society necessarily represents a unified sphere 
with constructive development as its goal.  The points raised in the article are used in 
this thesis as a starting point to shed light on some of the key erroneous assumptions 
and expectations held by advocates of civil society development in Iran.       
 
Challenging inaccurate conjectures regarding civil society is critical.  Civil society, if 
understood better, does have the potential to significantly aid in developing better 
quality of life for people across the globe, even if it is not a final solution in itself.  
Moreover, civil society can be one tool in the promotion of democratic states and 
provide invaluable assistance in social and economic development.  However, the 
latter two objectives are general in scope while the merits and structure of the former 
are disputed.  Consequently, it is imperative to understand not only how different 
individuals define civil society, but also the reasoning and context behind their 
views.   
 
The following analysis focuses on presenting a brief overview of several of the 
inaccurate assumptions made by policy makers, activists and academics alike 
regarding civil society, as presented in Carothers’ (1999) article.  This analysis sets 
the stage for more formative discussions regarding how civil society is considered by 
thinkers from varying social and political backgrounds and ways in which more 
tangible results can be reached.      
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1. Diversity and disconnect within civil society 
 
One of the key arguments presented by Carothers is the fact that civil society is an 
amalgamation of a diverse group of actors, not a cohesive group of “noble causes and 
earnest, well-intentioned actors” (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, p. 20).  Often, an 
erroneous assumption is that civil society always works for the public good and that 
it is a relatively cohesive force at odds with the state in situations where the state 
fails its citizens.  As the article notes, public interest is itself disputed and frequently 
different groups have different and potentially conflicting interests, causing rifts 
within civil society itself (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, p. 21).   
 
Here, it is also important to raise the issue of democracy.  Carothers agrees that civil 
society can play a role in advancing democracy.  He writes, “It [civil society] can 
discipline the state, ensure that citizens’ interests are taken seriously, and foster 
greater civic and political participation” (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, p. 21).  In a 
general sense, a participatory environment in which citizens are encouraged to take 
part in political life, without necessarily engaging in partisan conflict, can promote a 
representative and democratic political system.  However, as the article goes on to 
say, some scholars have come to warn  “…that the proliferation of interest groups in 
mature democracies could choke the workings of representative institutions and 
systematically distort policy outcomes in favour of the rich and well-connected or, 
more simply, the better organized” (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, p. 23).  Here, we are 
warned that lobbying by civil society organizations that fall outside a democratically 
elected system can lead to misrepresentation and take-over of entities that could 
have, without such pressure, created a more representative environment.  Moreover, 
others, such as Larry Diamond (1994, p. 7) have made a similar argument, 
contending that “…a vibrant civil society is probably more essential for 
consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it”.    
 
It is also important to note here the article’s view on the reverse impact of democracy 
on the extent and development of civil society.  It is argued that democracy does not 
ensure a strong civil society by using examples such as Japan and Spain which have 
relatively weak civil societies alongside a democratic state.  In the case of Japan, an 
argument can be made that its system of capitalism was able to grow because of its 
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weak civil society.  The “civil society school of Japanese Marxism”, for example, 
“…argued that Japanese civil society was weak, showing how the patriarchal family 
and a culture of individual deference towards power allowed Japanese capitalism to 
grow quickly with very little social resistance” (Lewis, 2002, p. 573). In the case of 
Spain, its democracy was also consolidated without a strong civil society sphere.  “In 
Spain, the transition to democracy was orchestrated by state elites via the legal and 
institutional mechanisms of the old regime” (Encarnación, 2001, p. 60).  Here, the 
writer makes an objection to the American approach which negates the extent of 
democracy in such countries because they do not have what is perceived to be an 
“optimal level of citizen engagement” from the perspective of American political 
analysts.  In essence, it states that “A strong belief in civil society should not fuel an 
intolerant attitude toward different kinds of democracies” (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, 
p. 23).  The lesson to be taken away from the argument related to democracy for civil 
society discussions is with regard to how a country’s democratic credentials are 
evaluated and the role civil society plays in forming that perception.  Unfortunately, 
the arguments presented in the Carothers article are insufficient in creating a clear 
account of how they reached their conclusions on the relationship between 
democracy and its impact on civil society.  However, what they do represent is a 
useful stepping stone by exposing a number of false or, at least disputed, assumptions 
regarding the bearing democracy has on the formation of civil society and civic 
engagement in general.     
 
Moreover, a debate on this topic is important in raising issues related to the common 
perception of democracy, which often conflate the notion of a democratic state with 
liberal democracy.  A democratic state implies a system of government determined 
by a voting process.  Larry Diamond refers to the aforementioned system as an 
electoral democracy, which he contrasts with liberal democracy, to signify a minimal 
level of civil freedom that ensures meaningful competition and participation (1996, 
p. 20).  In this situation, the ideological stance of actors or bases of legislation are not 
limited to a large degree.  In a liberal democracy, a stricter set of guidelines based on 
particular values, for which the standards and procedures vary, are applied to 
preclude elections being used as a tool to bring about illiberal regimes.  In general, 
key features of liberal democracy include, but are not limited to, the control of power 
by elected officials, constitutional constraint of power and barring the prohibition of 
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minorities from expressing their interests in the political process (L. Diamond, 1996, 
p. 22).  Therefore, the mere existence of elections that do not lead to accountability 
or institutions that are not based on ideals such as individual liberty, freedom of 
expression and rule of law, are not sufficient indicators of the liberal ideals often 
associated with democratisation efforts.  It is useful to keep such issues in mind when 
engaging with other texts on civil society since a thinker’s political perception on 
issues such as liberalism and democracy and socio-political background play a 
crucial role in how she defines and utilizes civil society in a policy debate.  Political 
and social perspectives reveal a great deal of information as to why and how a certain 
thinker presents his or her views and, by understanding this background, the reader 
can ascertain a clearer meaning of an author’s vantage point when discussing civil 
society and the potential policy intention behind its presentation.  
 
2. State-civil society divide 
 
Finally, the Foreign Policy article by Carothers emphasises the fact that the state-
civil society debate is not a zero-sum situation in which the state and civil society are 
direct competitors.  Carothers states, “Civil society groups can be much more 
effective in shaping state policy if the state has coherent powers for setting and 
enforcing policy.  Good nongovernmental advocacy work will actually tend to 
strengthen, not weaken state capacity” (Carothers & Barndt, 1999, p. 21).  
Regardless of whether this statement is accurate in all cases or not, it is significant 
nonetheless for questioning the perception that civil society ultimately counters or 
clashes with the state.  In fact, as noted first by de Tocqueville, civil society serves as 
an important arena for democratic institution building (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. 16).  
Therefore, it is valuable for proponents of democratisation who base their advocacy 
of civil society on de Tocqueville’s work to acknowledge the potentially constructive 
role of the state.  This is critical for both academics and policy makers involved in 
setting the agenda for civil society organizations, whether in developing or 
developed countries.  It is important to break away from a simplified state-civil 
society dichotomy.   
 
By looking at the division as one of state versus civil society, we may disregard 
potential opportunities for collaboration and, moreover, ignore situations in which 
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civil society is working against the greater interest of the majority.  Furthermore, 
divisions within the public sphere make it important to place judgement on the 
quality or type of action rather than the sphere or legal space in which it is 
undertaken.  For example, “A rich family can plot to buy up a newspaper, and then 
use it to discredit their enemies, and with care the whole operation may be carried 
out within the law, but this would involve no manifestation of dual automony (sic), 
or of civility” (Whitehead, 1997, p. 107).  We can also consider the role of 
government funding for civil society, which, as Carothers argues, occurs more often 
than generally recognized.  An inaccurate assumption is that, as a competitor of 
government institutions, civil society is independent from their control.  However, 
funding of civil society by the public sector, as is particularly prevalent in democratic 
countries, suggests that the relationship between the two sectors is much more 
complex, requiring further investigation into where the points of convergence and 
departure exist.  This latter notion, as with other points and uncertainties raised 
above, will serve as a significant basis when examining the definitions and debates 
affiliated with civil society.       
 
Social capital as stimulus for civil society promotion 
 
The renewed interest in social capital has also played a role in popularising calls for 
civil society.  Social capital is a form of capital “embodied in relations among 
persons” that serves as a facilitator in social structures (Coleman, 1988).  The notion 
of social capital presented by Bourdieu consists of two elements, “first, the social 
relationship itself that allows individuals to claim access to resources possessed by 
their associates, and second, the amount and quality of those resources” (Portes, 
1998, pp. 3-4).  The two elements are important because they imply a layer of 
complexity by placing weight on the substance of a relationship and present the basis 
upon which social capital can perpetuate various inequalities in a given context.  This 
can be extended to exchanges in civil society whereby the type of opportunity 
afforded to actors in segments of civil society needs to be taken into consideration.   
 
According to Robert Putnam, one of the most famous thinkers associated with the 
concept, social capital is a public good based on trust and the idea of reciprocity 
(Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993).  In practice, scholars have made claims similar 
66 
 
to the following, that “An abundant stock of social capital is presumably what 
produces a dense civil society, which in turn has been almost universally seen as a 
necessary condition for modern liberal democracy” (Fukuyama, 2001, p. 11).  Social 
capital as embodied in networks and norms is associated with generating a positive 
environment in which democracy can thrive.  In this respect, social capital has also 
come to play a key role in development language as it “…has seemed to promise 
answers which are attractive both to the neoliberal right—still sceptical about the 
role of the state-and to those committed to ideas about participation and grassroots 
empowerment” (Harriss & De Renzio, 1997, p. 920).  Civil society promotion based 
on social capital is noteworthy in that is has been applied to both developed and 
developing states.            
 
However, in the same way that the term civil society has been erroneously assumed 
as positive or benign and vague in nature, social capital as a foundation for civil 
society has its critics.  “Social capital has become the latest elixir within discussions 
about development, becoming ‘all things to all people’…” as it has ineffectively 
attempted to provide an over-arching framework for society (Putzel, 1997, p. 940).  
James Putzel explains that while networks and norms sustaining trust enable 
dialogue, the ‘political content and ideas’ are what determine the contribution of 
networks to democracy (1997, pp. 941-942).  In addition to the aforementioned 
shortcoming of common references to social capital, there also exist negative 
consequences with the potential to create more harm than good.  These negative 
consequences, as outlined by Alejandro Portes, include, “…exclusion of outsiders, 
excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward 
leveling [sic] norms” (1998, p. 15).  The final consequence of levelling norms refers 
to instances where group solidarity is based on mutual feelings of adversity in 
relation to the mainstream; if an individual overcomes this adversity, the original 
solidarity breaks apart.  Overall, over-confidence in the concept of social capital 
serves as an important example of how seemingly constructive ideas can actually be 
manipulated or lead to adverse outcomes when put into practice 
 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the literature on social capital and civil society 
emphasises the role of organisations while paying less attention to social movements.  
Taking the understanding of social capital as outlined above, social movements can 
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result from, and produce, social capital.  The following section provides an overview 
of what social movement means and how it needs to be considered as a component of 
civil society. 
 
2.3  Social Movements as Civil Society 
 
In light of the current shortcomings for dealing with civil society in literature and 
practice, this thesis argues that social movements can be included in studies of civil 
society.  This outlook considers civil society as a politicised concept, in contrast to 
perspectives that attempt to present civil society as neutral or benign.  Supporting the 
inclusion of social movements in civil society are Cohen and Arato (1992, p. 492), 
who argue “…that social movements constitute the dynamic element in processes 
that might realise the positive potentials of modern civil societies”.  Views regarding 
the nature of civil society can have far-reaching effects on how social movements are 
formalised and represented, and subsequently analysed and interpreted, resulting 
from the contentious balance of power between civil society and the state.  Including 
social movements in civil society studies can offer significant insight into a given 
society as it draws on activities that take place on the boundaries between social and 
political spheres.   
 
As argued by Tarrow (1998, p. 2), social movements result from the coming together 
of contentious politics with relevant social networks and resonant collective action 
frames in a way that allows them to interact with opponents in a sustainable manner.  
By accepting this position, the following chapters examine the Iranian reform 
movement through the lens of agency and the role of individuals in social 
movements.  Particular attention is paid to elements of contentious politics embodied 
by political opportunities and constraints.  The political opportunities include those 
afforded with the opening up of the public space once Khatami was elected, while 
the constraints range from the conservative state structure to limitations of reformist 
networks.  Collective action frames are assessed in order to study how reformist 
actors, specifically public intellectuals, used the concept of civil society to construct 
meaning for their agenda.   
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Framing as a process 
 
Snow and Benford’s account of collective action frames is used in this research.  
This account stands for the principle that social movements are not simply vehicles 
for the transmission of existing ideas.  Movement actors are the ones who are 
“…signifying agents actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning 
for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers” (Benford & Snow, 2000, 
p. 613).  Therefore, the act of framing is a process that generates a movement’s 
development and simultaneously impacts those outside the movement with which it 
interacts.  From this perspective, examining the process and the actors involved 
provide a unique and substantial insight in the transformations of a civil society.  It is 
not the frame itself that should take precedence in a study but rather the dynamic 
process of framing.  According to Robert Benford (1997, pp. 414-415), by 
concentrating on frames as ‘things’ rather than the processes and dynamics of 
framing, scholars of social movements have belittled the utility of framing as an 
analytic tool.         
 
One consequence is that current research and literature has come to largely ignore the 
role of agency in the construction of ideas that shape social movements.  This 
shortcoming is related to a process whereby abstract notions of a movement are 
accepted as concrete reality, what Benford (1997) identifies as reification.  In other 
words, Benford objects to “…the process of talking about socially constructed ideas 
as though they are real, as though they exist independent of the collective 
interpretations and constructions of the actors involved” (1997, p. 418).  As a result 
of reification, the movement has come to represent the instigators of change rather 
than the actors who form the movement.     
 
A parallel can be observed between the weakness of studying frames/framing and 
civil society.  By focusing on the organisational and institutional aspects of civil 
society, a key ingredient, namely the actors who shape this fluid and dynamic sphere, 
are overlooked.  Taking these shortcomings into account, this thesis will examine the 
role of agency in civil society building, paying particular attention to how the process 
of implementing the civil society frame (i.e. the framing itself) was shaped.  The 
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following section delves into the theories of the public intellectual as they serve as 
strategic agents of change in the process described above.  
 
2.4  The Public Intellectual (rowshanfekr)  
 
There exists a significantly smaller body of literature addressing the specific role of 
public intellectuals in civil society from either the theoretical or empirical 
perspectives.  The available theoretical literature tends to focus on the relationship 
between public intellectuals and an existing public sphere instead of focusing on the 
roles these individuals have in shaping modern conceptions of civil society.  In the 
following sections, a brief analysis of theoretical literature on public intellectuals as 
defined in this thesis and considered relevant is offered.  Subsequently, a theoretical 
analysis is provided of the relationship between public intellectuals and civil society 
in the context of societies undergoing socio-political development.   
      
The goal of this section is to provide an understanding of the term ‘public 
intellectual’ used throughout this thesis and the term’s bearing on the research 
methodology.  Similar to civil society, defining the term intellectual has proven to be 
one of the more challenging aspects of the background research, as available 
definitions are elusive.  There is no single, absolute definition of intellectual that can 
be applied to individuals across geographic and temporal boundaries, “…how we 
understand the term intellectual depends to a great extent upon the cultural traditions 
alive in a society and the reasons for this.  Thus who or what an intellectual is, is 
more than a matter of self-definition, it is also a matter of historical consciousness 
and its realization” (Eyerman, 1992, pp. 33-34).  Therefore, this section is dedicated 
to elaborating a working definition of the public intellectual that will be used 
throughout the study.  In the English lexicon, “intellectual” commonly refers to a 
person using his or her intellect or mind in pursuit of knowledge.  However, this 
general definition provides little value when studying a class of individuals who 
fulfil particular roles within a society.      
 
Invariably, all individuals who engage in critical thinking in their life can be labelled 
as intellectuals if such a basic characterisation is used.  To use Edward Said’s 
definition, “An intellectual…[is] someone whose whole being is staked on a critical 
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sense, a sense of being unwilling to accept easy formulas, or ready-made clichés, or 
the smooth, ever so accommodating confirmations of what the powerful or 
conventional have to say, and what they do” (cited in Nabavi, 2003, p. 2).  Gramsci’s 
characterization of the intellectual provides a useful angle towards reaching the 
definition used in this research.  According to Said (1994), “Gramsci’s analysis of 
the intellectual as a person who fulfils a particular set of functions in the society…” 
(p. 8) is a close representation of reality, which he contrasts with thinkers such as 
Julien Benda, for whom intellectuals are “…a tiny band of super-gifted and morally 
endowed philosopher-kings who constitute the conscience of mankind” (pp. 4-5).  As 
cited in Roger Simon’s (1982) Gramsci’s Political Thought, Gramsci considers all 
men to be intellectuals.  He expands on this basic definition by separating the 
intrinsic characteristic of thinking from the function an individual performs in 
society.  Therefore, the intellectual is the person who functions as an organizer in 
society (Simon, 1982, p. 92).  Or, as Mohammad Khatami states, the intellectual 
understands challenges of her time and “…represents the only hope for finding 
solutions to those problems” (Khatami, 2000a, p. 111).  In essence, the intellectual 
recognizes social obstacles and, more importantly, engages with potential answers.  
This thesis largely accepts the idea of intellectuals as ‘class-bound’, in contrast to 
views that consider intellectuals as a class-in-themselves, lacking a relationship to 
the means of production, or, alternatively, a ‘class-less’ group of individuals who rise 
above their class of origin (Kurzman & Owens, 2002).  This is a significant point as 
it relays the inherent influence of the intellectual’s class and origin in her intellectual 
activity.    
         
In analysing the role of public intellectuals in Iranian civil society, ‘intellectuals’ 
refers to writers and thinkers who hold expertise in a particular field of study and 
express ideas and theories that add to the knowledge-base of a topic.  These 
individuals may be academics or members of other professional groups, they include 
sociologists, philosophers, lawyers and journalists.  It is important to note that 
membership in any of the previously mentioned professional bodies is not sufficient, 
but rather, emphasis is placed on the intellectual’s contribution of critical analysis to 
the field.  For example, journalists who report on an event or situation in a 
descriptive manner are not considered intellectuals for the purposes of this study.  
The intellectual, here, is the individual who engages with an idea or concept in a 
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critical manner and makes a personal contribution to the process of change.  In other 
words, the intellectual is not just a thinker but an organiser in society.  According to 
a leading author on civil society in Iran, Majid Mohammadi, intellectuals have 
connected the work of multiple organisations to themselves, similar to the way in 
which the press and student movements have taken on the work of political parties 
(Muhammadi, 1999, p. 193).     
 
In the Persian language, the term used to refer to intellectuals since the emergence of 
the Communist Tudeh Party in 1941 is that of rowshanfekr. Since that time, the term 
has “…established its tradition within the ideological framework of opposition to and 
rejection of the state” (Nabavi, 2003, pp. 3-4).  The literal meaning of rowshanfekr, 
also written as roshanfekr, is “enlightened thinker”.  The definition of intellectual 
used in this thesis is that of a thinker who is critical, but not necessarily opposed to 
the state.  What constitutes a public intellectual is an individual’s ability to express 
opinions on social and political topics relevant to her time in a manner accessible by 
the general population on topics beyond the narrow scope of her field.  Of course, the 
extent of the public intellectual’s ability to effectively express her views will be part 
of the analysis.   
 
The ‘religious intellectual’, or ‘rowshanfekr-e dini’, represents the key actors 
affiliated with the reform movement, as will be discussed in later chapters.  
According to a central figure of the reform movement, Alireza Alavitabar, religious 
intellectuals have had two distinct, yet inter-related, roles in Iran over the last 100 
years, namely a socio-economic function and that of idea generation (andishegi) 
(Alavitabar, 1998, p. 43).  Most public intellectuals of the reform movement fall 
within this category.  What differentiates a ‘religious’ intellectual from the 
intellectuals not identified as such are the following characteristics: (1) the holding of 
religious beliefs and acceptance of religion’s role as an adjudicator, (2) belief in 
religion as a necessary condition for humanity’s happiness, (3) commitment to 
increasing knowledge about religion and extending an invitation to others 
(Alavitabar, 1998, p. 44).       
 
It should be noted that the term intelligentsia has also been used by scholars writing 
about Iran when referring to the class of individuals called intellectuals in this thesis.  
72 
 
One such author who provides a sound argument for this word choice is Hamid 
Dabashi.   Dabashi wrote in 1985 (p. 151), “We shall use the concept intelligentsia as 
a distinct social stratum, conscious of its collective existence and concerned with the 
ideological solutions to actual or perceived social problems.  Intelligentsia is 
preferable to intellectual because the former is a broader, more value-neutral term.  It 
is a sociological category, as opposed to an ideological claim”.  Separating the 
intelligentsia from intellectuals reinforces a politicised characteristic of the 
individual, which Dabashi further distinguishes as anti-traditional.  However, 
Dabashi’s writing focuses on intellectuals from between the two revolutions that took 
place in Iran in the 20th century.  While his distinction between the intelligentsia and 
intellectuals was deemed suitable in that context, it is less so when examining the 
thinkers addressed in the context of reform in the 1990s and 2000s.  While the 
reformist group of intellectuals referred to in this thesis were largely affiliated with a 
political movement, they lacked a unified ideological base as was more common in 
years past.  Forums such as the otagh fekr, roughly interpreted as the theory or idea 
room, where key reformists are said to have come up with the reform movement’s 
strategies, were more informal, as stated by a leading figure in an interview.  The 
intellectuals of the reform movement, as discussed in Chapter Four, took on different 
roles and identities at the same time as they contributed to the ideas underpinning the 
reform movement.  Moreover, the widening public space and mediums through 
which individuals could disseminate their voice10 contributes to breaking up the 
concept of the intelligentsia as an independent class and provides a case for using the 
term intellectual.  Additionally, it has been noted that one characteristic of Iranian 
intellectuals is the limited level of dialogue amongst them (Muhammadi, 1999, p. 
210).  The absence of prolonged and structured dialogue between intellectuals can be 
attributed to a number of factors, including state restrictions on opposing viewpoints 
under different regimes.  Another factor can relate to the self-segregation of 
individuals belonging to particular groups of thought, e.g. religious vs. secular.  
Overall, the issue of intellectual networks relates to the idea of social capital, 
                                                 
10
 During the Khatami administration, numerous daily newspapers from the perspective of reformists 
and journals in different fields, such as the arts, literature and philosophy, emerged.  They represented 
a growing public space for debate in contrast to an earlier period when the state ideology dominated 
the tightly regulated communication industry.  While the state has consistently controlled television 
and radio, the introduction of the internet paved the way for a new space for dialogue.  Satellite 
television channels in the Persian language were also appearing at this time but they are not applicable 
to this period as they were the domain of a diaspora community that was disconnected from internal 
struggle undertaken by reformists.         
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particularly the role of relationships within and between intellectual circles.  This 
may have in turn affected the impact of intellectuals on the rest of society as the 
establishment of bridging networks did not come about readily.              
 
Furthermore, a distinction is made between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ public 
intellectuals.  The ‘primary’ intellectual, as used here, is an individual who is the first 
to initiate a theory or ideology.  The ‘secondary’ intellectual, in contrast, does not 
necessarily introduce the new theory of ideology but, rather, contributes to the 
critical discourse of existing ideas.  What is termed ‘secondary’ here is similar to the 
notion of the intellectual as ‘interpreter’.  The ‘interpreter’ model of the intellectual 
represents: 
…someone who proceeded by working on the interpretation of ‘texts’, 
broadly conceived, with a view to translating or juxtaposing the goals, codes 
and norms of one perspective or form of life in terms of other available 
perspectives of forms of life.  This model high-lighted the possibility of 
mutual understanding, but only through the recognition of difference.  
(Osborne, 2005, p. 52, emphasis in original) 
 
The secondary public intellectual implies a more active agent who is engaged in 
transmitting their perspectives into the public sphere through their writings and 
lectures.  This is similar to the intellectual as ‘mediator’ category, where the mediator 
is involved in ‘vehicular’ ideas; ‘vehicular’ refers to ideas “…designed as problem-
solving devices, something that will simply ‘move things along’ and take us from A 
to B” (Osborne, 2005, p. 53).  The intellectual as mediator not only uses vehicular 
ideas, she “…is a broker of ideas, and a facilitator of talk around them…The 
mediator is interested in the production of ideas-receptive cultures, for these are the 
necessary sources of innovation and dynamism” (Osborne, 2005, p. 54).  The 
mediator is differentiated from the secondary as the latter designation places less 
emphasis on the intellectual’s steady injection of new ideas.   
 
In the case of Iran, the notion of civil society was not an original concept, but it 
offered a fresh approach for intellectuals who were seeking a platform on which they 
could base reform.  Intellectuals affiliated with conservative political factions, 
referring to academics and those engaged in critical analysis, used similar ideas in 
order to promote support for conservative policies.  This thesis focuses on the role of 
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the ‘secondary’ intellectual as an agent of civil society.  A further argument can be 
drawn from this thesis that as grand ideologies disappear in political and social 
debate, the number and relevance of ‘secondary’ intellectuals increases.   
 
The dual role of the public intellectual: A product and leader of civil society 
Public intellectuals involved in civil society building take on two overlapping roles 
in civil society spaces.  In an article examining the role of intellectuals as agents of 
change in Mexico, Roderic Camp writes: 
Few people recognize the large part intellectuals have had in weakening their 
own interrelationships and thus their effect on public life.  In one sense, 
intellectuals appear to be far worse culprits than the government in effectively 
censoring their own kind through group domination of various journals and 
newspapers.  (Camp, 1981, p. 314) 
 
This group mentality can be seen in the rise of reformist intellectuals.  Furthermore, 
on the one hand, public intellectuals focused on engaging or promoting a particular 
brand of civil society take on a leadership role.  On the other hand, these intellectuals 
are themselves products of an existing civil society that is in constant flux.  As a 
result, it becomes difficult to distinguish cause and effect when analysing the role of 
agency in empowering civil society within a particular context.  The argument made 
here is that individual agency, on the part of the intellectual, is both a champion and 
product of civil society which cannot be disengaged from one another.  Rather, civil 
society, as a public sphere in which formal and informal dialogue takes place, needs 
to exist for intellectual thought to grow and, in exchange, promotes civil society.  
However, this also implies that public intellectuals have the ability to hinder the 
strength and pace of civil society’s development as a result of the way in which they 
engage with the language of civil society in the public domain.       
 
The issue of reputation is critical in giving an intellectual authority and voice. 
Reputation refers to the affiliation of an individual to particular figures or 
organisations as well as the extent to which the intellectual’s thoughts have been 
disseminated.  In the case of reformists in Iran, intellectuals’ affiliation with both the 
state at large and the reform movement specifically was indicative of where they 
could express their thoughts and how far they could go in expressing critical or 
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controversial opinions.  The newspapers or journals in which intellectuals published 
their work or the public forums in which they spoke depended on their social and 
political affiliations.  Moreover, the extent to which an intellectual could criticise the 
regime or voice controversial opinions before being reprimanded depended upon 
their historical involvement with the 1979 revolution and connections with the base 
of the regime.  The extent to which a person’s affiliation with the revolution can 
protect them from punishment by the state has tapered since the 2009 elections and 
continues to fade as internal power struggles divide the conservatively dominated 
regime.  Therefore, not only was the intellectuals own ability to connect with the 
public an issue, their chances of gaining initial access to public opinion was based on 
previous association.  However, it is important to note that their status could, and 
often did, change as a result of the degree they pushed boundaries and were 
confronted by adversaries in the state.  Their ability and willingness to push 
boundaries would ultimately stimulate the growth of civil society as it encouraged 
more citizens to express their opinions in a variety of forums, a sign of an evolving 
civil society.  The relationship between the public intellectual and society is a 
reciprocal one, with the role society assigns to intellectuals and the reaction of the 
state to them determining the power of the intellectuals.  “Intellectual self-image and 
definition, as well as the image and definition of intellectuals held by society as a 
whole, particularly political leaders, directly affect the intellectual’s role and his 
ability to play a specific role” (Camp, 1981, p. 304).       
 
2.5  Conclusion 
 
The main argument that can be drawn from this chapter is that with the historical 
development and expansion of the concept of civil society, theoretical and applied 
literature on civil society has tried to claim neutrality, despite its clear roots in liberal 
thought and the emergence of capitalism.  Moreover, the correlation between civil 
society and democratisation needs to be better understood, as it may be overstated at 
times.  Based on these sweeping assumptions, decisions are made by policymakers 
and scholars regarding development and democratisation through the promotion of 
civil society which are unable to achieve their intended goals.  Furthermore, not 
enough is known about the role of agency, particularly in reference to intellectuals 
who engage directly with civil society promotion.  Therefore, policy makers and 
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activists working in the arena of civil society development need to be challenged 
with regard to the flawed assumptions made about civil society’s inherent merits 
while engaging with a broader reading of civil society.   
 
Despite the drawbacks and shortcomings described above, civil society is not without 
merit.  The understanding of civil society used in this thesis is one where the arena is 
more than just organisations but also includes less structured collective actions such 
as social movements.  Although the domain of civil society is that which is separate 
from the economic sector, or market, and the institutions of the state, the complexity 
of society dictates intersections and overlaps.  Finally, the concept of civil society as 
used in this thesis is not about a static, independent sector of society or the path to 
the establishment of a distinct, utopian society.  Rather, civil society is deemed as the 
arena “…where power relationships are not only reproduced but also challenged.  It 
is an arena that neither determines nor is determined, but allows debate and 
contestation to take place with outcomes that are contingent” (Howell & Pearce, 
2001, p. 3).  A more encompassing perspective on civil society, which includes 
social movements, requires scholars and policy makers to examine and analyse the 
sphere in which actors create, reproduce and restructure the meaning of concepts that 
impact social order.   
 
The next chapter provides an empirical overview of Iranian history focused on the 
role of civil society and how it has been analysed in the literature.  The objective will 
be to reveal how an overreliance on perspectives that consider civil society to be only 
possible in liberal contexts, or which restrict it to voluntary associations, limits our 
ability to understand and engage with complex environments.  Moreover, the 
remaining chapters are part of a wider assertion of this thesis of how civil society 
was used as a frame by reformists in line with social movement theories and 
collective action frames.  Namely, collective action frames serve to reclassify as 
unjust what was once tolerated, and construct larger frames in order to adapt them to 
a given context (Snow & Benford, 1992; Tarrow, 1998).  The chapters that follow 
will show how reformist intellectuals realigned their association with the state and 
began a campaign, using the concept of civil society, to enhance their positions of 
power, how civil society activists benefited from the new campaign of civil society 
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promotion and, finally, how conservatives appropriated civil society language for 
their own means.            
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Chapter 3: Exploring the Iran Case through Literature 
 
While the last chapter concentrated on the theoretical literature underpinning this 
thesis, the following chapter explores the relevant historical context that led up to the 
period of the research focus, namely the rise and pursuit of the reform movement 
from 1997 to 2005.  In addition to tracing key issues and the concept of civil society 
through the history of 20th century Iran, pertinent literature addressing civil society 
during the reform movement, and its limitations, will be examined.  On the whole, 
the chapter will rely on two categories of literature, the first being works that deal 
directly with Iranian civil society by name, and its development.  A second set of 
literature used is one that does not directly address civil society as a concept by name 
in the Iranian context but draws on related issues based on broader approaches to 
civil society explained in the previous chapter.   
   
Although the inadequacies and overuse of civil society as part of the democratisation 
agenda of development practitioners was discussed in the previous chapter, the 
empirical study of civil society can still prove beneficial to a study of the 
democratisation process.  Similar to Jenny Pearce’s argument in reference to Latin 
America:  
...the concept of ‘civil society’ encourages us to ask what difference a more 
diverse associational life can in fact make to the development of a rights-based 
state in the region.  We can explore the extent to which the inequalities of the 
marketplace can be reconciled with the political equality premised in the 
concept of ‘democracy’, and whether associational life can contribute to such a 
reconciliation by re-shaping the political arena in ways that make it 
accountable to and representative of wider social groups.  (2003, p. 114)   
 
The following chapter is not an exhaustive account of Iranian history or literature as 
it relates to civil society; rather, it is intended to provide a snapshot of how 
components of civil society played decisive roles in bringing about or moving 
forward key moments of the country’s modern history and helped shape present day 
Iranian society.  Finally, the literature discussed below contributes to the application 
and understanding of civil society theory in non-Western contexts.          
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At this point, it is important to note two key issues that frame Iran’s historical 
developments as it relates to civil society.  The two points are, one, its history of 
survival as a rentier state and two, a tradition of Shia Islam as the dominant religion.   
As argued by the noted scholar Theda Skocpol (Skocpol, 1982), it was the 
vulnerabilities of a rentier state and the characteristics of Shia Islam that played a 
strong role in fomenting the 1979 Revolution.   Rentier state refers to the country’s 
reliance on abundant natural resources, including oil and gas, for government funds 
in place of taxation.  As a result, the state’s responsibility towards, and in turn 
expectations of citizens from the government, has played a significant role in how 
welfare is structured in the state.  In other words, the state is expected to meet the 
basic welfare needs of its population from the sale of its resources instead of taxes 
obtained from citizens; accountability is also impacted as citizens are more 
demanding of governments when they have a higher tax burden.  To an extent, if the 
state is able to support itself and its citizens financially, economic interests can lose 
colour in favour of other concerns.  In Middle Eastern countries: 
…rentierism enhances state autonomy by eliminating economically motivated 
pressure groups and by making a segment of the bourgeoisie dependent on 
the state. But at the same time it leads to the emergence of culturally and 
ideologically based groups such as Islamist movements, for whom economic 
issues are of secondary importance. (Shambayati, 1994, p. 307) 
It should be noted that while the role of economic welfare and equality may become 
secondary, it by no means vanishes.  Economics can come to the forefront of internal 
politics at full force when the state is not able to manage its resources or loses 
income as a result of domestic or international politics.   
 
In large part, the Iranian state, both during the various monarchies and in their 
aftermath, has been a key provider of employment as it manages an economy based 
on property and natural resources, such as petroleum and natural gas, rather than 
industrial production.  Earning its wealth from the sale of these resources has a 
bearing on the state’s relationship with international actors who serve as customers 
while diminishing accountability towards citizens whose tax burden is limited: 
“…external rents such as oil revenues are not the result of productive activity. The 
governments of countries such as Iran can not [sic] claim credit for increasing the 
national wealth based on their ability to  enhance hydrocarbon revenues, nor can they  
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claim  credit for economic and social development” (Shambayati, 1994, p. 310).  As 
a result, “Unable to legitimize themselves on their performance, rentier states try to 
legitimize their rule on moral and cultural grounds” (ibid).  The economy is 
secondary so long as the state is able to maintain economic stability: 
Politically, a rentier political bargain is stable only as long as sufficient 
resources are available. In times of abundance it hinders the emergence of 
independent political interests demanding democratization and strengthens 
the autonomy of the state vis-a-vis society. A vibrant civil society is unlikely 
to emerge and non-governmental interests are usually organized around the 
state’s allocation system. Political reform and democratization can be 
expected in rentier states only in time [sic] of declining resources or in times 
of fiscal crisis. (Schwarz, 2008, p. 610)  
In essence, a rentier state minimises interaction between citizens and the state that in 
turn minimises the space for civil society formation.  In contrast, state formation in 
economically developed countries involves bargaining over citizens’ ability to 
contribute the necessary resources of money and military service, whereas in poor 
countries the state has the option of ignoring or coercing citizens (Moore, 2001, p. 
394).  So long as the state meets the financial needs of citizens, challenge to its 
authority from the mass base of its population will be limited.  The state’s 
competitors are more likely to emerge from a smaller group of individuals, such as 
public intellectuals, who have loftier ideological goals than economic gain (for 
example, establishment of an Islamic state in the case of the 1979 Revolution and 
liberalisation in the case of the reform movement)11.                  
 
The second issue, Shia Islam, specifically the Ithnā ʿAshariyyah branch, took on an 
influential role once it was adopted by the ruling Safavid dynasty in the 16th century.  
One significant factor of Shiism is the principle of marja-i taqlid, meaning source of 
emulation, which refers to a learned religious scholar and cleric who has earned the 
title of Grand Ayatollah and has the authority to rule on religious law and act as a 
source of guidance for his Shia followers.  Shia Muslims are encouraged to select 
and follow a marja as part of their religious practice.  This principle was used when 
establishing the role of Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic and previous to that 
was instrumental in giving religious figures social and political power (Amirpur, 
2006).   
                                                 
11
 This is not to say that economic wellbeing and control play no part.   
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A second significant factor is the practice of charity and volunteerism which have 
played a role in socio-political developments.  These practices are embodied in 
doctrines such as Khums, the giving of one-fifth of a person’s earning as an Islamic 
tax, often given to a marja for allocation amongst those in need.12  This practice, in a 
sense, has played the role of taxation such that the relationship between religious 
leaders and communities is transformed into one of local governments, where the 
citizens provide cash that religious authorities must use to deliver goods and services 
to those in need (see for example Algar, 1969; Nasr, 2007).  Communities often set 
up voluntary associations which are responsible for the actual distribution of the 
goods and services purchased using these finances.  The traditional bazari 
(merchant) class were major donors who developed a strategic power relationship 
with religious figures (Bashiriyeh, 1984), which will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  In addition to the payment of official monies, regular charitable giving on 
special holidays or to mark events such as weddings or illness is common practice.  
While charity may be given directly on these occasions, they are usually passed on to 
community volunteer associations which are familiar with the needs of local 
community members.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter, and thesis in general, to 
examine the above issues in detail and how modern lifestyles and changes in 
government have swayed attitudes towards welfare and the practice of charitable 
giving.  What is relevant to note is the existence of community participation, due to 
its bearing on civil society development as a whole, and the various links between 
different segments of society.     
 
Hegel’s understanding of civil society is useful as he supports the view that civil 
society is not a natural state but a product of history.  The development of Iranian 
civil society, it will be shown, is also unique to its historical experience.  The 
significance of the issues raised above in this historical development are twofold.  
First, the rentier state has played a significant role in how the Iranian state’s 
relationship with its citizen-base has developed (Skocpol, 1982).  Even after the 
establishment of a republic, the state was able to survive independent of taxes, 
                                                 
12
 The practice of Zakat, which represents the giving of one-tenth of a person’s assets (assets used to 
calculate this amount are based on a specific list of items), is considered the duty of practising 
Muslims.  However, this practice is less prominent amongst Shia Iranians than that of Khums.    
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remained a major provider of employment and did not pursue privatisation as the 
private sector represented competition rather than a source of income from taxation.  
Referring back to the Hegelian notion of civil society, the Iranian context diverges 
from Western history, where the state was considered a mediator in the civil society 
sphere that coincided with the emergence of capitalist interests: rather, in Iran, the 
state has historically stood at the top of society as a paternalistic figure with 
responsibility for welfare, which is based on its own discretion, and not reliant on 
taxes from the commercial sector for its survival.   
 
Second, religious taxation resulted in the granting of power to the religious clergy 
within communities by controlling substantial financial wealth.  Hegel’s views from 
the last chapter can be used here as well to show that while liberal interpretations of 
civil society are not sufficient for the understanding of non-Western contexts, they 
provide a platform from which questions can be asked.  Hegel argues that political 
power is needed to interfere and facilitate conflicting interests for the different forces 
in civil society in order to retain its ‘civility’.  Taking this viewpoint, scholars of 
modern Iran need to examine how different interests, such as the bazar and clergy, 
were reconciled with one another, particularly as certain sectors of civil society, such 
as the religious establishment (before being incorporated into the state), controlled 
vast amounts of wealth and played a significant role in welfare provision.  In fact, 
with the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the state and religious authority were 
merged, and the new political authority appropriated many voluntary community 
associations.  It was in this setting that reformists found themselves by the late 1990s 
and the civil society discourse transpired.  Ferguson’s view on the relationship 
between a reduction of public spirit and consequent rise in corruption corresponding 
with the growth of commercialisation, as discussed in Chapter Two, relates to the 
role of the bazar and expanding business interests in Iran.  On the one hand, the 
bazar and private sector can be considered part of civil society as active agents for 
social change.   On the other hand, members of the bazar and private sector have 
made political alliances and taken actions based on their own self-interests.               
 
The first section of the chapter elaborates on the types of literature addressing Iranian 
civil society.  The second section offers insight into key stages of 20th century 
Iranian history, up to the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.  The third 
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section delves into the aftermath of the revolution and the establishment of strategic 
institutions that reveal the increasingly blurred boundaries between civil society and 
the public sector.  The final section provides a critical look at a spectrum of academic 
literature that addresses Iranian civil society directly through its relationship with the 
reform movement in order to illuminate gaps in existing literature.  By setting the 
contextual framework for the following three empirical chapters, Chapter Three 
traces the concept of civil society to reveal how it circulated, become appropriated, 
reinterpreted and contested in modern Iranian history.  This allows for a more 
complete understanding of the situation as it existed when reformists came to utilise 
civil society for the purpose of enhancing political and social power.   
 
3.1  Types of Literature13 
 
While English language literature analysing the civil society discourse in Iran grew 
in the period surrounding Khatami’s presidency, it is limited to several academics, 
with most in-depth theoretical work in English written by Masoud Kamali, an Iranian 
born professor of sociology in Sweden.  This narrow group of work is analytical in 
its approach to discussing the origins of Iranian civil society, based on a particular 
definition given by the author, and how civil society developed historically, with 
particular attention given to the Constitutional Revolution in the early years of the 
twentieth century and the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  Unfortunately, this body of 
literature is limited in diversity and scope.   
 
There also exists a second category of writers, consisting of a number of scholars in 
areas such as political science, philosophy and religion who touch upon the notion of 
civil society and its characterizations in, and implications for, Iran as part of their 
greater social or political discourse.  Their ideas are of importance due to several 
factors, including their comprehensive understanding of Iran’s past and present as 
well as their influence in various political circles.  A great deal of this literature 
emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, parallel to the rise in global interest in civil society.  
                                                 
13
 The aim of this literature review is to gain an understanding of the civil society activity taking place 
in Iran as well as the theoretical discourses surrounding the topic.  While some sections refer to 
English literature by scholars based outside of Iran who have greater autonomy in terms of what they 
write than individuals based in Iran, Persian language literature has been thoroughly investigated and 
included in the thesis, particularly in the section on the civil society discourse in Iran and Chapter 
Four.       
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Therefore, a portion of this chapter will examine their views and analyse their 
significance to gain a better understanding of why Iranian civil society has taken its 
present shape and how new ideas and different interpretations of Islam and Iranian 
society can influence future political and social change.   
 
A third component of literature on Iranian civil society exists which is dedicated to 
the development of civil society organisations, particularly nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), since the 1997 election of Khatami.  This type of literature 
follows a broader trend in development circles that are concerned exclusively with 
organisations and their role in economic development and political democratisation.  
The definition of civil society used here is in line with that used by donor agencies 
working in the field of development, as addressed in Chapter Two.  Most work in 
this category can be found in the form of reports and studies on the emerging NGO 
sector as civil society is deemed synonymous with the NGO sector.  Examples of 
literature that emerged from Iran during the reform period include those generated by 
organizations such as the Hamyaran Iran NGO Resource Centre, the Iran CSOs 
Training & Research Center (ICTRC) and other organizations working on capacity 
building programmes for Iranian NGOs.  Literature in this field from outside Iran 
includes research on areas such as capacity building, NGO laws, youth, human rights 
and environmental issues and the role of information and communication 
technologies, (for example, see Katirai, 2005; Mostashari, 2005; Rohde, 2004; 
Squire, 2006).  The significant point to take into account with this body of work is 
how they categorize an organization as an NGO (and whether this matches 
internationally recognized standards), their side-lining of traditional organisations as 
well as why and how the NGO, in this literature, is often conflated with all of civil 
society.  A deeper exploration of these questions falls largely outside the scope of 
this thesis.     
 
A bulk of academic literature on contemporary Iranian civil society, particularly 
fitting in the organisational category of civil society, places its focus on the women’s 
movements.  Examples include Elaheh Rostami Povey’s study on trade unions and 
women’s NGOs (2004) and numerous publications by Ziba Mir-Hosseini on gender 
issues in Iran, such as “Debating Women: Gender and Public Sphere in Post-
Revolutionary Iran” in Civil Society in the Muslim World (2002).  Haleh Afshar has 
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also written extensively on the topic of women in Iran, offering insight on topics 
such as Islam and feminism (see for example Afshar, 1998; Afshar, 2007).  While the 
participation of women in Iran’s political and social spheres is not a new 
phenomenon, Iran witnessed an outward surge in political and social activism by 
women and for women during the reform period that is reflected in this research and 
can be attributed to the reform movement’s campaign for liberalization of rights 
combined with the effect of international campaigns for women’s rights.  Although 
this type of literature is valuable, its exclusive focus does not provide a broad 
understanding of the discourse that took place among reformists on the issue of civil 
society.  Moreover, this type of work is often grounded in particular feminist 
perspectives, which is a complex area of study on its own.     
 
Finally, a limited component of literature reflecting Iranian political and social 
development addresses the intellectuals who have played an important role in 
Khatami’s campaign and the reform movement as a whole.  Most literature, written 
primarily in the late 1990s and early 2000s is descriptive, setting out the various 
arguments of intellectuals.  As this PhD thesis sets out to study the role of public 
intellectuals in the promotion of civil society, a component of the reform 
movement’s agenda, the literature will also be addressed in the concluding section of 
this chapter.   
 
3.2  Definitions of Civil Society in the Iranian Context 
 
One of the first issues to be addressed, either directly or indirectly, in civil society 
literature is the definition of civil society with which the writer works.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, when various writers set out to examine and analyse civil 
society in theory or practice, they use a general theoretical framework from which 
their results are derived.  Understanding how and why a writer defines civil society in 
the way he or she does is an important first step in comprehending the theoretical or 
policy implications they set out.  It is for this reason that the following section 
focuses on how various authors dealing with the Iranian context understand civil 
society and how they apply to analysis of the current state, and future prognosis, of 
Iran.    
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Writers discussing Iranian civil society often differ in their approach as a result of the 
conditions and definitions of civil society they use as a backdrop for their work.  This 
approach is necessary since Iranian society, with its history of authoritarianism and 
cultural ties to Islam cannot be equated with Western society, where the term civil 
society first came about.  On the one hand, this “re-defining” of civil society to meet 
the needs of a particular social or political order can be seen as submitting to the 
illiberal traditions of a society and justification of present-day order.  However, as 
literature such as Civil Society and the State (Keane, 1988) has shown, civil society, 
even in the Western context, does not have a uniform definition and authors with 
varying views have faced criticism in the way they have defined and used the term 
civil society.  Therefore, interpretations that authors discussing Iran have used can 
lead to a better understanding of the way in which its society has developed and point 
the way forward.  Rather than dismissing the notion that civil society has ever existed 
in this context, we can view the differing ways in which it has emerged and the 
mechanisms necessary to either strengthen this same form of civil society or 
transform it altogether. 
 
While some authors spell out their working definition of civil society, some allow the 
reader to assume the definition or interpretation of civil society they employ.  As 
such, many writers reviewed in research for this thesis have used Gellner’s 
definition, or a derivative of it, in their analysis.  As described in Chapter Two, 
Gellner equates civil society with nongovernmental organisations that hold the state 
accountable.  Their points of agreement and departure in applying this definition of 
civil society to the Iranian context are interesting, particularly in light of the fact that 
Gellner did not see civil society as being compatible with Islamic society.  In “Civil 
society in Iran: Past, present and the future”, Ali Paya14 defines civil society as “… 
‘social institutions’, which act as a buffer between the individual and his or her 
‘social environment’, and create breathing spaces for the individual vis-à-vis other 
individuals and powerful social institutions or socially constructed entities” (Paya, 
2004, p. 165).  He elaborates on this by defining powerful institutions as the state, 
similar to Gellner, but expands this definition to include large business corporations.  
While the definition may be useful in his brief overview, its use of the term “social 
                                                 
14
 The relevance of Ali Paya’s work will be discussed further later in this chapter.   
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institutions” is too ambiguous, especially if considering Iranian civil society to be in 
a developing stage.  What is useful from Paya’s work is his reference to civil society 
as a social construct that is continuously changing (2004, p. 165).  As a social 
construct, there can be greater freedom in the conceptual interpretation and practical 
application of civil society to development contexts. 
 
It is in fact these interpretations that change the values and limits attributed to civil 
society, as can be seen below.  Masoud Kamali, a key writer on Iranian civil society, 
as well as civil society and Islam, identifies civil society as “…a social sphere where 
non-political individuals and groups interact and organize their social life” (Kamali, 
1998, pp. 35-36).  He adds to this definition by separating society into the two 
spheres of civil society and the state, similar to the definitions used above.  For him, 
there is a difference between the Western conception of civil society and the case of 
Iran.  In Iran, “It is a civil society of communities and institutions rather than 
individual citizens and their associations” (emphasis in original, Kamali, 1998, p. 
11).  He departs from thinkers such as Gellner by challenging two key notions of 
contemporary civil society: that of individualism and democratic institutions.  He 
states that the latter two factors are attached to the socio-cultural development of the 
West and are not relevant to Iran’s history or that of other Muslim societies where 
groups and communities supersede the individual.  In their place, he contends that 
civil groups and their affiliated institutions that counteract the state form the basis of 
civil society in Iran (Kamali, 1998, p. 11).  In Multiple Modernities, Civil Society and 
Islam, he states that a civil society must meet the following conditions: 
1-Relative autonomy of a societal sphere from the state 
2-Relative autonomous access of some societal actors to the state or its elite 
3-Existence of a relatively independent public sphere 
4-Legal and/or normative protection of societal agents and institutions       
5-Existence of a ‘solidary sphere’ based on redistribution of resources  
(Kamali, 2006, p. 40) 
With this basis, it is much easier to see how civil society has historic roots in Iranian 
history, particularly with the ulama, or Islamic clergy.  Kamali explains in detail the 
historic role of the ulama in Iranian society, with examples of the Constitutional 
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Revolution as well as the Islamic Revolution, as a powerful force, particularly 
against the state (2006, p. 222). The stance represented by Kamali adds an important 
dimension to any study of Iran by inferring that civil society should not be studied 
simply as a modern phenomenon but to also consider the socio-political precursors to 
contemporary debates.   
 
Kamali further challenges the entire notion that civil society, as a Western concept, 
cannot exist in Muslim communities.  He describes two different forms of civil 
society, that of “An indigenous civil society based on a core of quasi-traditional and 
indigenous-modern influential groups” and “A modern civil society built around a 
core of Westernized intellectuals and modern social groups” (Kamali, 2006, p. 255).  
With Kamali’s depiction of civil society, we see a different side, one that has 
survived and can be further bolstered in Muslim societies.  Overall, Kamali himself 
finds that the social movements that have evolved over time and found voice in 21st 
century Iran are promising despite the numerous obstacles they face, an issue that 
will be discussed in detail at a later point.  However, this is not to say that Kamali’s 
distinction between Western and non-Western models of civil society can be 
categorically seen as a positive move.  While he allows, and effectively argues for a 
different view, his interpretation of civil society can potentially leave out certain 
activities aimed at changing society such as ideas and actions pushing for human 
rights and democratisation.      
 
Even at this introductory point we witness how the different interpretations of civil 
society clash in a manner that may impact forthcoming analysis by looking at how 
Paya’s arguments conflict with those by Kamali.  While Kamali takes great care to 
distance civil society from the individual, Paya’s definition of civil society makes 
direct reference to it.  Here, as with all literature on the topic, we are reminded of the 
significant role the writer’s definitions of each term play.  Nevertheless, though 
Paya’s understanding of civil society uses the individual as the point of reference, he 
continues to write of the existence of civil society in Iran.  He notes the importance 
of the Islamic clergy, making particular mention of Shia jurists, and their role in 
countering state power, with another noteworthy group of individuals, the asnaf, or 
networks, resembling a more diverse set of European guilds (Paya, 2004).   Overall, 
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the difference between the authors opens up space about how Iranian society’s past 
should be examined and what this implies for the future. 
 
3.3  Historical Background: 20th century Iran 
 
This section provides a look at the historical backdrop of the issues central to this 
thesis, namely civil society development and the role of public intellectuals, by 
examining significant events and discourses from the Constitutional Revolution up to 
the revolution that abolished the monarchy in 1979.  Civil society in Iran will be 
examined from a historical perspective, with specific focus on several key events in 
Iran’s modern history.  The role of intellectuals in major political shifts is also 
described.  Although partly descriptive, the following sections support the argument 
that even though civil society is a theoretical concept born from Western thought, the 
ideals that it represents are not unique and have a long standing tradition in non-
Western contexts, including Iran.  While it has not always been referred to as civil 
society in name by social and political actors and observers, the attributes that make 
up civil society were not only present but have been influential in shaping social, 
political and economic life in the context of contemporary Iran.  The crowd, as it is 
called by Ervand Abrahamian, has been used to articulate the wants of the masses in 
Iran, particularly in cities, through organised practices, such as strikes, public 
meetings and protests (Ervand Abrahamian, 1968).  For Abrahamian, the crowd is 
not a mob but a more organised demonstration, representing the masses’ form of 
expression.  In a sense, this can be seen as a provisional basis of civil society, the 
definition of which will by the late 20th century include demonstrations, 
organisations and space with links to democratisation.        
 
The Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) 
 
Iran’s constitutional revolution, or Mashrutiyyat, took place in the early twentieth 
century, roughly dating between the years 1905 to 1911. The political setting was a 
monarchy, controlled by the Qajar dynasty that lasted from the late eighteenth 
century up to 1925.  The outcome of this so-called ‘revolution’ was the establishment 
of the first national parliament (majles-e showra-ye melli) and a constitution.  The 
term ‘revolution’ is placed in quotes because it can be disputed whether the 
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constitution was developed as a result of a movement or revolution.  As Stephen 
Poulson (2005) argues in Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Iran, social 
movements and revolutions are closely linked in Iran, and, in the case of what is 
historically referred to as the Constitutional Revolution, not all of the ‘revolutionary’ 
goals of its instigators were realised.  It is necessary to raise Poulson’s argument here 
because it introduces the nuances that should be considered when analysing the 
actors and events that surround such significant moments in social and political 
development and will be relevant in this thesis. 
 
As argued by Gheissari and Nasr, a domestic crisis arose by the end of the 19th 
century as a result of a European attempt to dictate the direction of the country’s 
economy and politics, leading to a struggle that has in turn shaped Iran’s modern 
politics.  The struggle was, “…between, on the one hand, the ideals of freedom and 
rule of law and, on the other, the demand for stability, order, development, and the 
kind of state that can provide them” (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, p. 23).  In other words, 
conflict emerged from an effort to balance the desire for welfare provision from the 
state with the aspiration for individual autonomy and limiting state power.  Making 
the situation more complicated, there existed multiple factions based on a diverse 
range of interests that formed, broke and recreated alliances within this struggle.  A 
look at the constitutional revolution, and other defining moments in Iran’s history, 
reveal the complexity of Iranian society.  This complexity uncovers influential social 
circles and their formal and informal institutions, the discourse among and between 
different factions and the civil society sphere that emerged as a result.            
   
One of the most striking features of the Constitutional Revolution was the activism 
and dialogue instigated among various social groups and a growing press.  According 
to Masoud Kamali, the main social groups on the eve of the Constitutional 
Revolution were the aristocrats, the ulama (clergy), the landlords, the bazaris 
(merchants), modern urban groups, peasants and tribes (Kamali, 1998, p. 80).  These 
social groups named by Kamali can be categorized as components of civil society 
which were organised around shared interests and mutual benefits.  This is confirmed 
by Hadi Khaniki, an advisor to Khatami and intellectual, who states that on the eve 
of the Constitutional Revolution, a number of entities existed that can be attributed to 
visions of civil society, as entities with socio-economic roles, ideological vehicles, 
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etc.  According to him, these civil society entities include but are not limited to 
networks of ulama, syndicates and zurkhaneh (translated directly as ‘house of 
strength/power’, zurkhaneh are traditional gymnasiums) (Khaniki, 2002, p. 93).        
 
The following sections will outline how the different components of civil society 
eventually gave way to the Constitutional Revolution.  The bazaris, for example, 
were the owners and leaders of commerce; however, outside the marketplace and 
their commercial pursuits, they also established associations among themselves and 
collaborated with other groups in non-commercial activities to meet collective and 
mutually beneficial goals.  The ulama, for the most part, remained separate from the 
state and had consolidated their power by the 19th century as a result of growing 
support for the notion of high ranking clerics providing religious guidance and 
serving as sources of emulation (Azimi, 2008, pp. 30-31).  As described below, 
members of the ulama and bazari class often supported one another’s social and 
political agendas.     
 
The Tobacco Movement (1891-92) as a precursor  
 
While the Constitutional Revolution itself took place in the early twentieth century, 
its groundwork was laid earlier as a result of events that impacted the country’s 
political and social landscape.  By the late nineteenth century, the political rule of the 
Qajar dynasty was well established as were their ties to foreign countries through a 
series of strategic concessions that provided vast benefits to the royal court.  
Beginning in 1889, preliminary negotiations were complete for an agreement with 
the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Great Britain whereby, “…all rights concerning 
the sale and distribution of Iranian tobacco inside Iran and in export were given to 
the English company, which, in return was to pay the Iranian government: £15,000 a 
year” (Kamali, 1998, p. 77).  With the arrival of the English company’s employees, 
the bazaris, who were impacted by such concessions to foreign companies, 
responded negatively to what they considered an incursion on their economic 
interests.  Cooperating with the bazaris were the ulama; the cooperation between 
these two entities was based upon mutual interest due to the interdependence of the 
bazar’s economic power with the clerics’ social power.  In exchange for patronage, 
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the clerics, who were a respected group of individuals in Shia Iran, defended and 
supported the actions of the bazari class.    
 
During the tobacco movement, the merchants shut down the trade in the marketplace 
and organised mass demonstrations across the country with support from the ulama, 
who mobilized urban people and established themselves as leaders of city dwellers 
(Kamali, 1998, p. 78).  One specific form of support from the ulama was a fatwa, or 
religious edict, that opposed the use of tobacco on religious grounds.  While the 
details of the fatwa and its origins are complex and subject to debate (for example, 
dispute over who actually wrote the edict versus whom it is attributed to), its overall 
consequence demonstrates the strong role of the clergy.  The outcome of the public’s 
actions was the annulment of the concessions and, ultimately, the ulama’s lifting of 
the fatwa, effectively ending the boycott of tobacco.  The tobacco movement 
signified the rising role of ulama and showed how “…the ulama played their 
traditional role as the true leaders of civil society of Iran and forced the state to 
accept them as its civil counterpart” (Kamali, 1998, p. 78).   Ultimately, the events of 
the tobacco movement demonstrated to the public the role they could play in 
influencing the state, an understanding that motivated subsequent events leading to 
the Constitutional Revolution.   
 
Intellectuals and the Constitutional Revolution  
 
Another key component of civil society at the turn of the century was the role of 
intellectuals.  Ali Gheissari offers a detailed account of intellectuals and their 
establishment as an independent group in the late nineteenth century and during the 
Constitutional movement in Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century (1998).  He 
describes the increase in journals and newspapers along with the transformation of 
writers and poets into professional journalists.  The principles of the Constitutional 
movement were espoused in various forms of literature, and “Political writings, such 
as newspapers, leaflets, tracts and pamphlets, enjoyed a growing popularity among 
the literate public who became the new patrons for writers.  New ideas were 
introduced and debated” (Gheissari, 1998, p. 17).  In effect, the written word became 
a means to communicate differing ideas among the masses, albeit a platform 
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available for those belonging to literate groups.  The emergence of a critical press 
represented the foundation for a public space and platform for civil dialogue.   
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the intelligentsia consisted of young students 
sent to Europe to study, from affluent families with ties to the royal court and 
government (Kamali, 1998, p. 98).  Intellectuals were able to inject discourse with 
new vocabulary imported from European thought while “…infusing the old political 
idiom with a new content” (Azimi, 2008, p. 29).  These intellectuals differed from 
their predecessors, who were affiliated with the royal court or seminaries, and 
“…perceived the world…through the French Enlightenment.  They venerated not 
royal authority but popular sovereignty; not tradition but Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity; not Shadows of God on Earth but the inalienable Rights of Man” (Ervand 
Abrahamian, 2008, p. 35).  It was these individuals who brought words such as 
demokrasi (democracy), Kapitalism (capitalism) and sosyalism (socialism) into 
popular discourse, introduced new terms, for example chap (left) and rast (right) and 
redefined other terms, for example, “dowlat from patrimonial court to national 
government” and ‘mellat’ from ‘religious community’ to ‘nation’” (Ervand 
Abrahamian, 2008, p. 36).        
 
The contribution of exiled writers to public debates is also noteworthy.  According to 
Gheissari (1998), a number of authors contributing to this literature were living in 
exile and their work was, at times, published as a result of financial support from 
Iran’s merchant families who lived abroad while running their offices across India, 
Russia and the Ottoman Empire.  In fact, it was these merchants who helped the 
spread of ideas along the three main routes of Bushire-Bombay, Rasht-Baku and 
Tabriz-Istanbul at the turn of the century, “While the ideas of nationalism and liberal 
democracy had come to Iran through Ottoman Turkey and British India, respectively, 
the more radical socialist and communist ideas were imported from Russia” 
(Gheissari, 1998, pp. 17-18). The presence of socialist theory also had a profound 
impact on the course of intellectual activity and on Iran’s modern history as a whole.  
The Constitutional Revolution serves as an early example of the leading role 
intellectuals played in introducing ideas that eventually led to action by a broader 
section of society.  Here we see a form of civil society in action, as it was embodied 
in the discourse amongst intellectuals, collective action by the merchant classes and 
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the role of the clerics.  This type of discourse and power struggle between factions of 
society and the ruling state continued up to and through the revolution, as discussed 
below.       
 
From a Constitutional Monarchy to an Islamic Republic: Between two 
revolutions 
 
During the period between the establishment of parliament, as a result of the 
Constitutional Revolution, and the replacement of the monarchy with a republic by 
1979, a host of significant developments took place.  Civil society, as a space where 
ideas were debated and power contested through formal and informal structures, 
matured.  The roots and causes of the 1979 revolution itself are a complex and 
debated affair with a dedicated set of literature beyond the scope of this chapter 
(Examples of detailed academic studies of the revolution include Ervand 
Abrahamian, 1982; Kurzman, 2004; Zahedi, 2000).  During the lead up to the 
revolution, a vibrant civil society did indeed exist, some of which transformed in the 
revolution’s aftermath.  As previous and subsequent sections and chapters will show, 
a variety of institutions and actors from civil society were involved in the revolution, 
many of who were later altered and incorporated into the state.  This highlights the 
complicated and dynamic nature of civil society and the problem of expecting it to 
conform to a single model. 
 
Moreover, the revolution that saw the emergence of the Islamic government is part 
and parcel of a complex history that should not be reduced to “...narrating the 
conflict between the society and state.  The revolution and what followed can be 
better understood by paying attention to the dynamics of competition between 
democracy and ideology in the decades before the revolution” (Gheissari & Nasr, 
2006, p. 8).  Gheissari and Nasr are referring to the “inherent tensions” between 
commitments to democratic values and ideological claims.  This can be interpreted as 
a disconnect between a demand by a faction of society for an end to an authoritarian 
monarchy, while another faction, or at times the same faction, called for an 
ideologically grounded system of government not rooted in liberal democratic 
values.  Their reasoning reflects the argument that a strict binary between society and 
state ignores nuances of the relationship as well as the diversity amongst the actors 
representing each entity.  They argue successfully that, “It is important to place the 
95 
 
revolution of 1979 in its proper historical context: neither as end nor culmination of a 
historical process, but rather as an interregnum in a longer process of state-building 
that began in 1905 and is still unfolding” (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, p. 9).  Simply put, 
the events and discourses that emerged from the turn of the nineteenth century 
onward play a continuous role in shaping the country’s political and social landscape 
and its actors.  Neither the Islamic revolution nor the events that followed can be 
considered as a discrete occurrence, a theme emphasised throughout this thesis.  
 
Chapter Six will provide more in-depth coverage of how sections of civil society 
were usurped and adapted by conservative factions in the revolution’s aftermath.   
However, the following sections will address key events and groups in the period 
preceding the revolution.      The rationale behind the selection of the particular 
topics discussed below is that they represent core issues that impacted wider socio-
political changes in modern Iran, the role of public intellectuals and the influence of 
Western ideas and actions.  All of these are contextually significant in a study of 
contemporary Iranian civil society and how the concept came to be used by reformist 
figures in the Islamic Republic.    
 
The Tudeh Party 
 
One of the key subjects mentioned above is the Tudeh Party.  The Tudeh Party, 
roughly translated as the party of the masses, was launched in 1941 with efforts to 
continue the work of the banned Communist Party of Iran, though the Party was not 
definitively founded on the basis of communist principles.  The Party is described 
here as a substantial representative of intellectual activity in the social and political 
sphere of Iran in the decades leading to the 1979 Revolution.   The Communist Party 
of Iran was itself founded in 1920 and its activities included the establishment of 
trade unions in industries such as oil, and a women’s movement.  The parties 
represent the emergence of Marxist and socialist thought in Iran that were in large 
part a result of international communication and commercial lines between Iran and 
its neighbours to the north in addition to principles of liberalism and democracy.  As 
a result of government persecution and foreign intervention, both under Qajar rule 
and followed by the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), the Communist Party was 
unable to remain a publicly active organization.  However, after Reza Shah was 
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forced out of power in 1941, the Tudeh Party gained recognition as a social and 
political force.  Upon its inception, trade unions were established across the country 
then followed by the Party’s participation in parliamentary elections.   
 
Intellectuals were a key component of the Tudeh Party that had become a symbol for 
change.  Early on, ‘…the term “Tudeh’i” (a member of the Tudeh) was often equated 
with rawshanfekr (intellectual)’ (Nabavi, 2003, p. 9).  Discourse and scholarship 
were, therefore, core issues that contributed to the Party’s value as an organ of civil 
society, going beyond a political party with explicit political goals.  While the Party 
did not develop into an exclusive intellectual enclave, intellectual activity continued 
to play a role in the Party and, conversely, the Party played a role in generating 
scholarly dialogue.  Many individuals who gained prominence in Iran’s intellectual 
circles in the mid-twentieth century were in some way affiliated with the Tudeh 
Party.  While a significant number of its members played a role in making the 
revolution of 1979 happen, the party gradually lost political power until it was 
outlawed by the Islamic regime.  Nonetheless, the individuals, particularly public 
intellectuals, affiliated with the movement played a significant role in shaping social 
and political movements across Iran.            
 
Mosaddeq, the National Front and nationalisation of oil 
 
The Tudeh Party did not remain alone in its activities. In the 1940s, the National 
Front political movement was established by Mohammad Mosaddeq.  Initially 
opposing Mosaddeq and the National Front, the Tudeh Party later took part in the 
coalitions formed by the National Front.  Named Prime Minister of Iran by 
Parliament in 1951, Mosaddeq quickly moved to nationalise the country’s oil 
industry.  Up to that point, the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dominated 
the industry and had been refusing requests for higher royalties.  Mosaddeq’s actions 
were popular among the masses, initially receiving a wider range of support from 
groups such as the Tudeh Party and religious leaders.  He had the power of the public 
behind him, “Every time the opposition reared its head, whether in parliament or in 
the court, he would make a direct appeal to the public, and would rely on 
demonstrations to bring his opponents ‘under his influence’” (Ervand Abrahamian, 
1968, p. 190, the portion in inverted commas inside quote was cited from Ettelaat-i 
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Haftegi, 20 June 1951).  It is relevant to note Mosaddeq’s well-regarded status as an 
individual.  The British Charge d’Affaires stated in 1951, “The Premier [Mosaddeq] 
is able to control parliamentary and public opinion mainly because of his personal 
popularity” (Foreign Office document in Ervand  Abrahamian, 2001, p. 187).  
However, Mosaddeq and his pursuit of nationalism came under attack from many 
angles.  The foreign entities that had thus far benefited substantially from their 
agreement with the Pahlavi regime over the country’s oil wealth were at the forefront 
of this attack.  The Pahlavi regime (1941-1979) itself was displeased with the 
independent authority Mosaddeq was exerting as Prime Minister and its implications 
for the monarchy’s authority in the future.  Moreover, the prominent position of 
Communists in the situation alarmed other supporters.  Disagreements over sensitive 
issues, such as interpretation of religious laws, taxes on the bazaar and appointments 
to the ministries of justice and education caused rifts in the National Front, with the 
religious wing breaking away from Mossadeq (Ervand  Abrahamian, 2001, p. 200).    
 
In 1953, Mossadeq was overthrown with support from British and American 
intelligence agencies (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, p. 54):   
Although popular perceptions in later years would deny this, in the summer 
of 1953, the monarchy and the military’s realism resonated with many 
Iranians, whose personal interests and perceptions of national interest had 
diverged from Mossadeq’s platform.  Although many Iranians would later 
idolise Mosaddeq as a ‘secular saint’ and lament the consolidation of power 
in state institutions, the threat that they perceived to Iranian sovereignty and 
social stability in 1953 had nudged them to acquiesce to accelerating the pace 
of state-building and to vesting greater powers in those institutions that could 
provide order and protect Iran’s territorial integrity. 
While the idea of Mossadeq’s mission was applauded by many, the risks that 
accompanied it were not accepted.  Parallels can be drawn from the above 
assessment with current events, in which stability, individual freedoms and less overt 
threats to territorial integrity are endured when faced with full scale conflict (i.e. 
compliance with the Islamic regime in the face of unpredictable regime change 
instigated from the outside).  Overall, Mossadeq’s actions and his eventual overthrow 
in 1953 represent a landmark moment in contemporary Iranian history.  Idealism was 
suppressed in exchange for an unfair yet stable state.  Moreover (Gheissari & Nasr, 
2006, p. 54): 
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...it is from this point forward that the demand for democracy became largely 
reduced to intellectual debates; it increasingly was separated from the reality 
of Iranian domestic and foreign policies.  It is also from this point forward 
that any moves on the part of the state to become more autocratic were met 
with oppositional politics targeting state institutions.  This development left 
Iranians with a conflicted vision of their relations with the state: they needed 
what the state provided, but they were deeply suspicious of its authority.  
For some decades, ideological debates surrounding issues such as the relationship 
between the state, market and society were largely contained within intellectual 
circles.  However, these debates did not remain out of sight for long and global and 
domestic events eventually pushed intellectuals back into the public spotlight, itself 
an indication of civil society’s existence.  The National Front was a bastion for 
intellectuals who had travelled to or studied in the West and were keen to explore 
ideas such as democracy and liberty within a nationalist framework. Moreover, the 
National Front was, in practice, a coalition that included support from factions of the 
bazaar, representing the private sector, a collaboration that demonstrates civil society 
in practice.  While the National Front for all intents and purposes was made obsolete 
in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, its ideas are still referred to three decades 
after the revolution and is an important historical element of modern Iran.  In fact, 
“Mosaddeq’s fall was to have widespread consequences for Iranian political 
development in the rest of the twentieth century and arguably led directly to the 
revolution of 1979” (Ansari, 2000, p. 34).                 
 
The White Revolution 
 
Largely stemming from the events and groups discussed above in what can be 
considered an attempt to prevent public discourse from gathering pace, Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi launched the White Revolution in 1963.  What was termed the White 
Revolution was in fact a series of reforms aimed at modernisation of Iran through 
social and economic reform, including but not limited to land reform, privatisation, 
women’s suffrage and welfare reforms.  However, in brief, the outcome of the White 
Revolution did not yield the results promised by the ruling monarchy.  Moreover, 
“When the land reform bill and other measures were introduced by the Shah in the 
early 1960‘s, the autocratic manner in which he did this so outraged the opposition 
that the substance of the reforms,…, was lost in the dust created by charges of 
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dictatorship, corruption, and subservience towards the United States” (Heisey & 
Trebing, 1983, p. 159).  Clearly, the goals and outcomes of the White Revolution are 
more complex than the outline provided above and its nuances are beyond the scope 
of this work.  What is of relevance is, first, the reality of large scale social and 
political change that was taking place in the country in the decade preceding the 
Islamic Revolution.  Second, the events instigated by the state are just one indication 
of how social reform does not necessarily start and finish with state sponsored 
institutional change, as it bears out in the years leading up to the 1979 revolution.   
 
3.4  Intellectuals on the Eve of the Revolution  
 
Following the White Revolution, the intellectual elite were progressively findings 
themselves at odds with the monarchy (Ansari, 2000, p. 37).  The intellectual 
discourse preceding 1979 can be broadly categorized as having ‘leftist’ and Islamic 
ideologies, either separately or, at times, combined.  The common trait among these 
groups, which overlapped in certain cases, was the emphasis on creating an 
egalitarian society; as such, the individual was secondary to the needs of the group.  
These intellectual groups used frames and the process of framing to shape their 
discourse and engage with the public.  Ali Gheissari writes “Before the revolution, 
the intelligentsia and the radical political opposition more generally had adopted a 
utopian perspective with an overlay either of Marxist Leninism or militant Shi’ism, 
which regarded the individual merely as an inseparable part of a supreme whole 
whose worth was to be measured in terms of his or her place in such a totality” 
(Gheissari, 1998, p. 2).  Broadly speaking, the goal of the revolutionaries was to 
rectify the social schisms the monarchical system had embedded within Iranian 
society by, in the first instance, eliminating the monarchy.  The second step, that of 
establishing a new political order, was less clear and took on a different shape based 
on the ideology accepted by each of the numerous political groupings.   
 
The following section presents two key concepts that shaped or, in some way, 
affected these groups along with the public intellectuals who played an integral role 
in the concepts’ dissemination.  Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati are considered 
two of the principal intellectuals of contemporary Iran and were able to “…construct 
a ‘local’ image of Iranian culture in opposition to the ‘universal’ West, but do so 
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from within modernity, not from a ‘resurgence of ancient impulses’ or ‘religious 
fanaticism’” (Mirsepassi, 2000, p. 13).  While additional factors and influential 
figures existed, the following are leading examples of the role a concept paired with 
the voice of a public intellectual play in political and social discourse.  The following 
two sections will expand on these two key frames, namely Westoxication and 
Political Islam, which shaped pre-revolutionary discourse and were instrumental in 
guiding action that ultimately resulted in the revolution.  These frames were also 
what originally formed the public intellectuals of the reform movement, who later 
revisited, revised and countered them in their own work.  
 
‘Gharbzadegi’ (Westoxication) 
 
The issue of gharbzadegi, also known as ‘westoxication’ and occidentosis, played a 
significant role in shaping anti-monarchy sentiment in the decades before the 
Revolution, starting in approximately the 1960s.  Though not coined by him, Jalal 
Al-e Ahmad brought the theory of Gharbzadegi, also referred to as ‘Westoxication’ 
and ‘Occidentosis’, into the mainstream among scholars and the general public in 
Iran through the 1962 underground publication of his book which references the term 
in its title, Occidentosis: A Plague from the West.  The term represents the over-
reaching effect of Western thought and culture on Iran, and non-Western societies as 
a whole.  The issue of culture, ‘native’ thought and the ‘other’ gained momentum 
and the question emerged of “…how to eliminate foreign culture and introduce a new 
authentic culture” (Nabavi, 2003, p. 99). The result was a renewed discourse among 
intellectuals of how to tackle issues of domestic development while fighting colonial 
influence.  It is important to note here that while Iran was never officially colonised, 
different countries, particularly the British government, and later the US, exerted a 
significant amount of control on the reigning monarchy.  There is also a relationship 
between the notion of development (tawse-e) and westernisation according to Saeed 
Hajjarian, a leading intellectual of the reform movement, whereby development had 
become tantamount to westernisation; as a result of this, no link was constructed 
between the idea of development and Iranian intellectual tradition (Hajjarian, 1996, 
p. 57).          
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Considered a negative, ‘westoxication’ denotes the loss of indigenous culture and 
values to what some intellectuals of this time considered the superficial and 
commercial lifestyle of the West.  According to Al-e Ahmad, the occident consists of 
Europe, the former Soviet Russia and North America that have developed the 
industrial capacity to take raw material from non-industrial nations, or the ‘East’, and 
turn them into marketable goods.  These goods, in their new shape, are then sold to 
consumers created out of the proprietors of the raw material (Al Ahmad, Campbell, 
& Algar, 1984, p. 27).  The raw materials he references are not limited to material 
goods but also include ideas and practices.  For example, he cites the taking of 
anthropology from Oceania and sociology from Africa and Latin America (Ibid).  He 
designates Iran as one of the consuming and ‘backward’ nations.  Though the term 
and its sentiment existed before Al-e Ahmad, his work played a significant role in 
disseminating it with far reaching implications among the intellectual discourse of 
the time.         
 
According to Negin Nabavi, the criticism of westernization was two-fold, “It was 
contemptuous of the unsophisticated nature of the people who found the popular 
culture of the West appealing, but perhaps more importantly it was an indirect attack 
on the government that, in their view, encouraged such ‘useless’ enterprises because 
they did not challenge the government or raise any questions” (2003, p. 35).  
Moreover, this attack fuelled resentment against those who were able to take 
advantage of Western imports, both tangible and intangible, by those who were 
unable to benefit as a result of economic or social pressure.   
 
Political Islam 
 
Gradually, other voices emerged, most notably that of Ali Shariati, a public 
intellectual who inspired a leading contingent of revolutionary forces.  In the early to 
mid-20th century, the mainstream intellectual community disconnected itself from 
religion and was adamant about promoting rationality over tradition.  Religion was 
the domain of clerics and the merchant class.  However, in the decades leading up to 
revolution, radical perspectives on Islam emerged that divorced themselves from the 
clerical control.  One of the leading thinkers on the Islamic perspective was Ali 
Shariati, a sociologist educated in both Iran and France and widely perceived to be 
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the leading intellectual of the Islamic Revolution.  During his years in Paris, “...he 
was influenced by various intellectual trends, most notably existentialism and Third 
Worldist trends that criticised Western imperialism and consumer culture and 
advocated return to nativist identity” (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, pp. 69-70).  
Combining this with his expertise in religious doctrine, Shariati was able to 
“...interpret leftist dissent in Shia terms, which provided the revolutionary movement 
[of 1979] with ideological bridges between the various strands of the opposition to 
the Pahlavi monarchy” (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, p. 70).  Finding a strong support 
base among students and the lower middle class, Shariati was able to bring socio-
religious principles and the leftist ideology that had captured the world’s attention 
into a coherent and straightforward package.  Shariati’s work played a major role in 
bringing together different groups that defeated the Pahlavi regime.   
 
Of course, even though he clearly influenced revolutionary activism, he continues to 
be criticised by both religious and secular activists.  He was in sharp opposition to 
the control of clerics within Shiite Islam.  Upon his return to Iran from Paris, he was 
briefly imprisoned.  However, after his release, he began to both teach and give 
widely attended public lectures: 
In his main book, Eslamshenasi, published in 1969, he argued that Islam in 
its original form was a prescription for an egalitarian and democratic society, 
that historically monarchs on the one hand and the clergy of institutionalised 
Shi’ism on the other had created a false version of the religion that obstructed 
people’s right to know and to pursue the perfect society it prescribed, and that 
it was the duty of the true Muslim to oppose both these authorities. (Moin, 
1999, p. 173)   
Incorporating ideas he studied in the West into his understanding of Iranian society, 
he promoted a novel approach that was well-received by a society already 
disenchanted with the status-quo.  Through his written work and, more importantly, 
his compelling lectures, Shariati was in all senses of the term, a public intellectual.  
Though with much revision, Khomeini used Shariati’s rhetoric after observing its 
popularity among the country’s youth (Takeyh, 2006, pp. 14-15).          
                  
Fall of the Monarchy: ‘Esteghlal, Azadi, Jomhuri Eslami’  
 
The discontent and discourse among intellectuals, the merchant class, ulama and 
across the socio-economic spectrum in the 1960s and 1970s culminated in a 
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revolution in 1978-1979.  The refrain of ‘Esteghlal, Azadi, Jomhuri Eslami’, 
translated as Independence, Freedom, Islamic Republic, was a slogan used during the 
revolution and gradually turned into the motto of the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The 
slogan represented the core values of the revolution, at least at its origin, containing 
terms appealing to a diverse audience.  The alliance that opposed the monarchy, and 
came to support the Revolution, was able to mobilise around these ideas (though not 
everyone agreed with each one of the sentiments presented).  Independence 
represented the idea of Westoxication discussed above, and the desire to fight 
external interference and influence.  Freedom is founded on the call to reduce state 
power over citizens, bringing with it autonomy and space for civil society to grow.  
The final component of the slogan, ‘Islamic Republic’, is the most controversial and 
contested one.  From the onset of the revolution, the formation of a republic based on 
the concept of Islam was debated and its implementation remains disputed.  The 
specific model that emerged in the revolution’s aftermath, centred on the figure of 
the Supreme Leader, will be further discussed in Chapter Six.  Of relevance to this 
chapter is showing how key concepts can be traced across the decades, including the 
ideas of liberty and democracy which are entrenched in contemporary civil society 
discourse.     
 
3.5  The New Political System 
 
In the aftermath of the 1979 revolution that saw the overthrow of the monarchy, Iran 
moved towards the establishment of a republic with its first interim government.  
Early in the process, it became clear that Islamist factions, that were part of a larger 
and more diverse group of actors involved in the protests against the Pahlavi regime, 
were taking on dominant role.  Despite power struggles from opposing forces, a 
referendum was put forward in March 1979 asking for a vote on one issue: Islamic 
Republic: Yes or No. The result was a definitive ‘yes’, establishing a theocratic state 
that combined traits of a republic, such as universal voting rights, with a unique Shia 
Islamic system of government.  It is important to note from the onset that any 
accurate understanding of the Iranian state cannot assume that the regime implies a 
dichotomy between the religious and secular.  As one scholar states, ‘One of the 
many paradoxes of the Islamic Republic is that theocracy has been far more effective 
at persecuting the religious class than all of its monarchical predecessors.  A special 
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court for the clergy was established, and hundreds of Iran’s most learned and 
distinguished clerics were defrocked and imprisoned’ (Takeyh, 2006, p. 27).  This 
was the case before, during and after the height of the reform movement.  It shows 
the complexity and internal struggle within the clerical elite that exists even amongst 
the conservative faction.  It is this contention amongst conservative values that can 
lead to the potential breakdown or reform of the entire system.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blue lines appoint or elect 
Red line indicates approval of candidates 
Figure 1: Organisational chart representing the post-revolution political 
structure  
 
Since 2007, all citizens over the age of 18 have been able to vote in national 
elections; previous to this, the voting age was set at 15 years of age15.  As shown in 
Figure 1, the electorate, in theory, elects all three branches of government.  However, 
                                                 
15
 While there was a case that this change was to align the voting age with the minimum age for 
driving and serving in the military, it also represents the state’s fears of a powerful young voting 
population.   
Electorate 
Assembly of 
Experts President Majlis 
Supreme Leader 
Judiciary 
Expediency Council 
Commander of the 
Armed Forces 
Guardian Council 
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in reality, the system is set up in a way that limits the options and final say of 
citizens.  While the electorate appears to have a say in the election of state entities, 
either directly or indirectly, the complex nomination and approval system has 
gradually withered the candidate pool available to citizens, entrenching a 
conservative power base.  This system and its entities, described in further detail 
below, are significant to the thesis as they outline the institutional challenges facing 
reformists and attempts at liberalisation of the state.  Moreover, the prominent effect 
individuals with positions of power have supports the idea that agency (accompanied 
by political opportunity as entrenched in positions of power) can play a significant 
role in creating change.  The following sections tackle the key components of the 
Islamic Republic and the role of conservatives within them.             
 
What is ‘Islamic’ in the Islamic Republic of Iran? 
 
First, the term Islamic refers to the dominance of Sharia law, Islamic religious 
jurisprudence, in the country’s legal framework, as laid out in the Constitution.  
Moreover, the notion of marja’iyyat-e taqlid, meaning source of emulation or 
religious reference, is unique to the Shia branch of Islam, and was used to validate a 
ruling structure that placed a senior cleric at its centre, namely the Supreme Leader.  
The Supreme Leader’s role is based on the political notion of valeyat-e faqih, 
meaning rule of the supreme jurist.  This component of the Islamic political 
infrastructure can be considered even more significant as it allows for a religious 
dimension of authority to be continuously reassessed and reaffirmed based on 
individual religious interpretations.  The Supreme Leader is a high level cleric, 
appointed by the Assembly of Experts, and controls key institutions of the judiciary, 
international and domestic security and economy.  After the 1979 revolution, “The 
constitution recognised Khomeini’s position as that of a the Supreme Leader of the 
revolution and the Islamic Republic—a ‘Caesar’ and a ‘pope’ who would remain 
leader for life, would not be accountable to any authority, and would have total veto 
power over the decisions of the state’s branches and institutions” (Gheissari & Nasr, 
2006, p. 91).  Moreover, the Supreme Leader appoints half the members composing 
the Guardian Council, the body that must authorise all political candidates and 
legislation, described below.  The position of the Supreme Leader is life-long and 
two individuals have held this post to date.  The first was its co-architect, Khomeini, 
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who died of natural causes in 1989.  Though formally approved by the Assembly of 
Experts, Khomeini himself designated his successor and second Supreme Leader, Ali 
Khamanei, who remains in the post at the time of writing.   
 
From the beginning of the Islamic Republic, signs emerged indicating the political 
nature of the Supreme Leader’s role, most importantly when time came for Khomeini 
to nominate his successor.  Khomeini’s original choice was Hossein Montazeri, but 
he reversed this decision as Montazeri increasingly came to criticise the new state for 
its authoritarian reaction towards citizens.  To allow for his new choice to be 
approved, Khomeini requested a reversal of the Constitutional prerequisite 
stipulating that the person filling the post of Supreme Leader be recognised as a 
Grand Ayatollah before entering office.  Only Grand Ayatollah’s have the authority 
to serve as a source of religious emulation (marja-e taqlid).  Khomeini’s choice, Ali 
Khamenei did not receive his title of Grand Ayatollah until after beginning his tenure 
as Supreme Leader.  To date, Khamenei’s title is still not officially recognised by all 
religious leaders.  Khomeini’s controversial choice for successor continues to serve 
as a point of contention for the Supreme Leader’s adversaries, including 
conservatives and reformists.    
 
The other significant body of power within the Iranian political system that adds to 
the Islamic component is the Guardian Council.  The Guardian Council must approve 
all candidates running for office as well as any legislation passed by parliament to be 
in accordance with the Constitution.  In theory, approval is based on the individual or 
legislation meeting ‘Islamic’ standards which are not necessarily found in religious 
doctrines.  In practice, individual members of the Council base their decisions on 
their own interpretations of religious law. These interpretations are coloured by the 
members’ circumstances and personal beliefs.  The Guardian Council is composed of 
12 members, six of whom are clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader.  The 
remaining six members are lay experts of religion appointed by Parliament.  
Appointments made by Parliament are based on recommendations from the head of 
the Judiciary who is himself appointed by the Supreme Leader. 
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What does the republican yet Islamic system imply? 
 
It is the complex and circular system of elections, appointments and vetting that 
makes analysis and institutional reform of the Iranian power structure difficult.  The 
government structure established in the aftermath of the Revolution is innately 
contradictory (Azimi, 2008, p. 362).  As a republic with what can be considered a 
democratic system of elections, the state does not openly fall into the category of 
authoritarian rule.  “The constitution envisioned the Islamic Republic to be a modern 
state with all the institutional and organisational features of such a state.  It provided 
for a parliament, a judiciary, and an executive.  It delineated the powers of each 
through a system of checks and balances” (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006, p. 91).  However, 
the existence of a rigorous and often times subjective system of approval by the 
Guardian Council and the appointment of key posts by the Supreme Leader makes 
success by opposition forces a challenging and, at times, near impossible task.  The 
institutions of oversight are the stronghold of conservative figures that strive to 
maintain control through the preservation of religious rule, which is what guarantees 
their institutional stronghold.  In other words, the posts of Supreme Leader and 
Guardian Council are rationalised through a particular religious interpretation.  In 
order to maintain the status quo, decisions that reverse or revise religiously based 
institutions and laws place the survival of the entire system at risk.  Therefore, it is 
not surprising that actors with a political stake in the current system belong to the 
conservative camp and in opposition to the reform movement.      
 
3.6  Following the Establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
In the aftermath of the revolution, the most striking feature of the Iranian state was 
its various sources of power that at times supported while at other times opposed one 
another.  “Broadly speaking, the system is a composite of key personalities, their 
informal networks and relationships with other individuals and power centers (all of 
which converge over common interests in the form of political factions), and the 
institutions with which they are associated” (Thaler, 2010, p. 40).  These informal 
networks and power structures are a historical legacy, predating the current regime 
(Ibid).  It will be shown that the boundaries between civil society and the state are 
further blurred during this time as a result of the new government’s take-over of key 
welfare and charitable activities.  After the establishment of the new government, 
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organizations previously outside of direct state control, such as those serving 
traditional social roles or providing charitable welfare, began to be absorbed by the 
growing public sector.  Therefore, the boundaries between civil society and the state 
became further blurred.   
 
The situation was further complicated for the Iranian people with the onset of an 
eight-year war with neighbouring Iraq, from 1980 to 1988, that required swift action 
from the state and extensive social services to meet the needs of citizens facing the 
consequences of war.  Chapter Six, which looks at conservative perspectives of civil 
society, will provide in-depth coverage of the state institutions formed in the 
aftermath of the revolution with the intention of effectively absorbing activity 
traditionally attributed to civil society.  In other words, staunch supporters of the 
Islamic regime attempted to give the state power over social, conventionally non-
political interactions, such as those falling under the auspices of religious institutions, 
for example, mosques, or those which facilitated charitable giving.  The war played a 
role in unifying the country, in reaction to a foreign enemy, and allowed a core group 
of individuals to structure power with limited oversight or opposition from the 
general population.  However, the war was also instrumental in transforming the 
state-society dynamic: 
…it was not long before Iranians themselves were questioning the aims and 
consequences of the war.  Such questioning was itself a reflection of the 
deeper changes which had begun to thoroughly permeate Iranian society.  If 
Iranians had entered the war as obedient subjects, they emerged from it with a 
keener sense of their own relationship to the state.  (Ansari, 2007, p. 298)   
 
In reality, the unity that had led to a 99.7 per cent majority vote in a 1979 referendum 
in favour of the Islamic Republic had begun to dissipate within a very short period.  
Fractions and tensions developed even amongst the central figures of authority.  
However, concern over the war and strategic power plays led by Khomeini and his 
allies managed to contain these dissenting voices to an extent.   
 
From War to Reconstruction: Setting the stage for Khatami’s election  
 
With the end of the war and the death of Khomeini in 1989, the state’s focus turned 
to rebuilding infrastructure and the economy, leading to Rafsanjani’s presidency, 
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1989-1997, dubbed as the period of ‘Reconstruction’.  By this time, individuals who 
had originally backed a Khomeini-led Revolution but come to question Khomeni’s 
tactics and the regime, albeit silently during the 1980s, began to slowly voice their 
concerns.  This dialogue was taking place amongst individuals with reservations 
about the direction of the state but with strong revolutionary credentials, i.e. those 
who had shown their commitment to the establishment of an Islamic republic.  Their 
ideological background was based on the ideas presented above, including a desire 
for social and economic equality and a fight against Western interference.  However, 
they began to question the post-revolutionary regime’s ability to achieve these goals 
and saw themselves losing their ability to voice these concerns.  At the same time, 
households felt increasing economic pressure, caused by inflation and decline in real 
income and purchasing power as a result of reduced state control of the economy that 
had been in place during the War (for example, price controls and rationing of goods) 
(Kian-Thiebaut, 1999, p. 14).  In this atmosphere, the seeds for the reform movement 
were planted and led to the victory of Khatami in 1997.   
 
The purpose of the above sections was to provide a historical backdrop to the events 
that took place by the time the reform movement came to dominate discourse on 
Iran’s social and political spheres in the late 1990s.  The key points are:  first, the 
actors and institutions of civil society were neither new nor restricted to reformists or 
contemporary Iran.  Second, although the level of their power has varied, public 
intellectuals have played a role in the events that shaped modern Iranian history, with 
particular attention given to the twentieth century in the above analysis.  Finally, 
organisations that shape the public sphere cannot always be distinctly identified as 
changing contexts lead to a blurring of boundaries between civil and political society.  
Chapter Four will focus on telling the story of Iranian civil society from the period 
after this historical outline along with theoretical analysis.  However, before 
proceeding, the next section will provide a review of a group of literature that has 
also tackled the issue of civil society and the reform movement in Iran.     
 
3.7  Emergence of Civil Society Language and the Reform Movement 
 
The term ‘civil society’ entered Iran’s broader political language with the 1997 
election of Mohammad Khatami as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the 
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launch of the reform movement represented by Khatami.  Civil society, rule of law 
and democracy were some of Khatami’s top campaign slogans, in sharp contrast to 
his conservative opponent who had the backing of the country’s unelected Supreme 
Leader, a man whose word supersedes that of any elected President.  However, 
Khatami’s drive to bring democratic change by empowering the people struck a 
chord with the electorate, particularly women and youth movements.  Millions rallied 
around Khatami, leading him to a decisive victory with seventy per cent of the vote.   
 
The concept of civil society began appearing in intellectual discussions, particularly 
in intellectual journals focusing on society, politics and literature, leading up to and 
particularly after Khatami’s election.  For example, in the decade before Khatami’s 
election, no exclusive articles appear in the journal Adineh.  However, in 1997, a 
number of pieces on the topic can be found.  For example, in the October/November 
(Iranian month of Aban) issue of Adineh, a large section deals with civil society and 
other related aspects.  They asked scholars and figures from Iran’s literary and 
artistic scene what is meant by civil society.  The responses were, as expected, 
ambiguous, abstract and, on the whole, optimistic.  Emphasis was placed on citizen 
rights, whereby the relationship between citizens and citizens and the state is based 
on law; another individual writes that civil society is one in which individuals know 
to not impose their wants onto others; an actor states that he wishes in a civil society 
to be able to take his scripts onto stage regardless of individual taste but based on 
predefined laws; and, an artist states that it relates to the feeling of security ("Dar 
Jame'e-ye Madani, Donbal-e che Migardid? (In Civil Society, What Are You 
Looking for?)," 1997).  In another article written for Adineh in the Summer of 1997, 
Kazem Alamdari argues that an independent civil society has not yet been 
established in Iran, similar to other developing countries (Alamdari, 1997, p. 119).  
Amongst the reasons provided are those that are reiterated by reformist intellectuals 
in the next chapter, namely: the absence of social forces that can confront/oppose 
total power seeking and the fact that the majority of organisations that are considered 
to be nongovernmental are in fact governmental (Ibid).  The Adineh pieces are a clear 
reflection on how civil society can be used to represent basic social desires, 
particularly as they relate to freedom and rights.   
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The following sections take a critical look at both English and Persian language 
literature surrounding the concept of civil society as it emerged during Khatami’s 
presidency in the Iranian context.  The audience for this literature was mainly found 
outside Iran among individuals interested in the changes taking place in the country, 
although some of the work was read, either in the original English or translated into 
Persian, by intellectuals and academics inside Iran.  In fact, as a result of increased 
international contact, some of the individuals travelled to Iran and participated in 
roundtables or wrote for an Iranian audience (Kamrava, 2001, p. 168).  Scholars such 
as John Keane also visited Iran, giving lectures on subjects such as democracy and 
civil society (one of the reformist public intellectuals interviewed for this thesis 
specifically mentioned his discussions with John Keane).  The issues dealt with in 
this section include theoretical approaches to and definitions of civil society, 
discourse within Iran, the role of intellectuals in the reform movement and empirical 
work undertaken on Iranian civil society.   
 
The re-emergence of civil society as a panacea to underdeveloped political and social 
systems in the past two decades has ignited fierce debate.  Common questions range 
from the seemingly basic including what civil society means to more complex 
questions of whether the bolstering of civil society, however one may define it, will 
lead to a better life for those living in economic, political or social hardship.  Not 
only has the Islamic Republic of Iran not been immune to such debates, but 
politicians and intellectuals, both domestic and international, appear to attach 
prospects for the future of the state upon opportunities for and impediments facing 
Iranian civil society (Amirahmadi, 1996).  While civil society is not a new aspect of 
Iranian society, it has become a mantra of youth, women and student movements 
since the latter half of the 1990s, primarily with the election of Mohammad Khatami 
as President in 1997 and 2001, as will be described in further detail below.  
However, the definition and nature of civil society advocated by individuals, whether 
they be voices from within Iran or individuals residing abroad, is highly dependent 
upon the overall political and social systems advocated by them, particularly with 
regard to their views on Iran’s brand of Shia Islam and its role in the political and 
social order.   
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3.8  Critiquing Literature on Iranian Civil Society 
 
An example of English language literature 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide an example of literature written outside of 
Iran by looking at an Iranian philosopher, Ali Paya, who has close connections to the 
country.  A look at his work allows readers to become familiar with a common type 
of descriptive and prescriptive literature regarding the current state of Iranian civil 
society and its implications for future development.  As the literature dates coincide 
with the research timeframe, it provides important background information regarding 
the context in which public intellectuals to be studied were active and the type of 
work they encountered.   Paya is a recognised Iranian writer, Associate Professor of 
Philosophy at the National Research Institute for Science Policy in Iran and a visiting 
academic in the UK who has written about civil society and intellectuals.  In “Civil 
Society in Iran: Past, present and the future”, Paya jumps quickly from the historic 
precursors of civil society to civil society in the era following the Islamic revolution.  
He notes that following the revolution, Iranian society initially witnessed freedom 
that had not been available for decades.  Moreover, a shift from the prevalence of the 
values of the working class to that of the middle class also added to the momentum 
of civil society’s recognition (Paya, 2004, p. 168).  However, this open society was 
put to an end with the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the capture of total 
control by the clerics.  Here, Paya notes that, as can be expected, the dual role of the 
clerics, as both leaders of religion as well as protectors of the nation’s sovereignty, 
began to contradict one another and, “…the notion of utility took precedence over all 
other values” (Paya, 2004, p. 169).  It was for this reason, Paya states, that modern 
institutions were introduced within Iranian society.  Unfortunately, the curtailment of 
individual freedom was kept in place and, it was in this atmosphere that Khatami 
unexpectedly won the 1997 elections with a platform of re-empowering civil society.     
 
Elected to the presidency under a banner which included civil society, Paya pays 
special attention to Khatami’s role in civil society.  With regard to Khatami’s plans, 
Paya notes that in order to gain a wider range of support for his programme, Khatami 
introduced his ideas as that of an “Islamic civil society” (Paya, 2004).  In the wake of 
his election, a relatively free press appeared, nongovernmental organizations were 
increasingly established and local elections for city councils were arranged.  
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However, by the end of Khatami’s second term, many of the people’s aspirations for 
rule of law, freedom of expression as well as other similar ideas were not realized.  It 
is this failure that Paya does not explain in any detail.  We are left wondering why 
exactly Khatami’s reforms initially received such tremendous public support.  One 
reason for his popularity can be the exact programme he presented to the people.  
However, a contrasting, and possibly more pessimistic, outlook is that it was not 
Khatami’s plan itself for an Islamic civil society that won people over but the fact 
that he was less favoured by the ruling supreme religious leader.  It is important to 
understand the reasons behind Khatami’s success in order to better analyse the 
reasons for which his supporters began to lose faith in the reform movement upon 
reaching certain roadblocks, after less than a decade of attempts to improve the 
country’s social and political condition. 
 
With regard to the future of civil society in Iran, Paya himself has a relatively 
optimistic outlook.  He provides several reasons for his forecast.  First, he cites the 
Shia religion’s encouragement of free enterprise in the economy and Iranian 
society’s familiarity with modern ideas and institutions, encouraged by globalization 
and the fall of the Ba’athis regime in Iraq (Paya, 2004, pp. 171-172).  This is in 
parallel to the intellectual trajectory in the West with regard to civil society.  
Enlightenment thinkers, such as Ferguson, and those who came after have linked the 
rise of civil society to the development of capitalism.  According to Marx, cited in 
(Kumar, 1993, p. 377), civil society “…embraces the whole material intercourse of 
individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces”.  
However, Paya also notes several factors which impede the development of Iran’s 
civil society.  First, while religion may pave the way for a free society in certain 
respects, the Institution of Emulation in Shia Islam that controls the relationship 
between believers and their Grand Ayatollahs creates a situation where “…the 
emulators are more likely to listen to their Ayatollahs than their political leaders” 
(Paya, 2004, p. 171).  This is one key barrier to the establishment of political parties.  
Secondly, Iran’s diverse ethnic landscape requires a strong state to protect national 
sovereignty.  While the Persian language, dominant religion of Shia and national 
history bond the country, geographic and ethnic diversities have proven to be sources 
of tension.  The central government has played a strong role in either subduing 
tensions or creating a common platform that maintains the country’s unity.  Finally, 
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when faced with harsh conservative reaction, there are fewer individuals willing to 
take risks in order to develop the institutions of civil society.                
 
With this basic analysis, Paya fails to provide enough evidence to support his claims 
from either an empirical or theoretical point of view.  We are faced with numerous 
questions regarding how he weighs the negative and positive prospects for civil 
society in Iran.  Moreover, he provides little background for the transition that took 
place between the traditional forms of civil society to that of contemporary society.  
One final detail that requires clarification by Paya is with regard to the use of the 
word `individual’ in his definition of civil society.  While he does mention the Shia 
religion’s advocacy of individual freedom in economic spheres, he does not mention 
how the individual is treated in other realms.  In this respect, Mehran Kamali’s 
explanation (discussed earlier) of civil society provides a better starting point, given 
the significant role the Shia religion has and continues to play in Iranian society.   
 
The civil society discourse within Iran 
 
The discourse within Iran has been categorized by analysts of Iranian civil society in 
a number of ways.  One of the main struggles is access to primary sources as most 
can only be found in the original Persian.  Even in times when language is not an 
issue, access to the text itself is problematic.  Often the books were printed in limited 
numbers before they were banned by the state, making it difficult to gain access to 
copies.  Iran has a complicated and changing system of censorship.  However, 
several works, such as Khatami’s Islam, Dialogue and Civil Society can be readily 
found.  Throughout the thesis, relevant Persian language sources that were obtained 
have been cited.  A bulk of the work on civil society is by intellectuals and political 
figures discussing their views of civil society, the role of civil society in the political 
sphere and the relationship between civil society and Islam.  Some of this work, 
including books, journal articles and interviews, is addressed in Chapter Four, 
alongside analysis of how reformist public intellectuals viewed civil society.  In 
addition, there exists literature in Persian that takes a more theoretical and abstract 
look at the concept of civil society.  Some of the authors writing about civil society 
in the Persian language have also published in English.  Moreover, it is clear that 
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English language material about civil society has been reviewed by intellectuals in 
Iran, particularly as they cite some of this work in their writings.   
 
The civil society discourse within Iran: Persian language literature 
   
Similar to the journal Adineh, discussed above, other journals took up the topic of 
civil society around the time of Khatami’s election.  One of these key journals is 
Iran-e Farda, or Iran-i Farda, (translated as, ‘Tomorrow’s Iran’ or ‘The Iran of 
Tomorrow’), a journal dominated by nationalist-religious figures.  In fact, they 
dedicated a large section of their 39th issue, published in December/January of 
1997/1998 (coinciding with the month and year of Dey 1376 in the Iranian calendar).  
One of the articles in this issue was entitled “Jame’e-ye Madani be Zaban-e Sadeh”, 
or “Civil Society in Simple Language”.  In the article, two definitions of civil society 
are provided: one being that affiliated with proponents of civil society, political 
figures, students, social and political press, etc. and the other affiliated with 
academia.  In the former, civil society is linked to the whole of society, where society 
is based on ideas such as the rule of law, transparency, division of power between 
political parties and councils, etc. (Alijani, 1997/1998, p. 10).  The latter definition is 
one where civil society is the space between the family (the private or personal) and 
the state (power and government); this space consists of organisations councils, 
political unions, arts and intellectual associations, etc. and endures regardless of the 
state and its actions (Ibid).  The writer goes on to state that some of these 
organisations are political, such as political parties which look toward gaining 
political power) while some are not.  He expands on this fact in the endnotes of the 
article, clarifying that some thinkers separate civil society from ‘political society’ 
(Alijani, 1997/1998, p. 13).  However, he does not delve further.   On the whole, this 
piece sheds light on the desire by thinkers and journals to tackle the issue of civil 
society and maintains the existence of a far-reaching characterisation of civil society.        
One key academic on civil society in the Persian language is Mousa Ghaninezhad, 
who, according to Mehran Kamrava (whose article is discussed in further detail 
below), is one of the few authors to “have written on civil society with some 
consistency”  (Kamrava, 2001, p. 168).  Ghaninezhad’s 1998 book, entitled Civil 
Society: Liberty, economics and politics (Jame'e-ya Madani: Azadi, iqtesad va 
siyasat (Civil Society: Liberty, economics and politics)) provides an in-depth look at 
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civil society theory.  In contrast to some other writers in civil society, Ghaninezhad 
has a strong economic focus, with the first section of the book focused on civil 
society and political economy16.  Moreover, Ghaninezhad expressed the fear that the 
far reaching use of the term civil society in Iran will lead to its degradation as a 
concept, as intellectuals and speakers link civil society with their own views and 
political wants (Ghaninezhad, 1999, p. 13).  The appropriation of civil society, 
especially by reformist intellectuals, is a significant argument that is validated in 
Chapter Four.      
 
Also discussed by Kamrava is the independent researcher Majid Muhammadi, whom 
Kamrava describes as “…one of the most influential voices within the civil society 
discourse…” (Kamrava, 2001, p. 169).   He has written an in-depth book on civil 
society, published in 1999.  For Muhammadi, the organisations that lay the 
foundations for civil society are those that are the go-between/intermediary (vaset) 
between the state and the individual (Muhammadi, 1999, p. 347).  What weakens 
civil society and strengthens mass society, according to Muhammadi, are social 
movements that attempt to eliminate a political regime; in a mass society, individual 
freedom and rights are denied (1999, p. 348).  A mass society infers a society where 
diversity is not encouraged nor protected and the state, which can act as defender of 
order, is attacked.  With reference to Iran, Muhammadi notes that the government 
attempts direct control, on areas from the economy to culture, rather than taking on a 
more supervisory or administrative role  (1999, p. 353).  He considers Iranian society 
to not be a civil society but rather one that vacillates between a traditional society 
and a ‘mass’ society (Muhammadi, 1999, p. 357).  Ultimately, he claims that there 
exist structural, cultural, legal and theoretical barriers to the growth of civil society in 
Iran; in order to overcome these barriers, be believes there needs to be 1) a 
reassessment of concepts such as freedom, liberalism, capital, political participation, 
etc.; 2) a study of the everyday life of Iranians, as opposed to public culture; and 3) a 
study of legal, political, social and cultural barriers to the formation of civil society 
in Iran (Muhammadi, 1999, p. 364).  Muhammadi’s work provides a valuable, in-
                                                 
16
 It should be noted that the notion of civil society being tied to a free, competitive economy, as 
espoused by Ghaninezhad, was also reiterated by a key thinker of the reform movement (INT7) during 
a fieldwork interview.  Expansion of the private sector was addressed as a factor of civil society by 
other individuals interviewed, as well as in literature.    
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depth look at the basis of civil society in Iran, serving as a spring board for other 
more focused studies.              
  
Another key thinker is Hossein Bashiriyeh.  For Bashiriyeh, a democratic civil 
society discourse surfaced in Iran from the time of the Constitutional Revolution in 
response to dominant discourses (of which he asserts there are three: (1) traditional 
patrimonial discourse, (2) absolutist-modernist discourse and (3) ideological 
traditional discourse); the reason for its appearance in the late 20th century was due to 
“…deepening crises of political legitimisation and ideological domination…” and 
“…is the latest manifestation of the wider democratic discourse that was born around 
the time of the Constitutional Revolution, was retarded by the absolutist state, grew 
in the 1940s and made a short appearance after the Islamic Revolution.  The Islamic 
Revolution raised further obstacles in the process of democratisation” (Bashiriyeh, 
2001).  Bashiriyeh explains that the current social base of the civil society movement 
is not limited to religious reformists but “…is a new, articulate, political majority of 
twenty million people who voted for democratic reform.  It is opposed to religious 
absolutism, blind traditionalism, cultural control and a closed society” (Bashiriyeh, 
2001).  Two obstacles to democratisation include, one, the political culture of 
patrimonial and traditionalist discourses and, two, the merging of religion and 
politics; however, he believes that there is space for the emergence of democracy, 
with reasons including the reformation of Shia political theory and the surfacing of 
an intellectual trend that encourages dialogue and discourse (Bashiriyeh, 2001).  This 
last notion can be linked to the limited dialogue amongst intellectuals referred to by 
Muhammadi.   
 
In terms of defining civil society, Bashiriyeh believes that the term should be one 
that not only academics can discuss and understand but that can be put forth into 
common use; he defines civil society as a society in which citizens have the ultimate 
decision making power in how they wish to live their lives, including, most 
importantly, decisions regarding their personal lives ("Goftegoo dar bareh jame-e 
madani dar parto rooydad dovom khordad," 1997).  In a book on civil society, he 
specifies that civil society is the arena for social power and the space for social 
relations outside of direct interference by the state and consists of public/popular 
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(omoomi) institutions and groups (Bashiriyeh, 1999, p. 121).  Overall, he claims that 
civil society is a battle for democracy (Bashiriyeh, 1999, p. 61).           
 
In the same issue of Iran-e Farda mentioned above, issue 39 published in 1997/1998, 
an entire article was dedicated to asking Iranian intellectuals about their thoughts on 
civil society.  A few key points raised by a couple of the intellectuals addressed will 
be discussed here.  Ezatollah Sahabi, a scholar and political figure who was leader of 
the Nationalist-Religious coalition, stated that the public organisations of civil 
society are independent of the ruling government and private individuals, rather they 
are composed of many people who have a common interest in an aspect of their life, 
such as the political, social or religious ("Jame’e-ye  Madani - Democrasi 
Nokhbegan - Manafe'e Meli (Civil Society - Elite Democracy - National Interests)," 
1997/1998, p. 14).  In another vein, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari provided a list of civil 
society’s attributes, including: a society where votes and individual freedom is 
formally recognised; there exists a fair distribution of power; independence of 
citizens and society in relation to the state; the establishment of independent 
organisations, such as parties, syndicates, unions, etc. to preserve citizens’ freedom 
and rights ("Jame’e-ye  Madani - Democrasi Nokhbegan - Manafe'e Meli (Civil 
Society - Elite Democracy - National Interests)," 1997/1998, p. 17).  Overall, this 
resonates with the image of a liberal democratic style of governance.  Between 
Sahabi and Eshkevari, again the sweeping vision of civil society is shown, as well as 
the significance of the separation between citizens and the state.  The latter point is 
significant given the desire for reformist intellectuals to use civil society as a way to 
access power, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.       
  
The civil society discourse within Iran: English language literature 
 
The following section will examine two papers, written outside Iran, which look at 
the theoretical discourse that took place in Iran.  The first paper is chosen because of 
the comprehensive overview it provides of the civil society discourse, while the 
second paper is selected due to its concise argument challenging the role of Islamism 
in modern day Iran.  The purpose of this analysis is to consider how writers outside 
Iran perceive the domestic situation through sources available to them and, at a later 
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point, to consider the merits and shortcomings of such pieces.  Overall, it is believed 
that these particular pieces provide sufficient information for this review. 
 
Mehran Kamrava’s paper, “The Civil Society Discourse in Iran” (2001) categorizes 
his findings through the common threads that appear in Iranian literature on civil 
society.  According to Kamrava, there exist four main themes.  The first is that civil 
society has undergone an indigenization process.  More specifically, the definition of 
civil society has gone through a process of localization with the development of a 
political, cultural and, most popular, social understanding of civil society in Iran.  
The second characteristic of Iranian civil society is the significant role the state plays 
in civil society while a third stream deals with the role of Islam.  Finally, Kamrava 
notes the particular attention Iranian thinkers pay to the “ ‘image’ that non-Iranians 
have of the Iranian nation” (Kamrava, 2001, p. 165).  Each of these four fields 
presents an open area that requires further data and analysis.  In concluding his 
paper, Kamrava makes the claim that up to this point, “…the practical side of the 
civil society discourse has had far more of an impact on Iranian society and culture 
than its theoretical contributions” (Kamrava, 2001, p. 185).  The reasons 
underpinning the weak theoretical foundations of civil society discourse in Iran is a 
key area for further analysis and should be properly addressed.   
 
For many involved in Iranian studies, civil society is evaluated upon the extent to 
which it is used as a political tool, either by those who wish to discredit the state or 
those attempting to legitimize the Islamic nature of the state.  One such writer, Ali 
Banuazizi, Professor of Social Psychology and Modern Iranian History at Boston 
College, analyses the civil society debate in this manner.  He contended that after 
two decades in power, “Islamism” is “…a spent ideology, no longer capable of 
providing legitimation for the rule of the jurist (velayat-e faqih)” (Banuazizi, 1999, p. 
2).  Furthermore, it is this loss of legitimacy that has the political sphere looking 
towards reform, particularly through the development of a civil society, in order to 
preserve its own legitimacy and in this environment which Khatami seeks his reform 
programme.   
 
Banuazizi identifies three positions in Iran’s civil society debate.  The first he 
identifies as the hard-line conservatives who find civil society to be ‘antithetical to 
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the basic values and ideals of an Islamic society and state’ and also control key 
positions in the political structure (Banuazizi, 1999, p. 7).  The second group is 
composed of the individuals who wish to Islamicize civil society and differentiate it 
from the traditionally Western view.  Finally, he notes a third group composed of 
individuals “….who view the concept as ideologically neutral in terms of the 
ultimate goals and values of society, but useful as a basis for structuring state-society 
relations, protecting the relative autonomy and freedom of citizens and their 
associations, and promoting a more tolerant, pluralistic and democratic order” 
(Banuazizi, 1999, p. 7).  Overall, the struggle for a tolerant civil society is defined as 
a battle between hard-liners in the state apparatus, who also control means of 
violence and the judiciary, and the supporters of Khatami’s reforms towards the 
development of civil society.   
 
While the above classification does provide some clarity for analysing the civil 
society discourse in Iran, it can also be deemed too simplistic.  For example, it leaves 
out the possibility that some advocates of civil society attach Islamic concepts to the 
ideas they advocate only as a means to gain legitimacy in the eyes of other political 
figures.  Here, it is important to ask about the compatibility of combining the two 
concepts of civil society and Islam.  While it may very well be possible, it is 
important to look at both historical and practical evidence for such scenarios.  Even 
more problematic is the third, value-neutral, category Banuazizi mentions.  Can a 
political or social ideology be completely value-neutral?  This may be the most 
dangerous assumption to make, particularly at a time when many are advocating a 
strong civil society as the goal for improving quality of life for the Iranian people.  
Further explanation and analysis of this category is of great significance. 
 
Intellectuals and the reform movement 
 
While the above sections deal with the state of Iran’s civil society development as a 
whole, this section will be a brief assessment of literature surrounding the particular 
role of intellectuals in the reform movement that brought civil society to the forefront 
of political and social debates.  Intellectuals are generally addressed as a subset of 
literature on the reform movement with relatively few pieces dealing with their 
specific role in civil society development and advocacy.  The key group of 
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intellectuals active during the reform movement have come to be known as religious 
intellectuals due to their attempts to reform the current Islamic state as opposed to a 
revolutionary change.  However, even this group of religious intellectuals are not a 
unified group and their differences should be taken into account.  Other groups 
present, which were not part of the reform movement, are secular intellectuals and 
conservative religious intellectuals who advocate strict interpretations of Islam as the 
basis of political and social institutions.  This section will provide a brief outline of 
intellectual trends during the reform movement and highlight several works on such 
individuals and their role in political reform and advocacy for civil society. 
 
The key instigators of the reformist movement are a group of individuals commonly 
referred to as ‘religious intellectuals’, referring to a diverse group of laymen, 
laywomen and clerics with a wide range of opinions on political and social issues.  
‘New Religious Thinking’ emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which 
attempted to address a growing gap between the ideals on which the revolution was 
founded and the reality of the Islamic state that emerged (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 
2006, pp. 25-26).  As a group, they represented both a political and cultural force, 
pushing forward the concept of modernity in a religious society (Jalaeipour, 2003, p. 
139).  “Representing various strands of modernist Shia thought that had remained 
dormant during the war with Iraq, they offered new interpretations of Islam and 
began to articulate a theoretical critique of the Islamic state from an Islamic 
perspective” (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, p. 26).  It is their critical approach, 
which they came to express in the public sphere that grants them the status of public 
intellectual discussed in Chapter Three.  
 
With Khatami’s election in 1997, their platform became a newly liberalized press, 
which included daily local and national newspapers, through which they expressed 
their views in critical pieces that received an overwhelming response from public 
readership.  The main feature of their writings was “…its attempt to create a balance 
between its native belonging and the broader modern world” and the logic of 
democracy (Alinejad, 2002).  However, with political failures such as the loss of 
parliamentary control and then the presidency in 2005 to conservative hardliners, the 
entire vision religious reformists advocated in their writings appeared to have failed.  
This failure has been attributed to a weakness of critical tradition and democratic 
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practices in Iran’s history (Alinejad, 2002).  While the latter point has validity, the 
former can be criticized on the basis of Iran’s long history of intellectual activity and 
historic attempts to bring about social and political change, particularly since the 
Constitutional Revolution in the early twentieth century.  Nevertheless, the research 
will attempt to go beyond this to address both the reasons for failure as well as areas 
of success to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the role intellectuals play 
in social and political change. 
 
In this light, a critical aspect of intellectuals in the reform movement has been the 
press, which is one of the main ways of transmitting their ideas to the public.  
Journalists who promote the idea of the reform movement make up a new category 
of intellectuals who Farhad Khosrokhavar calls “intermediary intellectuals” who are 
contrasted with the notion of “grand intellectuals”.  According to Khosrokhavar, 
“’Intermediary intellectuals’ borrow some intellectual ideas from the ‘grand 
intellectuals’ but with considerable independence due to their involvement in Iran’s 
current political and social affairs” (Khosrokhavar, 2004, p. 198).  The group, 
composed of men and women between their late twenties and fifties, are composed 
of some one thousand journalists with their contributions having been “…essential to 
the diversification of thought in Iran” (Ibid).  Khosrokhavar’s categorization and 
subsequent definition of the intermediary intellectuals is interesting for its inclusion 
of a significant group of individuals who brought critical thought within the public 
sphere through the daily press, as opposed to specialized journals, where the work of 
grand intellectuals previously appeared.  However, it is unclear the extent to which 
the intermediary intellectuals, in Khosrokhavar’s paper contribute original thought or 
analysis and whether or not there exists a difference in the public value of the ideas 
expressed by grand intellectuals versus those of the intermediaries.  Therefore, this 
classification must be further examined in light of the definition of public intellectual 
used in this research before it is applied.           
    
On the topic of Iranian intellectuals, the key scholar is Ramin Jahanbegloo, a 
university professor in Canada17, political philosopher and himself considered a 
                                                 
17
 Jahanbegloo has previously held teaching and research posts in Iran.  For example, from 2003 to 
2005, he was Professor of Political Philosophy at Azad University.  He was arrested by Iranian 
authorities in 2006 and imprisoned for four months.   
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member of Iran’s intellectual circle who deals with the role of the intellectual in civil 
society.  In a brief article entitled “Is Iran Democratizing? The role of the 
intellectuals” written in 2000, Jahanbegloo refers to a young generation of 
intellectuals no longer wishing to mobilize political ideologies but rather wanting to 
express critical views of Iranian political and social traditions (Jahanbegloo, 2000, p. 
136).  Written only three years after Khatami’s election, his work is a suitable 
reflection on the initial role of intellectuals in the reform movement as well as a 
comparison of how the role of intellectuals has changed since the time of the 1979 
Islamic Revolution.  While his work clearly touches upon many of the issues this 
research project will address, it falls short of examining the shifts within Khatami’s 
presidency and how shifts within the intellectuals’ discourse impact civil society in 
practice. 
 
As a final, yet important, example in this section we can consider US-based 
Professor of Sociology Mohammad Chaichian’s (2003) “Structural Impediments of 
the Civil Society Project in Iran: National and Global Dimensions”, where he posits 
interpretations of civil society by Iranian intellectuals, activists and politicians into 
six categories and names the architect or advocate of each stance.  The 
interpretations vary mainly in terms of positions towards the roles of religion and the 
state.  One issue that diminishes his paper’s relevance for a study of the domestic 
debate within Iran is his inclusion of expatriate Iranians whose familiarity with the 
current Iranian situation can be brought into question.  However, as a descriptive 
document it provides a useful starting point in laying out points of differentiation 
within the Iranian debate.  Detailed analysis of the six categories will be carried out 
at a later time.   
 
Overall, literature on Iran’s reform movement engages with the role of intellectuals, 
including those who served as a public face for the ideas attributed to various sub-
groups (i.e. the religious reformist intellectuals).  The main contribution of this 
literature is its description of who initiated and moved the reform movement forward 
through various interpretations of the relationship between Islam and the state as well 
as ideas of democracy and civil society.  However, this descriptive approach does not 
adequately address how the intellectual rhetoric of reform that included the necessity 
of developing civil society lost support from both the public and political leaders in 
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an eight-year period, an issue that will be tackled in the research.  Further details of 
how these intellectuals developed will be presented in Chapter Four.  For purposes of 
this chapter, it is enough to say that existing literature on the complexity of reformist 
thinkers that examine their role as active agents who themselves evolved 
intellectually and ideologically is limited.  This is based on the fact that the discourse 
by and among intellectuals is highly dependent on their context and a straightforward 
reading of their texts or transcripts of their talks are insufficient for understanding 
them (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, pp. 4-5).  This thesis attempts to fill this gap by 
addressing not just the writings of these intellectuals but also providing insight 
through interviews and provision of analysis that addresses the nuances of the Iranian 
case.    
 
3.9  Conclusion 
 
The contentions that have been put forth in this chapter are as follows.  Using the 
basic organisational approach to civil society, one favoured by donor agencies 
working in development, civil society has a long history in Iran.  This has been the 
result of cultural norms based on Shia traditions of charity and the existence of 
traditional community based organisations.  It can be further argued that the 
associations from traditional civil society result in the manufacture of social capital, 
associations among individuals that lead to cooperation for the general wellbeing of 
society.  Therefore, the first assertion from the context presented above is to weaken 
claims that civil society and its related concepts inherently represent a distinctly 
modern and Western norm that should be injected into non-Western countries for 
their development.  Conversely, taking a more critical perspective of civil society 
that characterises its activities as a the space where dominant discourses are created 
and countered, particularly vis-à-vis state power, modern Iranian history illustrates 
its presence.  The second assertion is to argue that literature reveals the existence of 
civil society as a sphere of contestation for ideas among different groups and agents 
of change in Iran, albeit with varying intensity at different times and with the 
influence of Western thought.   
 
However, it was not until Khatami’s presidency that the concept of civil society 
gained wide prominence within and in relation to Iran.  The literature that emerged 
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has been limited in scope and subject to particular ideological perspectives, as 
discussed in this Chapter.  It is within this contextual reality that research for this 
thesis was undertaken.  The aim of the following chapter is to reveal how and for 
what purpose a concept that in practice has existed was appropriated and modified by 
public intellectuals in the reform movement as agents of civil society.  The findings 
from Chapter Four will then be compared with the take-up of civil society by social 
actors who used the political opportunities afforded to them by reformists in political 
power.                    
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Chapter 4: Public Intellectuals of the Reform Movement 
 
Starting in the 1990s, public intellectuals affiliated with the reform movement in Iran 
broadly disseminated the idea of civil society as an instrument for change while at 
the same time they themselves were a product of a nascent civil society.  Civil 
society was a vaguely defined and universal concept that reformist intellectuals used 
to free them and other revolutionaries from Khomeini’s strict interpretations of 
political Islam, to which they were no longer able or willing to concede.  Reformist 
intellectuals began to question the very system which they had brought about through 
their participation in the 1979 Revolution.  A reformist intellectual, Akbar Ganji, 
writing in a reformist daily newspaper, revealed that the ‘chain murders’ (ghatlhaye 
zanjirei) of dissident intellectuals were at the behest of the ruling conservative elite.  
This particular set of calculated murders of eminent political and intellectual figures 
dates back to the late 1980s and culminated in a number of brutal killings in 1998; a 
figure from the Ministry of Intelligence, who then committed suicide under 
suspicious circumstances, was identified as the perpetrator behind the attacks.  
Reformist writers brought the issue into public light, in particular by asserting that 
leading conservative figures, including clerics, were the ultimate culprits.      
 
The reasons Ganji gave in an interview as to why the murders became a focus of his 
writings included: the fact that the life of every individual matters, his questioning of 
any ideology that allows the killing of those with opposing thoughts, how political 
power that is related to protecting people can become involved in a type of 
extermination and, finally, the notion of how to prevent such a thing from being 
repeated (Ganji, 2000, p. 210)18.  The involvement of reformists in this revelation 
was just one indicator of their break from loyalty to the vision of an Islamic Republic 
led by a Supreme Leader.  One of the main sources to reveal the reality behind the 
chain murders was a former deputy minister of intelligence, Saeed Hajjarian,19 and 
Ganji was himself a former Revolutionary Guard (Ansari, 2000, p. 177).  In an 
unpublished article, Hajjarian himself wrote that he made certain that while his 
newspaper Sohbhe Emrooz remained open, not an issue would go by in which he did 
                                                 
18
 Before being published in Ganji’s book, his words (here and in the next reference to Gangi’s 2000 
book) first appeared in an interview in the daily newspaper Sobh-e Emrooz on 21 February 2000 
(2/12/1378). 
19
 Hajjarian became known as a key reformist public intellectual. 
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not refer to the murders (Hajjarian)20.  Ganji himself has claimed that one reason the 
defendants in the chain murders were identified and arrested was because Khatami 
refused to ignore the issue and saw it as one of honour (Ganji, 2000, p. 211).  In 
other words, the issue became politicised.   
 
Once Khatami was elected President, his administration provided a relatively open 
social atmosphere, the extent of which is described in this chapter and Chapter Five, 
where the ideas of civil society, as promoted by public intellectuals and practised by 
Iranian citizens, were exercised.  The image of the Islamic Republic was revitalised 
with Mohammad Khatami’s first electoral victory as president on 23 May 1997, 
corresponding with 2 Khordad 1376 in the Iranian calendar21.  In terms of 
appearance, Khatami’s neatly trimmed beard, modern frameless glasses and 
signature smile were a strong departure from the previous public faces of the regime.  
Even more significant was the manner and content of Khatami’s language to both 
domestic and foreign audiences.  A scholar of philosophy, Khatami was among a 
larger group of religious intellectuals with ties to the Islamic revolution who had, in 
the decade before the 1997 elections, come to increasingly question the future 
direction of the Islamic Republic.  Civil society was one of the issues that emanated 
from the group and another significant aspect of this period of reform was the 
heightened role intellectuals played in the political sphere.  According to one 
newspaper, out of twenty-two individual cabinet members Khatami introduced to the 
majles (parliament), at least seven held doctorates and all three clerics had achieved 
higher theological degrees (Tazmini, 2009, p. 61).  While higher education is not an 
absolute determinant of an intellectual, it is a relevant indicator of an individual’s 
inclination towards critical thought.    
 
The proceeding chapter will follow from Chapter Three’s introduction to key 
intellectual movements in Iran’s contemporary history, to examine the developments 
that took place in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution and eight-year war with 
neighbouring Iraq (1980-1988).  Significant individuals, as representatives of a larger 
                                                 
20
 The paper was provided to the writer by Hajjarian’s office without any information regarding its 
official publication.  Copies of the article can be found on websites such as news.gooya.com (an 
Persian language news website based outside of Iran).  The paper was published on that website in 
2005. 
21
 2nd of Khordad became a common name for the coalition of political parties and groups who 
supported Khatami and a movement for reform.    
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group will be introduced while the intellectual circles that emerged during the period 
of reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq war will also be probed.  The chapter addresses 
the influence of networks and relationships as they stimulate the rise of civil society 
discourse among reformist intellectuals.  The role of public intellectuals in the 
construction and use of civil society discourse to enhance positions of power after 
Khatami’s election will be examined.  Interviews with high-level reformist 
intellectual figures conducted during fieldwork are presented and analysed in order to 
answer the research question: how did public intellectuals affiliated with Iran’s 
reform movement [attempt to] impact the evolution of contemporary Iranian civil 
society and, potentially, encourage a turn away from a theocracy to a liberal 
democracy?  The chapter will apply notions of framing and political opportunities 
from social movement theories as part of the analytic process.      
 
While intellectuals cannot be deemed the sole voice of the reform movement, they 
have played a critical role inspiring plurality in Iran’s social and political spheres.  
As cited by Iran expert Arshin Adib-Moghadam (2006, p. 668): 
One may say that the intellectual tradition carried forward by oppositional 
Iranian intellectuals on the one side, and the burgeoning infrastructure of 
NGOs, professional unions and grassroots advocacy organisations on the 
other, has fostered a de-monopolisation of the political process and thus, ipso 
facto, has led to a ‘pluralistic momentum’.  It is this pluralistic momentum, I 
think, that engenders the imperceptive driving force of contemporary Iranian 
reformism.     
 
The plurality that Adib-Moghadam refers to is an integral part of what the reform 
movement came to represent.  Rather than seeking to implement a specific ideology, 
reformist intellectuals have initiated a new vision of contemporary Iran where 
diversity in ideas is not only tolerated but also promoted.  Reformist intellectuals, 
including clerics and non-clerics alike, have questioned and made attempts to 
reformulate the relationship between Shiism and politics (Kamrava, 2003, p. 105).  
As revealed in one-to-one interviews, the contradiction with pluralism is present in 
intellectuals who are also political players (i.e. involved in state politics as 
politicians).  In these cases, they are shown to have promoted civil society both as a 
theoretical concept for creating a multi-faceted, pluralistic society as well as a way 
for reformist politicians to re-enter politics and be allowed to promote their own 
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ideology.  Regardless of their motives, however, the reformist backing of civil 
society had the effect of entrenching critical opposition to the state in society as a 
whole.   
 
This thesis distinguishes between two types of public intellectuals, ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ intellectuals22.  The ‘primary’ public intellectuals of the reform 
movement meet the definition of public intellectual as given in Chapter Two, namely 
an individual engaging with and contributing to knowledge through critical 
discourse, within reach of a broad public audience, in a way that influences change.  
They were at the forefront of introducing concepts that shaped the movement’s 
general platform, such as civil society and rule of law.  The ‘secondary’ public 
intellectuals, on the other hand, did not introduce the concepts but were instrumental 
in institutionalising them within the movement and presenting them to society at 
large.  While there is no strict divide between the two categories, they each have 
distinct attributes and play specific roles in how the concept of civil society unfolded 
in contemporary Iran, as discussed in this chapter.  Secondary public intellectuals 
were the most common type of intellectuals involved in the reform movement.   
 
One cause of internal conflict for social movements aimed at redressing a problem is 
the failure to reach agreement on the responsible agent or source of blame (Benford 
& Snow, 2000, p. 615).  This was clearly the case with the Iranian reform movement.  
Overall, the reform movement’s weakness as a political force is argued to be partly a 
result of their failure to make use of civil society as a concept to empower the citizen 
base both to support reformists as political actors as well as to mobilise a force in a 
strong enough manner against the conservative state23.  Alternatively, the very failure 
to institutionalise the reform movement as a powerful political party resulted in its 
success to create a dialogue that continued outside the official political space and 
spilled over into an expanding arena of civil society.  It is within this civil society 
space that contentious politics continue to flourish, as seen in reformist challenges to 
                                                 
22
 It bears pointing out that while there are similarities between the idea of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ 
intellectuals presented here and Farhad Khosrokhavar’s (Khosrokhavar, 2004) “grand intellectuals” 
and “intermediary intellectuals”, my views were formed independent of his work.   
23
 The other strong force working against the reform movement is the state structure, which favours 
conservative forces, as will be discussed later in this thesis.   
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dominant forces of the state since the end of Khatami’s presidency, including the 
events surrounding the 2009 presidential elections. 
 
4.1  Pre-Reform: Revolution and war 
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to delve too deeply into the factions and 
individuals involved with the Revolution itself.  Experts have studied and written in 
detail on the subject matter, presenting numerous theories as to why and how the 
Revolution took place in 1978-1979, as mentioned in Chapter Three.  Of importance 
to this study are several factors that will be addressed in brief.   
 
The first is the diversity of groups who participated in the Revolution and made it 
possible. Groups involved included: a faction of clerics (it is important to note not all 
clerics participated in the political sphere and some made it a point to remain outside 
the political debates), students, urban middle class, communist parties, pro-
democracy nationalists and leftist Islamist groups among others.  What united these 
groups was the common goal of ousting the existing monarchy as embodied by the 
Shah rather than the aspiration for a specific replacement. According to some 
accounts (see Takeyh, 2006), Khomeini, who became the face of the Revolution and 
took the mantle of leadership afterward, was not considered for the role of head of 
state until after the Revolution and strategic manoeuvring by him and his supporters. 
He had a modest following inside the country based on some written work and 
speeches he recorded in exile and disseminated back in Iran through tape recordings.     
 
Second, soon after the Revolution, Iran was forced into a war with neighbouring Iraq 
that, partly due to political tactics by the new regime, turned into a costly eight-year 
struggle.  The emerging political forces, namely Khomeini and his adherents, were 
able to consolidate their power by redirecting citizen interests and resources towards 
the maintenance of national sovereignty against outside aggressors: 
If Iran's revolution and its claims helped to precipitate the conflict, its 
definition of the absolute stakes that the war represented helped fuel it long 
after it had stopped making any sense.  Iran's expulsion of Iraqi forces from 
its territory had been effected by mid-1982, yet the momentum of war and the 
drive to extend the sway of the Islamic revolution throughout the region 
prevailed over a more sober assessment of Iran's military capabilities.  
(Chubin, 1989, p. 3)  
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As a result, little time or resources were available for countering the power of 
emerging state structures or even supporting social development by the state.  It was 
only after the end of the war and the period of reconstruction, a time which coincided 
with Khomeini’s death in 1989, when a new era of intellectual activity emerged, 
among those involved with the revolution and who supported Khomeini, with a more 
critical outlook by citizens no longer engaged in the day-to-day struggles of war.   
 
4.2  Intellectuals Post-war and the Emergence of the Reform 
Movement 
 
The Revolution of 1979 and the subsequent eight-year war played a leading role in 
shaping the nature of the reformist intellectuals that comprised the reform movement.  
The intellectual activity and figures that emerged were influenced by both individual 
experiences as well as the general socio-political context of the country.  The costly 
war “…and the poor state of the Iranian economy, prepared the ground for 
disenchantment in the following decade. Thinkers, most of whom had been 
revolutionaries, started to come to the fore with their mainly Islamic thought” 
(Khosrokhavar, 2004, p. 194).  The turbulent period that followed the end of the war 
was compounded by the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.   Shortly before his 
death, Khomeini and his allies further complicated Iran’s status quo by introducing 
several key changes to the country’s constitution.  The country was thus faced with 
three factors, namely the end of a costly war in financial terms and body count, an 
amended constitution and the death of the Islamic Republic’s iconic leader.  From 
within this reality emerged a new set of intellectuals with strong ties to the revolution 
that began to question its tenets and future.  While this group was in no way 
homogenous or formally organised, they shared several common characteristics and 
loosely tied factions. 
 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, self-reflection on state policy began to 
overshadow ideas such as Westoxication and a preoccupation with outside 
interference for a group of intellectuals.  It was these intellectuals who laid the 
groundwork for the reform movement.  Though these intellectuals, whose discourse 
is referred to in Chapter Three as ‘new religious thought’, were dedicated to the 
revolution at its onset, they came to question the practices and policies of the Islamic 
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Republic during and after the Iran-Iraq War.  Their interest in political Islam was 
redirected to a focus on interpreting Islamic law in a way that regards time and place 
(Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, p. 26).  Mohsen Kadivar, Grand Ayatollah Hossein-
Ali Montazeri and Abdolkarim Sorouh are three of the more prominent figures who 
questioned Islamic practices and beliefs as they were promoted by the state.  Detailed 
research and analysis of the theological discourse around the idea of religious 
reformation falls outside the scope of this thesis.  Of relevance is to acknowledge 
critical discourse contending the fallibility of human interpretations of religion and 
encouraging separation of ‘church and state’, examples of which will be addressed 
below.  These religious debates were both a representation of civil society as a space 
for contentious politics in action, and an influence on intellectuals to pursue civil 
society as a concept by promoting pluralism.        
 
Moreover, when discussing leading intellectual figures of the reform movement, it is 
important to point out that, similar to past regimes, the main body of the Iranian 
political system since the 1979 revolution has been dominated by key personalities as 
opposed to entrenched political groupings or parties.  As Thaler (2010, p. 40) 
suggests “These personalities draw upon multiple networks or various 
commonalities—interleaved family, experiential, clerical, political, financial, and 
other relationships and interests which themselves may constitute power centres—
that serve as levers of patronage, mobilization, and dissent”.  Therefore, the networks 
and backgrounds of the public intellectuals are just as significant as the content of 
their discourse.  The next section explores the intellectual discourse and the groups 
that emerged among individuals with close ties to the revolution in the period of 
reconstruction that followed the Iran-Iraq war, roughly coinciding with the 
presidency of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997).    
 
4.3  The Emergence of Intellectual ‘Circles’ 
 
As mentioned above, the period of reconstruction following the war granted a 
reprieve from daily battle and critical discourse gradually surfaced among particular 
groups of intellectuals.  While the state still dominated almost all media outlets and 
maintained strict control over all spheres of life, including political, economic and 
social, some critical voices were gradually allowed to emerge.  The actors 
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articulating these criticisms were not in blatant opposition to the regime.  Most had 
shown loyalty to the Islamic republic either by supporting Khomeini’s rise to power 
in the early days after the revolution or by proving devotion to the country on the 
battlefield during the Iran-Iraq War.  In the late 1980s and early 1990s, public space 
for debate was limited as the state restricted liberty and freedom of speech.  In fact, 
by the time of Khatami’s first election, only one daily newspaper with critical views 
of the government, Salam, was in existence (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, p. 30).  
Outside such public forums accessible to the general public, discourse was restricted 
to a number of specialised journals and informal and formal circles of intellectuals.  
According to a published interview with one of the main reformist figures, the ideas 
emerging in the following three circles prepared the grounds for change amongst 
reformist intellectuals: The President’s Strategic Research Centre between 1990 and 
1995, the Kiyan journal and students and followers of Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali 
Montazeri (Mirsepassi, 2010, p. 132).  This claim was supported by data gathered in 
fieldwork and it is in these spaces, particularly Kiyan (preceded by the journal 
Kayhan Farhangi) and the President’s Strategic Research Centre, where the idea of 
civil society emerged.  The following sections will delve into the two forums in 
which intellectual debates critical of the Islamic regime took place and which 
gradually gave way to the establishment of the reform movement platform.  Special 
attention will be paid to Abdolkarim Soroush, a primary intellectual whose ideas are 
credited as instigating the reform movement.   
 
Another noteworthy issue related to these spaces is that the institutions themselves 
represent the blurred boundaries between civil and political society, challenging 
observers to label them or place them in distinct categories, such as political society, 
civil society or the state.  Similar to many other aspects of Iranian society, they defy 
clear-cut classification.  On the one hand, the journal and its publishing institution 
are outside the state structure, making it an independent sphere for civil society 
discourse.  On the other hand, for a journal such as Kiyan or its predecessor Kayhan 
Farhangi, to function they require state subsidies and would not have permits or be 
free to operate without close government ties.  Similarly, while the President’s 
Centre for Strategic Research is clearly a component of the government, the 
members and the critical discourse they engage with hint at activities carried out in 
spaces generally characterised as civil society spaces.                        
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Kiyan Journal 
 
The journal Kiyan and the circle of individuals with direct and indirect roles in its 
publication represent a significant commonality in the background of religious 
intellectuals affiliated with the reform movement.  The history of this journal is best 
provided by the individual whose name is most closely associated with it, Dr 
Abdolkarim Soroush, a non-clerical scholar and proponent of Islamic reformation.  
Kiyan was founded by a group of individuals who were running the quarterly journal 
Kayhan Farhangi (translated as Cultural Universe, or World of Culture) which began 
its work in 1984.  Kayhan Farhangi was based on the work of the country’s liberally 
inclined intellectuals, clerics and laymen, who had ties to the revolutionary 
establishment.  According to an interview with Soroush, one unique and innovative 
feature of the publication was the inclusion of an interview with one of the country’s 
intellectual-academic figures in each issue and the introduction of the latest cultural 
and literary works in the country; this was all done during the turbulent period 
following the revolution and amidst a war (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  While political 
leaders were focused on the practical, day-to-day running of the country in order to 
establish order in a post-revolutionary society, they were also dealing with the results 
of a major war.  It is therefore significant that an elite group of individuals 
maintained their commitment to intellectual activity that examined social and 
political ideas from a critical perspective despite the challenging surroundings. As an 
example, in a 1997 Kiyan article, Alireza Alavitabar, a reformist intellectual, asks 
how contemporary Iranian intellectuals can gain a deeper understanding of the West 
and modernity by analysing different viewpoints and suggests that reaching 
significant understanding is beyond one individual and requires wide-ranging 
collaboration amongst experts (Alavitabar, 1997).       
 
Even more critically, the journal represents a ground-breaking publication where 
taboo subjects such as the role of the Supreme Leader were questioned.  In an issue 
published shortly after Khatami’s first election, the editor wrote a piece in which he 
directly addresses the negative impact of an all-powerful Supreme Leader; 
specifically, the editor writes that the constitutional change handing complete power 
to the Supreme Leader was one of the traits of the period following Khomeini’s 
death and the end of the war, what he terms the ‘second republic’ (Shamsolvaezin, 
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1997).  He goes on to say that the 2nd of Khordad represents the threshold of a third 
republic, where excluded society (jame-eye mahzoof) can once more become a social 
participant (Shamsolvaezin, 1997, p. 5).       
   
If the journal Kiyan and its creators, as a whole, are considered to represent 
leadership of the reform movement as a collective, Soroush represents one of its 
founding religious intellectuals.  In fact, it was the publication of Soroush’s 
controversial article series on his theory of ‘Contraction and Expansion of Religious 
Knowledge’ (Qabd va Bast-e Teorike Shari’at), explained below, in Kiyan’s 
predecessor Kayhan-e Farhangi between 1988 and 1990 that led to the resignation of 
Kayhan-e Farhangi’s editorial board, whose members then went on to publish Kiyan 
(Jahanbakhsh, 2004). 
 
Soroush cites some of the controversial works published in Kayhan Farhangi such as 
articles on religious theory and arguments over Karl Popper (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 
2007).  This work received fierce criticism from various actors within the state, 
including the future president, Khatami.   Soroush states, “…the pressure didn’t 
always come from enemies or opponents; I remember that Mr. Khatami was culture 
minister at the time or he was the head of the Kayhan Institute.  He criticised some of 
Kayhan Farhangi’s methods; quite fierce criticism” (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  The 
issue of Khatami’s criticism for Kayhan Farhangi affords several insights into the 
development of Iranian politics, the origins of reformist leaders and the state of 
intellectual life as a whole.  First, the fact that the state allowed controversial works 
to be written in a time of political unrest provides a softer, less authoritative image of 
the state, albeit the criticism was coming from ‘inside’ forces and therefore not 
considered an outright threat.  Nonetheless, the existence of controversy or critical 
thought is in itself telling of the situation.  Second, the fact that an individual such as 
Khatami himself criticised the methods used by the publication dispels the 
assumption that the future base of the reform movement was a homogenous group of 
elites.  The contestation by Khatami, who later became an advocate of an 
independent press, sheds light on the changes of opinion that can take place within 
individuals, at least in practice.  
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The theory of ‘Contraction and Expansion of Religious Knowledge, which Soroush 
later turned into a book, argues that religious knowledge is: 
…like other forms of knowledge, subject to all the attributes of knowledge.  It 
is human, fallible, evolving, and most important of all, it is constantly in the 
process of exchange with other forms of knowledge.  As such, its inevitable 
transformations mirror the transformation of science and other domains of 
human knowledge.  (Soroush, Sadri, & Sadri, 2000, p. 16)   
Soroush’s work became a source of conflict and controversy.  The clerical 
establishment considered it a challenge to religious authority and forced the journal 
to shut down in 1990 (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, p. 27).  One year later, a 
number of individuals involved with Kayhan Farhangi decided to break away from 
the institution that had published the journal and establish the monthly journal Kiyan 
(translated as Foundation).  Soroush reiterated his theory in Kiyan; for example, in a 
1997 article on pluralism, he manifestly expresses that our religious knowledge is 
varied/plural (matnoo/motekaser) and mobile (sayal) (Soroush, 1997).  The most 
significant product of Kiyan is the discourse emerging among a group of individuals 
who have come to be called the ‘Kiyan circle’.   
 
It should be noted that the ‘Kiyan circle’ is a term that covers an ambiguous group of 
individuals.  According to Soroush, the term ‘Kiyan circle’ was never used during 
the height of the journal’s activity; it was coined and used only after the publication 
was banned (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  Furthermore, there is no straightforward 
classification of the circle or precise membership list.  In fact, Soroush claims the 
term has been exploited by individuals who did not have direct or significant 
involvement with Kiyan but claimed affiliation (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  The 
attempt by individuals, particularly reformists, to seek affiliation with the publication 
and its writers provides an example of the journal’s accreditation as an early platform 
for the upcoming reform movement.  The journal, along with its sister publication, 
Zanan (Women), “…were prominent platforms for the Islamic dissent that began to 
be voiced among ‘insiders’ after over a decade of the experience of Islam in power, 
and became a magnet for intellectuals whose ideas and writings now formed the 
backbone of the New Religious Thinking” (Mir-Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, p. 27).  
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Soroush provides two broad definition of the ‘Kiyan circle’ which affords insight 
into the direction and make-up of the journal.  First, he offers a general 
understanding of the term that consists of the journal’s readers and those who were 
interested in the ideas introduced in the publication (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  With 
regards to the numbers, he states that though the circulation figure of the journal was 
20,000, the results of a questionnaire included in the journal’s last issue indicated 
that an average of five people read each copy; therefore, the general ‘Kiyan circle’ 
consisted of approximately 100,000 individuals (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  The 
specific definition of the ‘Kiyan circle’ consists of people directly involved with the 
publication which included the editor-in-chief, editorial board, some of the writers 
and a group of individuals who met on a weekly basis at the journal for debates on a 
variety of subjects during which different points of view were expressed (Khojasteh-
Rahimi, 2007).  Many of the individuals cited at these meetings later became known 
as prominent members of the reformist movement and affiliated intellectuals.   
 
One of the most remarkable and arguable points made by Soroush in his interview on 
Kiyan is that the publication was harmed  as a result of the political openness that 
took place after Khatami’s election (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  He states that while 
Kiyan was being published and the circle was meeting, he had no political problems 
with anyone; however, on the eve of the elections and after, the opening-up of the 
political atmosphere aggravated and intensified disagreements and disputes.  He cites 
this issue as a social ill that needs to be solved, stating “All of us, who do not favour 
the country’s prevailing policies and sometimes write things to express our 
opposition – when we find ourselves faced with a period of political openness, 
instead of becoming more united, we start attacking each other.  It’s as if we think 
that our mission is to prove our superiority over the others” (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 
2007).  While the conflicts between members were settled to an extent, their very 
occurrence provides an example of a wider problem within Iranian society: when it 
comes to a plurality of ideas, even intellectuals, whose duty is to engage with critical 
thought, are not immune from conflict and intolerance.  In the end, the semi-formal 
association between cultural figures in the ‘Kiyan circle’ was terminated upon the 
banning of the journal (Khojasteh-Rahimi, 2007).  The journal was ultimately banned 
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in 199124.  While another similar publication attempted to replace it, the discourse 
that took place within and as a result of Kiyan remained unique.  The history of 
Kiyan, as expressed by the individual most closely affiliated with it, dispels the myth 
that the reform movement emerged from a unified group of individuals with a 
homogenous outlook.   
 
Additional analysis of Abdolkarim Soroush 
 
As presented above, a discussion of reformist intellectuals necessitates a more 
detailed look at Abdolkarim Soroush, who was featured on the Time 100 list of the 
world’s most influential people in 2005.  Born in 1945, Soroush began his higher 
education in pharmacology at the University of Tehran before pursuing his post-
graduate education in England.  In the aftermath of the revolution, he was a well-
known figure affiliated with the cultural councils credited for purging universities of 
individuals and curricula that did not meet the state’s standards of religion.  
However, by the late 1980s, he began to come into conflict with conservative 
elements in the state as a result of his challenging views on Islam and advocacy of 
pluralism.  Soroush himself defines religious intellectuals as individuals who “…are 
really religious; that is to say, religion is not just a research topic for them, it is a 
matter of faith” ("Some of our religious intellectuals are still afraid of being called 
liberal or secular," 2006).  He identifies civil society as “a society in which people 
supervise government” and the tools for this supervision depend on the times; he 
states that in our times the tools include newspapers, political parties, guilds and 
associations, etc. (Soroush, 2000, p. 64)25.  He further expands on this by stating that 
pluralism is also a pillar of civil society as human beings hold different views (Ibid).       
 
Soroush was a leader in Islamic scholarship and not only condoned but advocated the 
need to go beyond religious texts and to study works by other scholars both within 
and outside the Islamic world.  He studied and addressed works by individuals such 
as Popper, Kant and Habermas.  Though he believes that scholars of social science 
                                                 
24
 The exact year of Kiyan’s closure is unclear as literature refers to both 1999 and 2001; the journal 
may have been shut down by state officials and reopened several times as is commonly seen in Iran.  
Regardless of its final closure date, the journal’s impact was in the pre-Khatami era of the early to 
mid-1990s when the journal provided a unique space for dialogue among religious intellectuals.    
25
 Cited information in this paragraph is part of an edited and published speech (in Persian) by 
Soroush in Mashhad, Iran on 19 December 1997. 
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should not solely focus on political problems at the expense of others, Soroush has 
made significant contributions to the study of Iranian political thought.  He criticised 
the direction taken by the Islamic Republic through his writings and lectures, 
criticism which became particularly visible in the period following the Iran-Iraq War.  
His ideas have made theoretical and practical contributions across fields, including 
theology, philosophy and politics.  In effect, the ideas he expressed and his 
challenging of the status quo can be considered a precursor to the reform movement 
as a whole.  Though some of his contributions are addressed in the section on the 
Kiyan journal, this section aims to present a more comprehensive overview of his 
ideas beyond the journal.  It should be noted that a detailed examination of Soroush’s 
work would require a much more space than is available here; the intention is to 
provide a glimpse into the ideas expressed by a man who instigated, or at the very 
least influenced, the circle of individuals who later came to represent the intellectual 
and political face of the reform movement.  An added contribution of this section is 
to redress some assumptions about the nature of a religious intellectual who is often 
associated with the purging of academic institutions in the post-revolutionary period. 
 
The following paragraphs will examine Soroush’s views on a number of key 
concepts relevant to civil society discourse.  One of these is ‘justice’, an issue that 
has historically played a significant role in political and social movements and has 
also been addressed by Soroush on numerous occasions.  While he explains that he is 
devoted to the cause of justice, he finds the term problematic because it is open to 
conflicting interpretations; even defining a concept such as justice is difficult as it is 
a term that can be applied to any action without representing any specific activity 
(Seyyedabadi, 2006).  Soroush’s dealings with justice demonstrate his background in 
philosophy and desire to open up and challenge ideas rather than choosing to 
simplify concepts for the sake of political expediency. 
 
With regard to democracy and Islam, Soroush asserts that Islamic civilizations’ basis 
on fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and law does not inherently make civilisations 
dominated by Islam incompatible with the notion of rule of law (with rule of law a 
key factor for democracy).  For a model of religious democratic society, Soroush 
references de Tocqueville’s study of America, “…where, even though religion and 
politics were separate, religion guided the American society and polity and where the 
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ethics of universality in religion had a bearing on the harmony between the freedom 
of subjectivity and democracy” (Vahdat, 2002, p. 211, based on a 1994 article 
written by Soroush for the journal Kiyan).  However, what is amiss in Islamic 
civilizations is the notion of rights, as fiqh is based on duty rather than rights.  
Democracy based on the rule of law can be achieved once the concept of rights is 
introduced to fiqh, according to Soroush.   
 
With regard to liberty, Soroush has stated in interviews, such as the one with John 
Keane, that “…liberty is a value and that even the opponents of this virtue need it in 
order to express their opposition to liberty” ("CSD interview: The beauty of justice," 
2007, p. 10).  His expression that liberty is required even in order to oppose it makes 
it an essential value of society, as seen by Soroush.  Freedom, according to Soroush, 
is a component of justice; in contrast to justice, freedom as a concept is not abstract 
(Seyyedabadi, 2006).  Freedom of expression is a key component of liberty.  Soroush 
states that if the power of speech is taken away from human beings, his whole being 
is doomed; the freedom of expression brings with it freedom of thought, critique, 
writings, newspapers and public media (Soroush, 2003b, p. 74).  He further 
elaborates that, since the constitution in Iran, freedom of expression has not solely 
meant that speech considered to be ‘right’ (sokhanan-e haq) should be spoken (in 
other words, it is not only about the speech that is deemed to be the ‘Truth’); rather, 
any speech has the right to be spoken (Soroush, 2003a, p. 64).  
 
Therefore, those who promote justice should also be proponents of freedom, and, 
considering that it is possible to define freedom, it should not be a difficult value to 
provide a society.  Related to freedom, Soroush summarises democracy as the 
existence of three steps, each of which require freedom in order to be achieved: step 
1-installing rulers, step 2-criticising rulers and step 3-dismissing rulers; justice is 
achieved once people are able to exercise all three steps (Seyyedabadi, 2006).  He 
states: When man is not in power, he can breakdown right from wrong (haq o batel), 
but once in power he sees himself as right/in the right (haq) and considers all else 
based on his own standards; it is for this reason that he considers democracy and 
‘being democratic’ (democrasi va democratic boodan) as necessary (Soroush, 2003b, 
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p. 79). Intellectuals in the West have addressed each of these interdependent 
concepts: democracy, freedom and justice, on countless occasions.   
 
Civil society for Soroush begins when human beings entrust the right to referee 
(davari), rule (hakemiyat) and administer (mojri) freely to another person, and, he 
references John Locke’s opinion that civil society is equal to a regulated 
(ghanoonmand) society (Soroush, 2000, pp. 61-62).  Soroush goes further to state 
that the notion of the Supreme Leader is validated because it is included in the 
constitution, even if some might find it legitimate purely on religious grounds 
(Soroush, 2000, p. 62)26.  A society cannot be based on individuals’ selfish desires; it 
should be based on decisions that have been instituted collectively, such as in the 
constitution, rather than being based purely on the wants of a few without having a 
rational, legal basis.  In a sense, it is freedom of choice that defines a civil society.  
On the whole, however, Soroush emphasises the need for freedom to be paired with 
justice, as he states that without justice freedom becomes an ‘orphan’ (yatim) 
(Soroush, 2000, prologue).       
     
What makes Soroush’s thoughts noteworthy is that he speaks as a practising Muslim 
who has, at present, a high standing amongst Muslim communities and a past in the 
Islamic Revolution.  In order to accept the values of freedom and democracy, he does 
not disavow Islam, though he does contest the ways in which it is interpreted.  
“…Soroush distinguishes between a religious and a liberal democracy, a distinction 
grounded in freedom of faith and freedom of inclination, respectively” (Vahdat, 
2002, p. 210).  The bringing-together of the Islamic context with the terminology 
associated with Western liberal thought is just one of Soroush’s contributions.  His 
application of these ideas to the regime of the Islamic Republic is another.  He states 
that it is necessary to strive for a moral society as a political and religious goal 
(Soroush, 2002, p. 68).   
 
Soroush does not consider himself a politician or political leader.  Rather, he falls in 
the category of scholar and philosopher.  Nonetheless, he has consistently 
contributed criticism and suggestions on Iran’s political affairs.  He applies his 
                                                 
26
 Cited information in this paragraph is part of an edited and published speech (in Persian) by 
Soroush in Mashhad, Iran on 19 December 1997. 
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theoretical understandings to practical circumstances.  For example, in discussing 
modernity and tradition, he notes the conflicts that arise when modern tools are used 
with traditionalist mentalities, or vice-versa.  He cites the contradiction between 
Khatami’s performance and slogan and between his physical tools and conceptual 
tools as one reason for his failure to succeed (Seyyedabadi, 2006).  In a sense, he 
shows, in a very tangible way, the need to update the means used by those in power 
to achieve modern-day agendas.  While this may implicate the entire system of the 
Islamic Republic, it is also applicable to the reformists themselves who have 
struggled between their allegiance to founding ideals of the state, primarily those 
espoused by Khomeini, and their desire to see change.  Although Soroush expressed 
some of these ideas after the start of the reform movement, he was nonetheless a 
pioneer in post-Revolutionary Iran with his call for critical analysis to cover all areas 
of thought and the need for examination of history’s role in how religion is 
understood. 
 
The President’s Centre for Strategic Research  
 
In contrast to the Kiyan journal, less is known about the President’s Centre for 
Strategic Research (CSR), or Markaz Tahghighat Strategic Riyasat Jomhouri, in 
relation to the intellectuals involved.  The President’s Centre for Strategic Research, 
called the Centre hereafter, was established in 1989.  According to the Centre’s 
current website27, it was created to carry out research in fields such as politics, 
economics, legal, cultural and social studies.  The Centre was part of the Office of 
the President until 1997, when it was reassigned as the research arm of the 
Expediency Council, an official body of the state that serves as an advisor to the 
Supreme Leader28.  For purposes of this thesis, the reasons for the Centre’s handover 
and activities after 1997 will not be discussed.  Of relevance is the role the centre 
played up to 1997 as a hub for intellectual activity that resulted in the development of 
the reform movement, particularly as few other spaces were available for similar 
dialogue to take place among public figures.   
 
                                                 
27
 Website for the Centre for Strategic Research: http://www.csr.ir/ 
28
 Chapter Six provides more in-depth discussion and analysis of the complex state structure and the 
involvement of reformists and conservatives in the different branches.  
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The concepts that eventually framed the reform movement began to emerge during 
the period of reconstruction, after the Iran-Iraq War, a perception supported by one 
respondent, INT2, during his interview (as discussed in the introduction, respondents 
will be identified by individual codes.  The prefix ‘INT’ refers to reformist 
intellectuals).  The following information is based on INT2’s interview and the views 
are supported by Ali Mirsepassi’s Democracy in Modern Iran (2010).29  According 
to INT2, President Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted to grant some credit to the leftist 
thinkers whose political influence was rejected and for this reason Rafsanjani created 
the President’s Centre for Strategic Research during his term in office.  The 
respondent was invited to move from Esfahan to join this centre in Tehran and, by 
his account, it was at this juncture that members of the group began a dialogue 
amongst themselves.  He emphasises that the individuals involved had an interest in 
religion and were educated in various areas of the social sciences.  According to a 
news article with a key member of the Centre, one of the conclusions members of the 
Centre reached was that focusing solely on economic development was not sufficient 
and there was a need to address cultural, political and social development ("Az 
markaz tahghighat etrategik riyasat jomhouri ta halghe kiyan," 2007).  INT7, 
another intellectual, who was at the Centre for eight years working on the topic of 
political development, cites the time preceding Khatami’s election as a period when 
ideas developed and “a synergy was created between them [members who 
participated in dialogue at the Centre]”.  Moreover, figures such as Khatami and 
Soroush, who attended sessions on the topic of religion, took part in some of the 
Centre’s meetings.  In addition to his research at this Centre, INT2 was also a 
member of Kiyan’s editorial council.  Moreover, a group of clerics who were former 
students of the late Ayatollah Montazeri also worked with the group of individuals 
linked to the Centre and the journal Kiyan.  These individuals were united over an 
interest in religion and were all educated in areas of the social sciences that allowed 
them to carry out an interdisciplinary dialogue among themselves.  Up to the 1997 
elections, they were trying to work on the needs of civil society, such as the issue of 
                                                 
29
 Interviews for Mirsepassi’s book were conducted around the same time as fieldwork for this thesis 
was undertaken.  Some overlaps in data can be found.  The overlap is used to corroborate evidence 
and not considered a duplication of work as the central focus of each work is different: Mirseppasi 
concentrates on intellectual debates surrounding modernity and democracy whereas this thesis was 
motivated by a desire to understand why the idea of civil society was chosen as a framework for the 
reform movement.   
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privatization.  INT2 concludes that by the time Khatami was first elected, he and his 
colleagues had already begun work on the topics central to the reform movement.   
 
A number of inferences can be surmised from INT2’s account of the Centre 
summarised above.  First, his belief that Rafsanjani encouraged the Centre’s 
establishment as a way to include leftist thinkers is an indication of reformist thought 
originating amongst a group that had been both disenfranchised by the mainstream 
political sphere yet also given some space for activity.  In other words, this supports 
the argument that reformists were tolerated and granted a voice, albeit limited, in the 
greater state structure but their standing was fragile.  Second, the dialogue that 
eventually led to the key concepts that framed the reformist movement emerged from 
formal spheres, namely the Centre as a space for dialogue in the period before 1995 
in this case.  The Centre, Rafsanjani’s sponsorship of its creation and the type of 
environment it offered pre-1995 is an example of ‘political opportunity’, a building 
block of social movements.  As the Centre was later reorganised and became 
intolerant of challenging views, the opportunity was not embodied in the institution 
as a structure, but by the particular space it provided, allowing dynamic dialogue and 
the participation of a diverse set of opinions.  A third inference from INT2’s account 
is that the individuals who came to represent the reform movement and whose 
dialogue formed the movement’s basic principles emerged from a common and 
narrow base, as shown by the overlapping actors in key spaces such as Kiyan and the 
Centre.           
 
4.4  Why Civil Society? 
 
Building on INT2’s assertion that the ideas behind the reform movement emerged in 
the six to eight years before Khatami’s election, the following section provides in-
depth coverage of the reasons why civil society emerged as a key concept, according 
to interviews with key public intellectuals affiliated with the reform movement.  This 
section is based on in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted with members of 
the group identified as ‘secondary’ public intellectuals earlier in the chapter.  The 
section will identify the personal accounts and experiences that shaped these 
individuals’ relationships with the reform movement, the reasons reformists chose to 
support the notion of civil society and their definitions and findings of civil society.     
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The majority of data and analysis is grounded in interviews with eight individuals 
with the following profiles.  INT1 is a former government spokesperson in the 
Khatami administration.  At the time of the interview he was an academic at a 
leading university, was part of Khatami’s inner circle of advisors. Prior to Khatami’s 
presidency he held regional government posts.  INT2 represents a well-known public 
intellectual who was a key behind-the-scenes strategist of the reform movement.  He 
was an editor of a leading reformist newspaper during the Khatami administration 
and wrote extensively on the topic of civil society.  INT3 is a female intellectual who 
held high level posts in the Ministry of Interior during Khatami’s presidency and was 
a strong advocate for nongovernmental organisations.  Her credentials as an 
intellectual are based on her work as a researcher and writer.  INT4 is an academic, 
reformist newspaper editor and active member of the intellectual circles of the 
reform movement from the time of its inception.  INT5 is a female academic and 
former member of the parliament during the Khatami presidency.  INT6 refers to a 
key leader of the reform movement who has held posts in the government from the 
early days of the revolution but gained prominence in the Khatami administration.  
He is a principal figure in one of the main reformist political parties and has provided 
strategic guidance for the movement.  The most prominent of the respondents, INT7, 
was an influential thinker, strategist and public figure, considered to be one of the 
founding fathers of the reform movement. He was also an elected official for a period 
during the Khatami’s presidency.  INT8 represents a female member of Khatami’s 
cabinet, active in the field of women’s rights for over twenty-five years.          
          
1. Power: Challenging dictators and acquiring control 
 
The idea of power was a recurrent theme in interviews with regard to why civil 
society as a language and concept was used by reformists.  However, the basis of 
power as a reason to pursue the concept of civil society stemmed from two different, 
yet related, angles.  First, civil society was seen as a way to weaken the hold of 
dictatorial power.  This represents a more idealistic viewpoint.  The second angle 
emphasises a more pragmatic perspective, whereby individuals who saw themselves 
side-lined politically wanted an alternative route back into power.     
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As expressed by Saeed Hajjarian, a public intellectual and key architect of the reform 
movement from its inception, civil society has the power to dissolve political power.  
He explains this in an article on police and military states by providing the example 
of what happened to the Shah’s regime with the Islamic Revolution (Hajjarian, 2002, 
pp. 6-7).  He describes the outcomes of a police state, whereby society becomes 
“atomised” and civil society done away with; individuals have no protection by way 
of family, civil organisations, NGOs, political parties, etc. which is how the state can 
seize those without refuge.  However, at the same time, he claims the private sphere 
is partly secure and the public sphere is weak such that it is difficult for the state to 
control and organise the public sphere.  It is at this point that with the organisation 
(sazmandahi) of civil society that the power seeking state (dowlat-e eghtedargara) 
will dissipate.  He goes on to explain that the state can take steps to mitigate civilian 
power, but ultimately it cannot regain control.  Hajjarian’s view, though discussing 
the overthrow of the Shah, can be seen as parallel to the way in which reformists 
attempted to restrain the post-Revolutionary power of the state.   
          
Civil society to restrain abuse of power 
 
INT2 represented the first viewpoint and provided a direct answer to the question of 
why civil society was pursued.  What attracted him and his ‘friends’, as he referred to 
the circle of individuals around him, to the idea of civil society was the issue of 
dictatorship.  He said they saw that cycles of freedom in Iran were short-lived and 
they wanted to know how to stop the cycle of dictatorships that took over.  The first 
thing that came to his mind was that the regime has too much power and, “we need a 
power source that is of an equal level with the government (hokoomat)”.  But there 
were also questions such as “how does our outlook differ from the liberal outlook?”  
His response to this question was that equality was important in addition to 
individual freedom.  Civil society was the answer.  At the time, he claims, “Khatami 
saw civil society as resistance to despotism (moghavemat be estebdad)”.  In an 
article entitled “Chera Jame’e-ye  Madani?” (Why Civil Society?) appearing in the 
journal Iran-e Farda, the writer states that the most important function of civil 
society in democracy is to bring about a basis for limiting government, and this is 
done by oversight and limitations of actions by democratic states and democratising 
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of authoritarian states (Sardarabadi, 1998, p. 63)30.  The intellectual Sadeq 
Zibakalam, in an article for the magazine Jame-eye Salem31, wrote (as translated 
from the Persian), “In a civil society, the law is higher than the government 
(hokoomat), and in the interpretation of the “science of politics”, the level of its 
power is greater than governance” (Zibakalam, 1999, p. 92).  Similarly, according to 
INT3, the motivation for her to become involved in the issue of civil society was a 
need to prevent individual rule and a concentration of power.  INT3’s view and that 
of Khatami, according to her, was of organisations mediating between citizens and 
government.         
 
A comparable view is expressed by INT7, one of the key public intellectuals, 
political advisors and strategists of the reform movement, who himself ran and 
briefly held political office.  According to INT7, in the time period leading up to the 
1997 elections, “Our argument was that the government in Iran is very big, there is a 
strong state and a weak society and this can’t be.  There should be a balance between 
state and society”.  According to him, the government is independent from society 
and benefits from relative autonomy since it has oil and does not take taxes from the 
people.  At the same time, “the people of Iran are very dependent on the 
government” (INT7).  He provides a number of statistics, including the fact that 
under the last census (carried out in 2006) 29 million people received some sort of 
welfare support from the government.  INT7’s description of the state-society 
relationship reflects on the condition of a rentier state, discussed in Chapter Three.  
He asserts that, “Our [he and his colleagues] thesis was that if we want a strong 
democracy in Iran, one of the ways is the enrichment of civil society organisations, 
organisations that are people based”.  He (INT7) and his colleagues felt that the 
revolution started with ‘the people’ and “if this potential is not institutionalised, we 
would return to the time of the Shah”.  The Shah, representing the monarchy, refers 
to an undemocratic system of government that the revolution was supposed to 
supplant by granting voice to the citizen base.  INT7 claimed it was for this reason 
that one of the Khatami administration’s goals became the enrichment of civil 
society.         
                                                 
30
 The author provides an endnote reference to Larry Diamond’s work here (“Rethinking Civil 
Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation”, 1994).  
31
 Jame’eye Salem, Volume 7, Number 34, August/September 1997 (Shahrivar 1376). 
148 
 
 
Reformist intellectual and academic, INT4, confirmed that the discussion of civil 
society began before Khatami’s election as president.  It should be noted that rather 
than using the singular, INT4 used a plural pronoun, which includes himself, when 
referencing to intellectual circles that publicly debated the issue of civil society.  Use 
of the pronouns, ‘us’ and ‘we’ is common in the Persian language, providing a level 
of formality and establishing a degree of distance between an individual and the 
ideas they present.  The assumption should be that references to ‘they’ in the 
following section are either to the individual interviewee or to the larger group of 
intellectuals affiliated with public political discussions, unless otherwise stated.    
 
According to INT4, discussions of civil society were largely impacted by the Eastern 
European experience.  However, “We did not accept the Eastern bloc experience 
because it led to revolution and totalitarianism”.  He asserted that in the post-war 
period, there existed no organizations independent from the government, leaving the 
‘middle’ of society empty.  According to him, there existed two options for Iranian 
society to pursue, one being that of ‘Hegel’ (i.e. the supremacy of individual 
autonomy) and the other being a society without hierarchy.  The society that he and 
his colleagues chose was one where nongovernmental organizations existed.  He did 
not provide much further detail about this envisioned society.  The reason for 
choosing this path, he claimed, was the inordinate involvement of government they 
saw in everyday life.  As an example, he stated, “In Iran the government is 
everywhere.  When someone dies and you want to hold a funeral, the Government 
tells you which akhound (cleric) you can invite.  We wanted to make government 
smaller”.  Upon seeing such an inordinate level of involvement, the goal of those 
promoting civil society was to decrease the size of government.  A noteworthy point 
in this account is the reference to the funeral practices, which is, by all accounts, a 
personal matter rather than a broader political issue.  Based on background 
information on this informant, it was known that he had recently lost a family 
member and had faced trouble making funeral arrangements.  While this was a recent 
occurrence and may not have been an issue during the time debates around civil 
society were taking place preceding Khatami’s election, it indicates a post-
rationalisation of events.  The inference from this example is that the understanding 
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of past decisions is a complex and imprecise practice, and there exists a constant 
process of transformation in how intellectuals understand and rationalise ideas.          
 
In literature, similar references to the issue of restraining power can be seen (as 
addressed in the previous chapter).  Rule of law and rational law making have been 
considered key points to civil society.  For example, in an article on law making in 
civil society, the writer, a reformist cleric, discusses the importance of the law 
(ghanoon), respecting the law (ghanoonmandi), being law oriented (ghanoongaraie), 
etc. in civil society, regardless of the specific definition of it that is used (Mohaghegh 
Damad, 1998, p. 36).  He then goes on to state that one of the problems in Iran is the 
disorganised state of law making (vaze bi sar o samoon ghanoon gozari) and the 
need for there to be an agreement of principles that can serve as a pre-set assumption 
based on which laws are enacted and interpreted (Mohaghegh Damad, 1998, p. 44).  
 
Civil Society as a tool for access to power 
 
In addition to considering civil society as a tool to prevent the abuse of power or 
counter dictatorial rule, the concept of civil society was also picked up by 
intellectuals in discussions before Khatami’s election as a way to access power.  In 
other words, civil society was pursued, as ascertained from interviews, with the 
desire to find a new source of power among the electorate that circumvents the 
conservative dominated state structure.  This notion tackles a popular understanding 
of civil society that argues, “The political role of civil society in turn is not directly 
related to the control or conquest of power but to the generation of influence through 
the life of democratic associations and unconstrained discussion in the cultural public 
sphere” (Cohen & Arato, 1992, p. x).  There is contradiction among some reformist 
interpretations that see a much more direct link between civil society and political 
power.  The intellectuals involved in this endeavour were by and large 
revolutionaries who were at one point amongst the inner circle of the regime.  Upon 
losing their standing within this circle and their questioning of practices within the 
state, they began looking for other sources of power.  While spaces such as the 
President’s Centre for Strategic Research and a limited number of publications such 
as Kiyan offered them a partial outlet to impart their views, the idea of civil society 
provided them with the potential for direct access to power.  Overall, political parties 
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have a weak representation in Iranian politics.  Individuals such as Hajjarian, 
believed that political parties could establish connections with entities such as NGOs, 
associations and movements to generate cooperation (Khosravi, 2001)32.          
 
The following data is based on an interview with INT6, a prominent intellectual and 
leader in one of the principal reformist political parties.  According to him, “The 
government is the leviathan in Iran.  Structural wise, the Pahlavi and Islamic 
Republic regimes are the same and ’76 [1376 of the Iranian calendar, 1997 Gregorian 
Calendar] was an opposition to this”.  ’76 refers to the emergence of the reformists 
and their stance, which had emerged in the post-war period.  “We felt like we had 
created a beast (ghool) and understood that a few things had to happen, the most 
important was that the government has to be responsive”.  However, he also stated 
that in a short period, the regime could not become liberal or the government smaller 
because of people’s high expectations of the government.  He gave the example that 
society in general opposed privatisation and surveys have shown that over two-thirds 
of people wanted to keep radio and television under public ownership33.  His 
observations counter the idea of reformists wanting to limit government.  At the 
same time, he asserted that Iran needs a strong military and security because of its 
geopolitical position.  Instead, he provided another role for civil society, and a reason 
for reformists opting to use the concept.  He stated, “We went to civil society to rein 
in the beast (ghool-e bi shakh o dom).  We didn’t see it from the viewpoint of 
freedom and rights but it was mostly to stop the beast”.  He further elaborated on this 
metaphor and the role of civil society by stating, “We saw that in opposition to this 
beast we can create smaller beasts”.  The ‘smaller beasts’ he clarified are in reference 
to civil society.   
 
INT6 further explained that in the period before Khatami entered power, but after 
Khomeini’s death (1989), pro-reform individuals were slowly being disqualified 
from running for office (rad-e salahiyat) by the state structure and they, pro-reform 
actors, realized that as individuals they needed freedom to continue.  They felt civil 
society was their way.  “During the war, everything was done to maintain the 
government but after we realised that the beast (ghool) would knock us down 
                                                 
32
 A copy of this interview was received from Mr Hajjarian’s office. 
33
 He referred to a survey from 2004.  
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(INT6).  Moreover, he claimed he and his reformist colleagues wanted to create a 
local civil society based on their society’s needs, not simply as a way of modelling 
the West.  He asserted, “Certain things happened early in the revolution that led us to 
this.  Free elections, even during the war, allowed us to realise that voting doesn’t 
mean we are moving away from the revolution”.  The last statement is an indication 
of the strong relationship he, as a leading intellectual figure of the reform movement, 
sees between civil society and democracy.  This is significant because although he 
claimed the movement wanted to create a localised civil society, he still relied on a 
link between the Western idea of democracy and civil society.  Overall, however, the 
key finding from INT6’s statements in this regard is that civil society, as he and his 
colleagues saw it, was a tactic to achieve political power.  At the same time, the 
contrasting explanations for why civil society was chosen are themselves an 
indication of the conflicting meaning and responsibility reformists assigned to the 
concept of civil society.          
 
Related to this point is the attempt to attract segments of the population who had lost 
confidence in the regime to a reinvented image of the Islamic Republic through the 
principles of civil society.  INT3 directly addressed this issue. She stated that 
reformists wanted to change the view of people towards the regime so that it 
“…belongs to them (taalogh khater) and not something to fear”.  Her definition of 
civil society, provided later in this chapter, explains how she believed that through 
nongovernmental organisations, citizens could voice their desires.  This view can be 
attributed to the reformist aspirations of maintaining the Islamic Republic and using 
the concept of civil society as a way to attain power. 
 
2. Challenging violence  
 
Another less prominent, but important theme, that resonated most with INT2 was 
that of violence.  While a direct reference to the idea of violence was not made in 
other interviews with public intellectuals, its general premise can be seen in 
references to the promotion of dialogue by respondents.  INT2 stated, “I thought to 
myself, how can we lower the levels of unrest (shooresh) and still have people 
express their wishes?  We went towards civil society because of violence 
(khoshoonat).  Instead of slogans (shoar), people within civil society talk about their 
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ideas.  Our goal was to find a non-violent way”.  INT2 referred to the violence he 
witnessed during the (Iran-Iraq) war, in which he had voluntarily participated.  Even 
when the war was over, he “saw riots and unrest (shooresh) in several cities like 
Qazvin, Shiraz and Eslamshahr near Tehran”.  When speaking about the dialogue 
that took place at the Centre, discussed above, he stated, “We had all seen the 
violence of the revolution, war and domestic terrors.  They [referring to domestic 
terrorists] were assassinating and the others were executing (oonha terror mikardan 
va inha edam mikardan).  We saw lots of people being killed”.  Overall, this 
characterisation of civil society can be linked with the liberal origins of civil society 
and Ferguson, who wrote about civil society as the elimination of violence from 
human affairs.  Civil society offers a peaceful means of interaction and is similar to 
those who identified civil society as not just organisations, as will be described 
below, but rather as a space or forum for debate.  While this outlook on civil society 
presents a more nuanced and less restrictive view than one focused on organisations, 
it also poses a challenge in its ambiguity.  It was in this atmosphere of ideas about 
restricting excessive power and engaging in open dialogue that the 1997 presidential 
elections took place between Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, a hard-line cleric and speaker 
of parliament, backed by the Supreme Leader, and Mohammad Khatami, a moderate 
cleric and former Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who pursued liberal 
policies during his past political tenure.    
 
4.5  Reformist Entry to Power: Khatami’s election 
 
According to INT4, in the time period immediately preceding Khatami’s first 
election as president in May 1997, the intellectuals previously involved in the 
revolution of 1979 began to drift away and the revolutionary ideology lost its 
intellectuals.  Though these debates began before Khatami’s election, it was 
Khatami, a cleric, who was able to take them to the public in ways the intellectuals 
had failed to do.  When Khatami became a candidate for the presidency, the 
reformist intellectuals referenced above began to actively support him.  For example, 
INT3 stated, “At one point, I would be giving three lectures a day in defence of 
Khatami”.  It was during this election and afterwards that civil society entered the 
public sphere in Iran.  As recounted by INT6, while those in his circle were familiar 
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with the issue of civil society, it was not until Khatami’s entrance on the national 
stage that it became a public concept.   
 
Khatami as representative  
 
As an individual, Khatami played a significant role in bringing a new style of 
intellectual discourse into the public spotlight.  According to Abdolkarim Soroush, 
Khatami was himself an intellectual with a ‘deep’ (amiq) understanding of concepts 
such as civil society; this is in contrast to other politicians whom Soroush claims 
have only a superficial understanding (sathi) of new issues about which they speak 
(Soroush, 2000, p. 421)34.  During his election campaign and after his election 
victory, the issues that were thus far confined to limited circles of intellectuals 
entered the mainstream media.  For Khatami, “The role of civil society is better 
living (behtar zistan) or welfare (behzisti).  What shows the civil aspect of society is 
the conscious/aware (agahaneh), selected (entekhab garaneh) and voluntary 
(davtalabaneh) existence of individuals.  Humans have to be free in order to be able 
to have a voluntary presence in different fields of society, particularly the political, 
social and cultural” (Khatami, 2000b, p. 38).  Khatami takes on a broader approach 
to civil society.  He states that in ‘a’ civil society, thinking is free and must be 
expressed; the final referees are the people and they get to decide, (Khatami, 2001b, 
p. 68)35. Khatami states that while civil society is a concept emerging from the West, 
it does not mean that it must then be renounced.  In fact, he points to other Western 
concepts, such as constitutionality (mashrootiat) and republicanism (jomhouri), 
which have become embedded in Iranian society.  The main facets of civil society, 
he states, include: people being present in all arenas of society (he states that in an 
uncivil society people have no rights and this is against Islam); government has 
limits and must work within a particular framework (he points out that even the 
Supreme Leader is selected by the opinion of the Assembly of Experts  (which is 
elected by people); there exist organizations that serve as intermediary between 
people and government (this includes political parties, syndicates, etc.) (Khatami, 
2001b)36.     
     
                                                 
34
 Based on interview with Soroush in weekly Aban on 1/3/1378 (22 May 1999) 
35
 Based on the President’s speech and Q&A with students, 7 December 1998 (16 Azar 1377). 
36
 Based on the President’s speech and Q&A with students, 7 December 1998. 
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On the issue of civil society and freedom of the press, a translated work of Khatami’s 
words states: 
In this part of the world, and especially in Iran, religion has called people to 
establish and consolidate civil society, a responsible society, a society in 
which people are participants, a society where the government belongs to the 
people and is the servant of the people, not their master, and is consequently 
responsible to the people.  Civil society needs to be based on order and the 
cornerstone of that order, is the Constitution. (Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, 
p. 90) 
With regard to intellectuals, Khatami made the claim that Iranian society had been 
afflicted by two challenges in the past century, one being ‘unenlightened religious 
dogma’ and the other being secular intellectualism (Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, p. 
23).  A key feature of his thought was his reproach of dogmatic “Khomeinism”37 
(Shakibi, 2010, p. 162).  In a collection of essays published in 1993, Khatami 
asserted: 
Unfortunately, what has been called intellectualism in our society has been a 
movement that has been superficial and cut off from the people.  Never has 
the voice of self-appointed intellectuals travelled beyond the cafeterias and 
coffee houses where they have posed as a political opposition.  Even if people 
have heard their voice, they have found it incomprehensible.  Thus, there has 
never been any mutual understanding.  And if public-minded intellectualism 
came to the fore and gained respect, it was through people who cast their 
claims in authentic, traditional, and religious terms.  This was the reason for 
the vast popularity of figures such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Ali Shariati.  
These two were real intellectuals, and our society felt that they were a part of 
the people and spoke to the people’s pains and concerns. (Khatami & 
Mafinezam, 1997, p. 25).   
Here we witness the paradox of a religious intellectual’s claim that the reason the 
work of secular intellectuals was unable to take root in Iranian society was due to 
their inability to integrate and engage with the wider public, a critique that later came 
to be lodged against religious intellectuals including Khatami himself.  This is 
reminiscent of Gramsci’s call for “…intellectuals to develop a relational knowledge 
of and with the masses in order to help them become self-reflective” (Borg, 
Buttigieg, & Mayo, 2002, p. 164).  The idea also resonates with neo (or post)-
Gramscians, who discuss the importance of ideas and ideology relating to particular 
                                                 
37
 Khomeinism (as well as Leninism) refers to “…the construction of a universalist utopian modernity 
superior in morality, politics, social justice, and…economics, to that offered by the West” (Shakibi, 
2010, p. 80). 
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groups (for example, Stuart Hall’s work on the problem of ideology and Marxism 
(Hall, 1996)).  Khatami goes on to state that a lack or weakness of religious 
intellectualism is a major flaw that must be addressed (Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, 
p. 28).   
 
From the same collection of essays first published in 1993, we see that Khatami 
describes an intellectual as one who ‘…lives in her own time, taking on a social 
responsibility, her mind constantly curious and restive about reality and human 
destiny.  An intellectual is one who respects rationality and thinking and also knows 
the value of freedom’ (Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, p. 28).  He then adds to this 
interpretation to describe a religious intellectual as: 
...one who loves humanity, understands its problems, and feels a 
responsibility towards its destiny and respects human freedom,  She feels that 
humans have a divine mission and wants freedom for them.  Whatever blocks 
the path to human growth and evolution, she deems as being against freedom.  
(Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, p. 29) 
Religious intellectuals, he believes, can emerge by linking religious seminaries and 
universities.   
 
Khatami’s stance on censorship is interesting in that he does not believe in a system 
based on a singular dominant idea that isolates itself from critics.  He writes, “An 
active, evolving society must be in contact and communication with different, 
sometimes opposing views, to be able to equip itself with a more powerful, attractive 
and effective thought than that of the opponent” (Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, p. 
47).  An additional testimony is a statement he made during his inaugural speech, “It 
is only through the growth of thinking and intellectual forces in society, and the free 
exchange of ideas, that the government can choose the best views and ways and 
arrive at the proper criteria for justice in the sophisticated world of today…” 
(Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, p. 80).   These statements form a basis for the notion, 
expressed by respondents below, that civil society is a forum for the exchange of 
ideas.  Therefore, it is in line with this belief that reformists encouraged and 
participated in expanding newspapers during Khatami’s presidency.  Khatami’s 
choice of Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, Ata’ollah Mohajerani, upheld 
this belief by granting an extraordinary number of permits for reformist publications 
while at the same time authorising a previously suppressed sphere of arts and culture.  
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According to one calculation, in the first year of Khatami’s first term, the Ministry of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance “…issued more than 779 new press licences, bringing 
the total to 930 (Tarock, 2001, p. 590).  Looking at just the number of daily 
newspapers, while the numbers were gradually rising in the 1990s, there was a 
dramatic growth after Khatami’s elections.  According one estimate, in Iran, there 
existed 7 newspapers between 1979 and 1983, 34 in 1993 and 62 in 1996; this 
number increased to 112 in the period following Khatami’s election (Zoeram & Fee, 
2010, p. 224)38.       
 
At the same time, Khatami leaves room for interpretation of the law as it pertains to 
censorship.  When asked by a student if in a civil society the press should need a 
license to operate, he states that it is something that the laws of each society need to 
decide and Iranian society should not compare itself with Western society.  He says 
that Iranian society faces concerns such as political and security powers and 
espionage and counter-espionage and cannot just leave society to just ‘be’ on its own 
(be aman-e khoda raha konim).  However, he offsets his stance by stating that the 
current law requiring these licenses should not contradict people’s basic rights 
(Khatami, 2001b, p. 82).  
   
In his inaugural speech given on 4 August 1997, Khatami further called for an 
increase in public participation while asserting that “…the government is obligated to 
provide a safe environment for the exchange of ideas and views within the 
framework of the criteria set by Islam and the Constitution” (Khatami & Mafinezam, 
1997, p. 76).  Though Khatami’s words are tempered by his inclusion of Islam and 
the Constitution as boundaries, his interpretive understanding of Islam and the 
general tone of his speech are more telling of his message.  He goes on in the same 
speech to say: 
…as indicated by the late Imam Khomeini, we should always consider the 
elements of time and place in the question of Islamic Ijtihad [independent 
interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence] and understand Islam in such a 
manner that it can respond to and meet emerging issues and needs of all 
times.  (Khatami & Mafinezam, 1997, p. 79)   
                                                 
38
 The closure of many newspapers during Khatami’s presidency is another matter and points to the 
conservative challenge facing reformists.  The reason for using these statistics here is to show the 
attempts made by Khatami and his colleagues, such as his choice for Minister of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance, to open up the public sphere.    
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While Khatami had his own conception of civil society and increased participation of 
citizens, the understanding of civil society by intellectuals directed the way 
government policies were enacted, particularly as a number of the intellectuals were 
active in the political sphere, principally as advisors to the president or members of 
reformist political groups.  Given his lack of institutional power: 
The overall strategy, as conceived by many of Khatami’s closest advisors, 
was to use popular pressure from below in factional struggles behind the 
scenes at the top levels of the republican and revolutionary institutions in 
order to advance the politics of change.  This active use of popular pressure 
from below was needed since Khatami was attempting to re-define the power 
and prerogatives of revolutionary institutions whose real power was greater 
than that of the republican presidency.  (Shakibi, 2010, p. 293)   
This idea of popular pressure from below is fitting with the notion of civil society, 
particularly as it was envisioned by reformist intellectuals when it came to its use for 
gaining political power.  Further discussion of specific policies and laws addressed 
during Khatami’s presidency are beyond the scope of this thesis, however they can 
add value to legal research.  The next section outlines how the respondent 
intellectuals interviewed defined civil society as well as their perspectives on how 
civil society should be developed in society.  The findings can be contrasted with the 
perspectives of civil society activists who considered themselves as constituting the 
sector. 
 
4.6  Defining and ‘Generating’ Civil Society 
 
The following section presents the definitions of civil society provided by leading 
public intellectuals affiliated with the reform movement who were interviewed.  
These definitions are broadly grouped into two categories.  The first emphasises 
organisations and formal structures while the second is more concerned with civil 
society as a space.  The respondents expressed the view that civil society represents a 
space that is not under the direct control of the state or, more specifically, under the 
control of the conservative government.  However, regardless of emphasis on civil 
society as a space or organisation, the common thread was the role of civil society as 
an intermediary between the wants of society, namely citizens, and the state, as an 
institution and collective of political leaders.  On the whole, regardless of the exact 
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definition, there was emphasis on civil society as a facet of modernity ("Miz Gerd-e 
Kian dar Barehye Jame'e-ye Madani (Kiyan's Round Table on Civil Society)," 1996).  
This point is stressed in discussions on the relationship between religion and civil 
society (examined below). The divergence between interview data and literature on 
civil society by intellectuals is that, in general, the literature placed less emphasis on 
organisations and gave prominence to more abstract ideas.  It stands to point out that 
other writers and intellectuals have underscored the lack of a unified meaning for 
civil society by reformists.  For example, Ezzatollah Fooladvand notes that even 
before Khatami’s election, responses to the question of ‘what is civil society’? 
remained ambiguous; and when an explanation was given it was limited to either an 
example of an advanced society or a conversation on the existence of never-ending 
corruption (Fouladvand, 2000, p. 25).    
 
Organisational perspectives 
 
The first category emphasises the organisational aspect of civil society.  This 
interpretation can be linked back to organisational definitions of civil society 
popularised in the late 20th century in the field of development, particularly by 
international agencies involved in capacity building programmes, as discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three.  Khatami himself emphasised that civil society 
organisations have to be people-based (mardomi) and not, as he says has been the 
case in countries like Iran, created from the top; in this criticism he includes political 
parties (Khatami, 2001a, p. 37).  According to a former Khatami government 
spokesperson and reformist intellectual, INT1, the idea of civil society is the 
existence of organisations that are not under direct command from the government, 
and which are separate from private for-profit enterprises.  This characterisation is in 
accord with the basic Western, liberal definition of civil society and was broadly 
shared by respondents.  It emphasises the affiliation of civil society with a type of 
organisation or collective action.   
 
Different individuals expressed additional nuances that attach particular values or 
elaborate on this definition.  For example, INT3 separated civil society into two 
factions, that of nongovernmental organizations and local city councils.  According 
to her, the idea was to create organizations independent of the state with the 
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collaborations of governments such that the citizens can communicate their needs 
and views.  She asserted that the government has an obligation to create the 
groundwork for political parties and NGOs.  These organizations should be tools that 
are able to force changes in the views and structure of the government.  What she and 
her colleagues attempted to do was give certificates to organizations and to organize 
them within the structure of the Islamic Republic: 
The idea was to create organisations independent of the state with 
collaboration of the government such that citizens can communicate their 
needs and views.  These organisations were to be tools that can force changes 
in the views and structures of the government.  (INT3)   
The purpose of these organisations, she stated, was to play the role of an 
intermediary between citizens and the government.  However, it is unclear how this 
relationship would operate in practice.   
 
Of particular significance here is the distinction she makes between traditional 
citizen activity and what she deems modern civil society.  The former focuses on 
charity while the latter is a check on state power.  Again, we see the emphasis on 
civil society as a mediator between citizens and the state.  An interesting point is her 
inclusion of city councils in civil society.  As elected offices mandated by the 
constitution, it is unclear why city councils would be considered part of civil society.  
While she explained that these assemblies have the power to support civil society 
organizations, she did not clarify why they would in themselves be considered a part 
of civil society.  According to her, in Iran, citizen-based organizations have a history, 
but not with what she considers today’s description of civil society.  While she did 
not elaborate on the distinction between traditional and modern definitions of civil 
society, her example of traditional charities as conventional citizen-based 
organisation versus a civil society organisation provides an indication of her 
conceptualisation.  That is to say, the difference between what she considers modern 
representatives of civil society and previous models is that modern civil society is 
involved in the political process by being a vehicle that connects citizens with the 
state.  Organisations such as charities, on the other hand, do not play such a role.  Of 
course, it is interesting to examine the difference between this perception of 
organisations such as charities and the role of traditional organisations absorbed by 
the state, as will be explained in Chapter Six. 
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Local Councils as civil society 
Local councils were a mandate of the new Constitution enacted after the 1979 
Revolution: 
In order to expedite social, economic, development, public health, cultural, 
and educational programmes and facilitate other affairs relating to public 
welfare with the cooperation of the people according to local needs, the 
administration of each village, division, city, municipality, and province will 
be supervised by a council to be named the Village, Division, City, 
Municipality, or Provincial Council. Members of each of these councils will 
be elected by the people of the locality in question. Qualifications for the 
eligibility of electors and candidates for these councils, as well as their 
functions and powers, the mode of election, the jurisdiction of these councils, 
the hierarchy of their authority, will be determined by law, in such a way as 
to preserve national unity, territorial integrity, the system of the Islamic 
Republic, and the sovereignty of the central government.  (The Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran) 
According to the Constitution, the councils, along with the majlis, form the 
legislative branch of the state.  However, in practice, the councils were never put into 
place until Khatami came to power.  In fact, according to a leading reformist figure, 
Mostafa Tajzadeh, the reformist push to enact the mandate on city councils was 
denounced by conservatives who saw it as an expensive project without any real 
value.  Conservatives continued to make moves against it; for example, Tajzadeh 
notes how the conservative figure Ali Larijani, then head of Islamic Republic of Iran 
Broadcasting, contacted him after the date of the first council elections were 
announced encouraging him to take back the announcement and postpone the 
election, with the excuse (an excuse that Tajzadeh did not take as valid) that the date 
was too close to that of elections for the Assembly of experts (the body that elects 
and oversees the actions of the supreme leader) (Tajzadeh, 2004)39.  Nonetheless, the 
first elections for city, village and provincial councils took place in 1999.  The role of 
these newly established entities was to elect mayors and oversee economic, social 
and cultural affairs at the local level, including the provision of welfare services.  
They are unique in the history of Iran’s political system in that they represent a shift 
away from centralised administration to local oversight.   
                                                 
39
 Tajzadeh’s article referenced here was first published in Yas-e No newspaper, 26 February 2003 
(7/12/1381).   
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However, the reality of Iran’s current political structure limits their power.  On the 
one hand the overdue establishment of these councils is indicative of the reform 
movement’s attempts to rectify the missteps that altered the original vision of the 
revolution.  On the other hand, however, reformist figures, as indicated in interviews 
(for example INT6, R1), considered the councils to be vehicles for the promotion of 
civil society or even, in some cases, a component of it (INT3, INT7).  
 
The characterisation of an elected body of the state as civil society reveals two 
important points regarding the reform movement’s leaders.  First, it indicates the 
ambiguous nature of civil society they envisioned for Iran.  Second, it indicates the 
reformist inclination towards using state institutions for their own purposes by 
changing perceptions of them, for example, affiliating city councils with civil society 
instead of the state.   Alternatively, they were aiming to capture power at the local 
level and reform the state through decentralisation, reducing the power of the central 
government.  The perception of using city councils as a way to capture power is 
exemplified by an interview with Saeed Hajjarian in the bi-monthly Cheshm Andaz 
Iran magazine, where he states that in other contexts, such as Turkey and Egypt, 
certain political parties were able to begin their activities through their work in city 
councils (Ghani, 2006, p. 66).  However, the ultimate aim of regaining power from 
conservatives is not feasible given the governing structure where the power of the 
Supreme Leader supersedes all other authority.  This issue is also addressed by INT6 
who claimed that due to Iran’s structure, “…the way to enrich civil society is through 
government.  If reformists aren’t in power civil society cannot breathe”.  This 
statement was made following explanations of how 33,000 council organisations 
were established in one day by the Khatami administration as a way to hand power to 
the ‘people’.   
 
However, according to INT6, decentralisation on its own is insufficient as it is 
ultimately through the presence of those who support the ideals of reform in 
government that civil society can take shape.  This observation supports an 
understanding of civil society that is not about the organisational aspects of civil 
society but the internal values through which they operate.  In line with this 
understanding, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari wrote in an article, printed around the time 
that the councils were to be launched, that the city councils should be looked at as a 
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step towards civil society and democracy; he states that this is the case despite the 
fact that there are conditions on elections for the councils, such as stipulations placed 
on candidates, that are not in line with freedom, democracy and civil society, as there 
is a need to start from somewhere (1998, p. 19).  The significance of the councils is 
in its ability to take power structures closer to the hands of citizens.  Eshkevari’s 
mentioning of the restrictions placed on candidates is an illustration of his unease 
with the continued influence of state power.            
 
Intermediary and space for dialogue 
 
Ultimately, as asserted by INT6, reformists developed their vision of civil society 
through experience rather than theory.  The idea of civil society as an intermediary 
between ‘society’ (presumably the voting population) and the state featured regularly 
in interviews, and is supported by literature.  For example, Majid Mohammadi, a key 
writer on civil society, notes in a 1997 article in Kiyan magazine that civil society 
comes after the establishment of institutions and organisations that rest between the 
government and family and includes notions such as social consensus (1997, p. 38).  
This perception also fits the second definition of civil society mentioned at the start 
of this section that characterises civil society as a space for debate and discussion 
rather than focusing on official or even informal organisation.  However, the 
practical explanation for this outlook was unclear.  For example, in the case of INT3, 
she pointed to nongovernmental organisations as the entity serving as the 
intermediary.  Similar views can be found in literature.  For example, in an article on 
the impact of civil society on the Islamic Republic’s international relations policy, 
civil society is designed as organisations that serve as the intermediary between the 
individual and government (Dehshiri, 1999, p. 12).  However, most other 
intellectuals interviewed did not clarify their definition of civil society that they 
envisioned for the country.  For INT2, civil society is the space where individuals 
can pursue their demands “without throwing stones”.  This explanation is in line with 
his views of non-violence explored above.  The vague explanations offered are in 
line with the multi-faceted quality of civil society explored in Chapter Two.  In this 
sense, civil society is an undefined arena for the contestation of power (Howell & 
Pearce, 2001).       
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4.7  Civil society and its Affiliation with Islam According to Reformist 
Intellectuals 
 
One area where almost all reformist intellectuals interviewed were in agreement was 
the relationship between civil society and Islam; they either directly opposed or 
questioned the connection between civil society and Islam that was presented by 
Khatami.  In a statement made by Khatami less than one year after taking office, he 
argued, “While Western civil society, historically as well as theoretically, is derived 
from the Greek city-state and the later Roman political system, the civil society we 
have in mind has its origin, from a historical and theoretical point of view, in 
Madinat ul-Nabi” (Khatami, 2000a, p. 16).  Madinat ul-Nabi (or Madinat al Nabi) 
means the ‘City of the Prophet’.  As Khatami explained, “…it is only after such a 
return to the common identity that we can live in peace and tranquillity with other 
peoples and nations…. Seeking abode in the common Islamic home – Madinat ul-
Nabi – is tantamount to the assumption by Muslims of their true position; that is, 
securing their true connection with  Islamic identity” (Khatami, 2000a, p. 17).  With 
regard to the relationship of democracy and Islam, Khatami does not believe there to 
be a conflict between the two; he claims that “If Islam belongs to all times, in 
different times and with consideration of different needs it has to respond to those 
needs” (Khatami, 2001a, p. 35).       
 
However, Khatami does not provide sufficient clarification as to what his Islamic 
interpretation of civil society means in the practical sense for a modern nation-state. 
Moreover, the intellectuals of the reform movement reject Khatami’s interpretation 
of civil society and deny any relationship between the definitions of civil society they 
discuss and the notion of Madinat al Nabi as espoused by Khatami.  In fact, the 
general consensus amongst respondents was that Khatami only made this connection 
as a way to gain political favour with sceptics as the idea of a distinct ‘Islamic’ civil 
society was not part of the discourse amongst reformist intellectuals.  This view is 
espoused by Saeed Hajjarian, who in a published paper stated that while Mohammad, 
the Islamic prophet, created the first Islamic civil complex (mojtameh madani 
eslami), this is not to be mistaken for civil society; civil society encompasses the 
appearance of citizenship as a concept and the individual’s ability to make 
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independent decisions and have the free will to join organisations voluntarily and 
adjust rules and regulations (Hajjarian, 1998, pp. 317-318)40.         
 
According to INT1, Khatami’s linking of civil society with Madinat al Nabi, referred 
to as Madinat from here forward, was a mistake from the viewpoint of intellectuals.  
He stated that this conflation was in reality a play on words as there is no relationship 
between the old idea of Madinat and today’s modern world.  The problems with the 
development of civil society during the reform period were multifaceted.  With 
regard to Islam, INT6 stated that in Iran, any serious discussion needs to consider 
Islam or else it will not fit society, however this does not mean that everything needs 
to be “Islamicized”.  The main finding with regard to the role of Islam in the 
reformist discourse on civil society is that while Islam is a major factor in Iran’s 
social and political culture, it was not an underpinning of the reformist civil society 
discourse.  INT4 supports the above argument in his statement on the relationship 
between the civil society promoted by reformists and Islam.  He stated that for civil 
society to exist, rule of law and independent, private life is required.  However, this 
idea was translated by traditional factions of society as ‘bi-namoosi’ (one without 
honour, a term often used to express a lack of personal morality).  In other words, 
traditional, or conservative, leaders considered the call for independence in 
individuals’ private lives as a free pass to surrender to immoral, unregulated 
existence.  It was due to this belief that Khatami presented his ‘Madinat al Nabi’ 
argument to lessen the pressure on him.  In essence, Khatami made claims about civil 
society’s religious connection as a political tool.     
 
Alternatively, INT5 argued that Khatami’s discussion of Madinat was in order to 
explain civil society to the general public and prevent them from believing it is a 
foreign or Western concept.  According to her, those who criticised Khatami for 
talking about Madinat did not understand Iranian society.  Similar to other 
respondents, she agrees that this was done to localize the issue of civil society and 
distance it from its Western roots, and arguably, accusations of Westoxification.  
However, her statement implies that it was successful in making it more acceptable 
to the general population and is an example of how religion is used to validate an 
                                                 
40
 The book chapter from which this Hajjarian reference comes from was originally published as an 
article in the journal Etela’at Siyasi-Eghtesadi in 1997 (Vol 11, Nos. 9-10).  
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issue, regardless of its actual accuracy.  However, in almost all the other interviews 
with reformists and even conservative intellectuals found in Chapter Six, the point 
was made that there is in fact no relationship between the idea of civil society 
discussed by reformists and that of the religious society implied by Madinat al Nabi.  
Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter Five, civil society actors, such as members of 
student groups, women’s rights activists and nongovernmental organisation 
representatives, rarely if ever, connected the idea of civil society with Islam, further 
evidence of the irrelevance of Khatami’s association between the two concepts.            
 
The issue of Madinat exemplifies a larger concern with the use of civil society as a 
concept.  Though the concept and its theories originate in the West, it has been 
adopted and adapted in other contexts by different actors with various intentions.  In 
Iran, reformists adopted the concept in an attempt to break free from the increasing 
power of the state in the post-revolution era.  While the definitions and 
characteristics they attributed to civil society were diverse and at times ambiguous, 
people like Soroush tried to make Islam more amenable to the space for dialogue 
created by civil society rather than redefining civil society to match Islam.  
Khatami’s introduction of Madinat into the discourse was ultimately inconsequential.  
 
4.8  Conclusion: The blurring of boundaries and meanings 
 
Ultimately, civil society came to signify a wealth of liberal ideas countering 
authoritarianism and conflict, while employing a less straightforward term.  
Reformists used the language of civil society to craft their vision of the good life, 
although as a group, or even individuals, they did not have a cohesive strategy or end 
game.  This is represented by INT10, an intellectual and close advisor to Khatami, 
who said, “When I went somewhere to give a talk, I barely understood what I was 
saying let alone the people I was speaking with.  Khatami told me that you have been 
my advisor for eight years and I am just understanding what you are saying.”  INT10 
points out that reformist discourse was not only unclear to outsiders, but was met 
with uncertainty even among the inner circles of the reformist movement.      
 
The following findings emerge from the investigation presented in this chapter.  
According to interviews, taking up the concept of civil society as the reform 
166 
 
movement’s mantra did not occur as an informed choice.  Rather, these significant 
agents of the reform movement gave the impression that the concept of civil society 
was gradually accepted by them because of their affinity for the adaption of Western 
theories.  CS6, a well-known academic working in the field of development, 
explained in an interview that while intellectuals became familiar with current 
concepts and theories, they were unable to see them in the framework of Iran’s own 
history and did not consider the question of whether or not civil society as a concept 
made sense in the given society.  However, he went on explain that Iranian society 
has been conditioned to model itself after Western experiences and there exists no 
clear understanding of civil society’s meaning in Iran.  With reference to religion, he 
stated that a reductionist approach is taken towards religion, in other words, 
intellectuals tried to reduce civil society and other concepts to fit with the principles 
of religion.  According to S6, “Civil society is the same as the elephant in Molavi’s 
[Jalal-e-Din Mohammad Molavi Rumi] story, where everyone said my idea is 
correct”.  In essence, one of the problems of the reform movement’s approach to 
civil society was the insistence by various individuals that their definition or vision 
of civil society was the correct one.  
 
This chapter addressed the question of how and why reformist public intellectuals 
came to represent and promote civil society by the time their group had captured the 
presidency, and the imagination of the country at large.  Their downfall can be 
attributed to their overly ambitious reliance on civil society as a solution.  However, 
one of the greatest gains was the ability of these individuals to introduce the ideas of 
democracy, pluralism and individual rights into the public domain from within the 
heart of the regime.  Reformists accomplished this goal by clarifying that their main 
goal was to end the monopolisation of power by a select group within the regime, 
using the mantra of civil society.  Political society and civil society became 
intertwined in this interpretation.  Chapter Five examines how the reformist 
audience, specifically those affiliated with a sector that considered itself to be 
representative of civil society, reacted to and even benefited from the reformist 
platform.      
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Chapter 5: The ‘Practitioners’ of Modern Iranian Civil Society 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present the findings of an empirical study on the agents, 
or practitioners, of modern Iranian civil society with the emergence of the reform 
movement in the political spectrum. These findings are based on in-depth semi-
structured interviews with non-state, civil society actors.  The underpinning rationale 
is to understand why and how social actors used the concept of civil society to 
enhance their positions of power vis-à-vis the state and society at large.  By the time 
of the second Khatami administration in 2001 and up to its end, activists and 
observers were largely disappointed with the outcome of reformist efforts, namely 
the failure to create sustainable and effective organisations and policies that gave 
security to the modern civil society sphere.  However, civil society practitioners 
gained experiences and exposure at both the domestic and international level 
alongside the establishment of more vocal public spheres during Khatami’s eight-
year presidency, none of which were simply reversed with a change in government.  
This chapter looks at how the civil society frame promoted by reformist intellectuals, 
examined in Chapter Four, and the political opportunities afforded to the public once 
reformists entered power, was taken up by individuals who considered themselves 
members of a modern civil society sector.  The term ‘modern’ implies association 
with liberal ideals of individual autonomy and accountability of the governing state.          
 
The arguments made are: first, the results of the reformist promotion of civil society 
from the time of Khatami’s election should not be judged solely based on the 
establishment and collapse of nongovernmental organizations or civil society-related 
institutional reforms.  Rather, analysis of Iranian civil society should take into 
account ways in which the new era, instigated by the 1997 presidential elections, 
inspired actors from different segments of society to engage with public affairs at 
large and created an opening for civil society actors who would not have otherwise 
had an opportunity to voice their opinions.  Second, as discussed in Chapter Four, 
civil society was used as a tool to gain support for reformists amongst the public and 
to prevent centralisation of power by conservative forces in the state by boosting the 
political power of reformists.  In this regard, the boundaries between civil society and 
political society were blurred as actors in certain segments of civil society appeared 
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to act as political agents.  Political society here consists of institutions such as 
political parties, electoral mechanisms and political leaders, essentially the “… arena 
in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to exercise control over 
public power and the state apparatus” (Linz & Stepan, 1998, pp. 51-52)41.  In 
contrast to political society, civil society actors are not in direct competition for 
political roles.  A third, and final, argument is that although some civil society 
activity was part of a brief trend that gained and lost popularity during the reform 
movement, some actors survived the reformists’ political losses and continued their 
work despite hostile conditions.  Therefore, greater insight can be gained by 
examining the legacy of the reformist movement through individual actors rather 
than the organisational structures that were left in place.       
 
In this thesis, civil society is identified not by the ambiguous classifications of 
reformist public intellectuals, as discussed in Chapter Four, but by an understanding 
guided by critical interpretations.  Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s definition is most 
helpful, as it understands civil society to be “…a sphere of social interactions 
between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially 
the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements, and forms of public communication” (1992, p. ix).  The last point, 
regarding public communication, refers to a key issue addressed in this thesis, 
namely the idea of civil society as dialogue or discourse.  Rather than looking at the 
organisations of civil society that can take on different forms and characteristics 
based on context, this chapter emphasises the agents of civil society.  During Iran’s 
reformist movement, these agents worked in different capacities and in varying areas 
of civil society.  Their commonalities included: self-identification as members of 
civil society and work within formal and informal organisations and movements, not 
directly involved in competition for power at the state level.           
 
                                                 
41
 The notion of political society existing as a category separate from civil society is a contested one.  
Following from this, some thinkers include political parties in their definition of civil society while 
others do not.  For example, Keane considers the concept of political society, a sphere falling 
between, the state and economic sector, on one hand, and civil society on the other, as an out-dated 
one (1998, p. 182).  In some cases, where thinkers place political parties outside the domain of civil 
society, the impetus is based on assumptions regarding the characteristic of each.  For example, in 
post-communist countries, political parties were associated with corrupt oligarchs while civil society 
was associated with ideals such as high principles and transparency (Gershman, 2004, p. 28).   
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Moving beyond the specific case of Iran, the findings presented in this chapter are 
intended to show that civil society activity should not be solely measured from a 
quantitative or organisational perspective based on the numbers and powers of 
organisations.  Rather, it should be evaluated from a qualitative outlook that takes 
into account the types and ranges of activities taking place in the public sphere in 
general. This includes looking at instances where citizens take initiatives and are 
critical in their approach to political as well as social activity.  Here the social 
movement aspect of civil society needs to be taken into account as a greater indicator 
of civil society activity rather than what is reflected in formal civil society 
organisations in the public sphere.  Social movements have a more diverse 
composition, consisting of loose coalitions of individuals and formal and informal 
organisations and networks, with the women’s movement serving as a valuable 
example.    
 
From an organisational outlook, civil society, as voluntary establishments outside the 
realm of the state and economy, has a long established history in Iran. The difference 
between modern and traditional civil society organisations (often referred to as 
Community Based Organisations, or CBOs) is explained in a report by Sohrab 
Razzaghi, one of the key players in civil society capacity-building efforts.  He 
describes traditional civil society as lacking “…respect for democratic values, human 
rights, and gender rights…” (Razzaghi, 2010, p. 18).  Alternatively, the rise of civil 
society as a symbol of freedom and democracy, as touted by reformists and taken up 
by the middle class, students and women’s rights activists, among others, became 
conflated with a modern organizational approach that emulated the West and was 
advocated in the field of development.  As such, civil society activists and observers 
of Iranian civil society considered the failure to institutionalize civil society through 
legislation and the inconsistent growth of civil society organisations, such as NGOs, 
as a failure by the reformists.  However, as was observed in interviews, civil society 
activists dedicated to their cause shifted strategies to accomplish their goals via other 
channels when their original path was hindered by conservative state powers.  
Therefore, the question remains, what was the contribution of the reformist period, 
when countless NGOs were given the green light for activity and in certain cases 
funding before opposing political factions shut them down?  On the whole, while 
certain aspects of civil society activity would have taken place regardless of the 
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reformists’ position in the political sphere, the success of reformists, particularly by 
the public intellectuals who pushed the slogan of civil society, was in their ability to 
open up the possibilities of civil society to a much larger faction and spectrum of the 
population, expanding the types of activity taking place and fostering discourse 
based on pluralism.  
 
Varying accounts of the successes and failures of modern Iranian civil society and 
the affinity towards an organisational vision of civil society can partially be 
explained by different understandings of civil society between practitioners and the 
public intellectuals who attempted to provide a theoretical grounding.  Analysis of 
the entire spectrum of Iranian civil society, based on different definitions, is beyond 
the scope, resources and intentions of this thesis.  Rather, this chapter focuses on a 
small group of actors involved in what has been dubbed the ‘civil society 
community’ during the Khatami era.  These actors engaged in public discourse 
through print media, participated in special forums and meetings designated for ‘civil 
society’ (i.e. taking part in events organised by civil society capacity building 
organisations) and designated themselves members of civil society.  To establish a 
manageable and representative sample of key players from this ‘community’, given 
the resources available, interviews and research emphasised three categories; namely 
actors in the women’s rights movement, student activists involved in the Islamic 
Association of Students (Anjoman-e Eslami-ye Daneshjouyan) and journalists.  To 
provide context to the often politically charged civil society activities of the groups 
mentioned above, interviews were also conducted with actors involved in more 
conventional development-oriented NGO activity (for example, environment, 
poverty alleviation and education).  The following paragraph introduces the women’s 
rights movement.     
 
It should be noted that although the general goal of the women’s movement has been 
to give voice to the needs of women in society, the vision and plan of action among 
proponents is far from homogenous.  A shallow separation of women’s groups yields 
categories such as feminist, religious/Islamic and Islamic feminist perspectives.  
However, an in-depth look reveals a more multi-dimensional set of groups that often 
overlap in terms of both values and programmes.  Detailed analysis of Iranian 
women’s groups and the various women’s movements that have existed in Iran is 
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beyond the scope of this research.  What is relevant is the impact of civil society 
language from the reform movement on women’s groups and individual women’s 
rights activists, particularly those who supported or sought to benefit from the open 
atmosphere touted by reformists, starting with Khatami’s election campaign.  The 
following section will briefly introduce the Iranian women’s movement that began to 
emerge in force in the mid-1990s.  Next, an outline of various developments that 
took place in that movement during the Khatami administration will be presented.  
The information and analysis includes data gathered during fieldwork, using semi-
structured interviews with women’s rights activists from varying backgrounds.  The 
focus is on how a specific number of women’s rights campaigners, activists and 
researchers observed and were swayed by the civil society slogan of the reform 
movement.  Analysis is focused on the connection between the notion of civil society 
as envisioned by reformist intellectuals and by individuals working on the issue of 
women’s rights. In particular, the research looks at the ways the emerging language 
of civil society was used to enhance the position of power amongst women’s rights 
activists. 
 
In order to accomplish the above, the chapter sets out the context in which modern 
civil society actors found themselves by the time Khatami entered the political arena.  
Next, personal interviews with individuals from the categories named above are used 
to illustrate varying perspectives on the concept of civil society as they emerged 
during the reform movement.  The ultimate objective will be to examine how the 
language of civil society was interpreted on the ground and to observe the bolstering 
of Iranian civil society as a result of political opportunities.  The findings show that, 
overall, while the basic ideas motivating civil society actors were not new, the 
Khatami presidency provided the political opportunity for these actors to carry out 
their work.  This was done both formally and informally.  Formally, the Khatami 
administration supported civil society actors by granting resources such as permits 
and funding.  More importantly, however, the reform movement gave informal 
support by making the sphere for civil society more receptive to new ideas.  As 
stated by Tarrow: 
…by communicating information about what they do, once formed, 
movements create opportunities – for their own supporters, for others, for 
parties and elites.  They do this by diffusing collective action and displaying 
the possibility of coalitions, by creating political space for kindred 
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movements and countermovement, and by producing incentives for elites and 
third parties to respond to.  (1998, p. 72)    
 
5.1  Historical Existence of Civil Society Organisations in Iran 
 
An informed consideration of Iranian society must recognise that the existence of 
civil society space and corresponding practices are not new phenomena.  This is true 
both in terms of an organisation-oriented definition and a broader outlook that 
emphasises a public sphere separate from the state and market.  Acknowledging the 
existence of civil society and its institutions is significant as it allows for a more 
realistic understanding of Iranian society that does not automatically reject the 
important contributions made by the sector before the introduction of Western 
notions and practices.  In terms of traditional civil society organisations, Iran has a 
long history of voluntary sector activity, particularly organised around local 
communities and Shia religious practices.     
 
Masoud Kamali asserts that Iran’s civil society, ‘…is a civil society of communities 
and institutions rather than individual citizens and their associations’ (1998, p. 11).  
This approach to civil society places less emphasis on a liberal understanding of 
citizens as independent, rational actors and stresses communal action outside the 
scope of the state and market.  Up to the early days of the twentieth century and the 
push for modernisation of society, civil society was of a traditional kind that 
contained two influential groups, namely the ulama, Muslim clerics, and the 
bazaaris, merchants, who had roles in both the Constitutional Revolution and 1979 
Revolution, with modern civil society also playing a role in the latter revolution 
(Kamali, 1998, pp. 11-12).  Arguably less politically influential, though still falling 
within a general definition of civil society, are the local Shia community 
organisations such as women’s social groups and charitable associations, which have 
existed as part of traditional civil society in Iran for centuries.  According to one 
estimate, there are approximately 3,000 to 5,000 charity organisations and 10,00042 
Sandoqh-e Qarz-ol-Hassaneh or Interest Free Funds43 (Motee & Namazi, 2000, p. 7).  
This traditional aspect of civil society remains in existence today but is accompanied 
                                                 
42
 It should be noted that the figure of 10,000 registered funds is questioned as data on NGOs and 
CBOs is unreliable (Motee & Namazi, 2000).   
43
 Explained further in Chapter Six 
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by a growing modern civil society sector, consisting of a public sphere, actors and 
organisations that were at the centre of the civil society discourse led by reformists.   
 
This chapter focuses on modern Iranian civil society, as this modern interpretation 
with its liberal associations informed the reform movement’s actions from the mid-
1990s onward.  Moreover, emphasis is placed on actors who engaged with this sector 
and how they viewed and utilised civil society rather than the organisations and 
structures themselves.  However, acknowledging the traditional sector is also 
important for the following two reasons.   First, traditional civil society organisations 
continue to fulfil important roles in Iranian society, including but not limited to 
charitable and local community engagement.  Second, programmes geared towards 
enhancing citizen participation, a component of civil society promotion programmes, 
need to engage with or at least recognise traditional organisations as they have direct 
access to a significant segment of the population.  Moreover, as addressed in Chapter 
Three (and further elaborated in Chapter Six), the post-Revolution state has 
incorporated various sectors of traditional civil society, either directly as part of the 
state structure (for example, Foundations) or through special dispensations (for 
example, associations affiliated with mosques).   
 
5.2  Civil Society and the Legal Structure 
 
The following sections outline the relevant features of the constitution, which can 
appear contradictory to the general practices of conservative powers.  This sets the 
complex and contradictory context that political and social actors have faced since 
the 1979 Revolution.  The main paradox in the Constitution results from the 
inclusion of clauses that demand all laws be consistent with Islamic values.  As the 
Islamic values being referenced are based on interpretations that differ amongst even 
the highest-ranking clerics, discrepancies are inevitable.  This is the principle 
addressed by intellectuals like Abdolkarim Soroush, who claims that religious 
knowledge is not sacred but fluid (Azimi, 1993, p. 419; Boroujerdi, 1996, p. 173), 
and Mohsen Kadivar who questions interpretations of religion by criticising the 
position of the Supreme Leader whose role is supposed to be mandated by God (Mir-
Hosseini & Tapper, 2006, p. 109).        
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The Constitution, ratified by a referendum in 1979 after the revolution and amended 
in 1989, contains a number of articles that are pertinent to civil society activity.  One 
of the most striking features of the Iranian political system is the contradiction 
between legislation ratified over the past three decades, policy enactment and the 
written word of the Constitution.  In reference to civil society, including activity in 
the public sphere, there are clear provisions that emphasise individual liberty.  
However, reality on the ground has shown clear discord between the legal framework 
and practice as a result of context and political leadership.   
 
In fact, the demands of reformist political and intellectual figures and their supporters 
were largely in accord with provisions already stipulated in the Constitution.  This 
understanding of the reform movement’s platform as a return to the Constitution, 
rather than representatives of a purely new ideological faction, emphasises the 
nuanced trajectory of the post-Revolutionary state.  In other words, the proposed role 
of state authority that emerged after the Revolution of 1979 was not based on a 
strictly conservative doctrine that stipulated a narrow view of the public sphere from 
which the reform movement distanced itself.  Moreover, there is strong evidence 
against the argument by opponents of the Islamic Republic that reformists 
represented the same base ideology of militant revolutionaries who took over the 
state in 1979 and the same mentality as conservatives who have structured the state 
thus far.  Despite the inherent push by reformists to enact key features of a 
Constitution already in place, they were not looking to necessarily, or solely, realign 
a broken path that had been started by the Revolution.  While some intellectuals of 
the reform movement may have initially focused on returning to the original ideals of 
the Revolution, there was a clear evolution of ideas, as presented in Chapter Four, 
when the ideas of pluralism and dialogue prevailed over loyalty to the Islamic state.  
A look at the Constitution is important to understand the extent to which notions of 
civic participation and individual liberty not only held a place in Iran’s history, but 
also became incorporated in the statutory framework of the Islamic Republic.  The 
following section will provide evidence of this by addressing relevant passages of the 
Constitution.      
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Protection of individual rights 
 
The following articles provide evidence of how the Constitution attempts to 
safeguard individual autonomy and freedom of thought. 
 
Article 23: The investigation of individuals' beliefs is forbidden, and no one 
may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief. 
 
However, this is in direct contrast with: 
Article 13: Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only 
recognized religious minorities, who, within the limits of the law, are free to 
perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their 
own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education.  
   
The contradictory passages in the Constitution are the result of inherent conflicts of 
creating laws that are both liberal, as they pertain to individual freedom and rights, 
and religious, as they pertain to a particular interpretation of Shia Islam.   
    
Contradictions in the defence and promotion of a dynamic public sphere  
The constitution provides evidence that the state is meant to not only tolerate but also 
defend and promote an active public space, including a free press.   
 
The Press 
Article 24: Publications and the press have freedom of expression except 
when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the rights of 
the public. The details of this exception will be specified by law. 
 
Again, the inclusion of Islamic principles acts as a control on the freedom of 
expression that is seemingly granted by the Constitution.  While official 
broadcasting, namely the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), has been 
controlled by conservatives since the Revolution and remained so with Khatami’s 
election, an independent press was promoted during the Khatami administration 
(Khiabany & Sreberny, 2001, p. 206).  Khatami appointed an ally, Ataollah 
Mohajerani to the post of Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance, who was 
responsible for regulation of the press and who, prior to his removal by pressure from 
conservatives, made it possible for the birth of a thriving press through the granting 
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of licenses for newspapers and journals (Khiabany & Sreberny, 2001, p. 207).  
However, this burgeoning press was openly attacked and restricted by opponents of 
reform, through the Guardian Council (responsible for interpreting the Constitution) 
and a complex court system (under the control of the Supreme Leader) (Gheissari & 
Nasr, 2006, p. 138).  Conservative attacks against the pro-reform press are best 
summarised in a statement made by Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, former president and 
later member of the Expediency Discernment Council and Assembly of Experts, two 
key bodies related to the Supreme Leader.  In a Friday sermon, Hashemi Rafsanjani 
claimed, “Today enemies are trying to undermine the sovereignty of Islam by using 
some sections of the press… to strip the Islamic Revolution of its Islamic content” 
(Khiabany & Sreberny, 2001, p. 217).  Similar arguments have been made to prevent 
collective action, as seen in the next section.       
 
Political and Social Organising 
 
Article 26: The formation of parties, societies, political or professional 
associations, as well as religious societies, whether Islamic or pertaining to 
one of the recognized religious minorities, is permitted provided they do not 
violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, the criteria of 
Islam, or the basis of the Islamic republic. No one may be prevented from 
participating in the aforementioned groups, or be compelled to participate in 
them. 
 
According to the constitution, the organisations necessary for an active and dynamic 
civil society are permissible.  However, the vagueness of principles, with regard to 
Islam and the preservation of the Islamic Republic, to which these organisations must 
adhere, have restricted the public sphere in practice.  Particularly with regard to 
preserving the foundation of the regime, social and political organising is severely 
restricted.  This has a profound effect on the formation of political parties and civil 
society organisations, especially those that question the regime’s practices.  With 
regard to non-political, nongovernmental organisations, there is no straightforward 
categorisation or mechanism to obtain legal status.  Voluntary community-based 
organisations working in areas of welfare and service delivery are either informal or 
under the auspices of government programmes such as the basij and Foundations 
(bonyads), discussed further in Chapter Six.  For other forms of nongovernmental 
organisations, no comprehensive and cohesive piece of legislation existed until 2005.  
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On the one hand, there were few pieces of legislation limiting the work of NGOs, on 
the other hand, there was little legal protection for these entities.44  NGOs have 
registered with various government entities including: the Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Justice, Owqaf and Charity Affairs, Ministry of co-operatives, Ministry 
of Culture and Higher Education, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Namazi, 2000).  Registration with 
each entity is dependent upon the types of activities with which the NGO engages.  
 
NGOs, in the sense of organisations working on issues of development or advocacy 
for rights, were more recently introduced in the Iranian public sphere45.  However, 
traditional and communal organisations aimed at welfare and charitable giving had 
been familiar for a much longer period.  An example of common social entities are 
the credit organisations (sandogh-e qarz-ol-hasaneh), or funds that offer short-term 
interest-free or low-interest loans based on Islamic values to help deprived members 
of the community (Namazi, 2000).  These funds derive from formal and informal 
networks, with some connected to local mosques and others affiliated with the 
bazaar (markets) and business owners, while other members of the community such 
as religious leaders and political figures have also been known to play key roles in 
their administration (Namazi, 2000).  The mixed formal and informal characteristic 
of these credit unions typifies such communal organisations.  The fact that the 
bazaar and religious and political figures contribute to their administration is also 
indicative of why they have been allowed to operate.  Charitable organisations 
providing services to vulnerable groups, which have a long history in Iran as 
indicated above, usually operate as informal social groups and have never been 
registered with any government body; although, charity organisations have been able 
to register with the Ministry of Interior and Owqaf (religious endowments) (Namazi, 
2000).  However, the issue of registration is complex and dynamic.  For example, as 
                                                 
44
 The 2005 legislation attempted to streamline the registration and legal process for NGO activity.  
Later, in 2011, a draft law was introduced in parliament that would in effect include representatives 
from bodies such as the Intelligence Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Basij in regulating 
NGO affairs ("Iran: Independent civil society organisations facing obliteration," 2011).  However, 
these legal statutes were not in effect during the Khatami administration.     
 
45
 In the Persian language, NGOs are officially referred to as “sazman mardom nahad” which in 
translation places the word person at its centre.  NGOs are also referred to as “sazman-e gheir-e 
dolati” which is a direct translation of “nongovernmental organisation.   
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of 2008, a law passed in 2001 was brought into effect proclaiming that only the State 
Welfare Organisation of Iran (Sazman-e Behzisti Keshvar) has authority to provide a 
license to charity organisations46.  The status of organisations already registered with 
other bodies is unclear.  Ultimately, while these organisations are not officially 
involved in political activity, their work continues to be monitored by the state. As 
with any activity that takes place in the public sphere, those groups that collaborate 
with religious entities such as mosques are, in the end, connected with the state.  In 
any case, their work is different from the types of development-oriented or advocacy 
organisations promoted by reformists and civil society actors during the reform 
movement.   
 
Until Khatami’s election, mass political participation had been encouraged through 
religious institutions, in particular mosques that were turned into polling stations 
during elections and were at the heart of political activity for traditional powers 
(Razavi, 2010, p. 86).  After Khatami’s election, reformists made a concerted effort 
to increase participation and increase the numbers and power of political parties, 
which, as discussed in Chapter Four, some reformists considered to be an aspect of 
civil society.  Structurally, the new parties that came into existence had the 
characteristics of political factions instead of parties. In other words these groups 
lacked organisation, making it challenging, “…to create a coherent political 
programme, which is the most recognisable function of a political party.  Instead of 
producing policies, organizing the public and keeping in touch directly, the new 
parties tried to communicate with the public through the press” (Razavi, 2010, p. 90).  
The issue of an absent political programme and the use of a press that was easily 
blocked by opposing forces from expressing their viewpoints, as mentioned above, 
are critiques that can be made against reform as a movement at large.  With regard to 
legal obstacles, in addition to the Constitutional article, a law was enacted in 1981 
that established a commission responsible for monitoring the activities of political 
parties, “The work of the new commission did not produce an attitude conducive to 
the creation of political parties, one reason being that the commission could stick an 
anti-Islamic Republic or anti-Islam label on political organizations and refuse 
permits” (Razavi, 2010, p. 90).  In effect, a subjective account of political activities’ 
                                                 
46
 Website of the State Welfare Organisation of Iran, 
http://www.behzisti.ir/Documents/Show.aspx?id=175  
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compliance with and stance in relation to Islam and a hard-line interpretation of the 
regime challenged the establishment of a free political space.  It was this space that 
reformists attempted to revitalise through the notion of civil society.     
 
Maintenance of a multi-layered system of governance  
 
Article 100: In order to expedite social, economic, development, public 
health, cultural, and educational programmes and facilitate other affairs 
relating to public welfare with the cooperation of the people according to 
local needs, the administration of each village, division, city, municipality, 
and province will be supervised by a council to be named the Village, 
Division, City, Municipality, or Provincial Council. Members of each of these 
councils will be elected by the people of the locality in question. 
Qualifications for the eligibility of electors and candidates for these councils, 
as well as their functions and powers, the mode of election, the jurisdiction of 
these councils, the hierarchy of their authority, will be determined by law, in 
such a way as to preserve national unity, territorial integrity, the system of 
the Islamic Republic, and the sovereignty of the central government. 
 
Article 100 provides provisions for a multi-layered system of government that 
distributes power amongst various entities while maintaining a cohesive central 
government.  Enacting the constitutional mandate by the establishment of local 
councils was one of the most significant contributions by Khatami’s reformist 
government.  In fact, members of the Khatami administration considered these 
councils as a component of civil society.  As discussed in Chapter Four, this 
understanding of civil society points to the blurring of boundaries between civil 
society and political society.  Local elections became a central battle ground for 
reformist political figures and civil society actors who chose to run for office in order 
to have their voices heard47.  However, similar to other political offices, 
conservatives in opposition to the reform movement eventually came to dominate the 
local city councils.  Although these actions were taken under the banner of civil 
society promotion, they were, in actuality, reformist attempts to decentralise political 
power. 
    
5.3  Civil Society: The introduction of a new concept  
 
While the reformist intellectuals involved in creating the political platform of the 
movement had their vision and plan of action for the development of civil society, 
                                                 
47
 Based on personal discussions with civil society actors and reformists in 2004 and 2008.   
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what happened on the ground had its own unique trajectory.  It is not possible to 
determine exactly what determined civil society activists’ actions on the ground, but 
it is feasible to uncover major patterns and corroborate some assumptions from direct 
interviews with the actors.  The following section presents findings in two areas: key 
characteristics of the modern civil society activity that emerged during the Khatami 
administration and,  significant influences on civil society activists during the 
Khatami administration, as they relate to their actions in the public sphere.  The 
results are based predominantly on interviews with student activists, women’s rights 
activists and NGO leaders.  Representatives from these groups were chosen due to 
the prominent role they played from the start of the reform movement.    
 
A study of the type and nature of civil society activity that emerged during the 
Khatami administration displayed several striking features.  These findings are not 
necessarily discrete or representative of civil society actors and organisations across 
the board.  However, they provide a macro-level understanding of the arena where 
many had pinned their hopes for the democratisation of Iran.  The following three 
features will be outlined below.  First, much of the emerging civil society activities, 
particularly as they related to NGOs, lacked structure and capacity.  Second, the 
activities were often focused on political effect rather than focusing on the internal 
needs of the group or organisation itself.  Finally, success, in terms of a group’s 
viability, was in part determined by its ability to be flexible with regard to outside 
forces, such as state regulations and donors. 
 
In this section, some of the general perceptions of civil society as a theoretical and 
practical concept by civil society actors will be outlined.  Similar to the definitions 
provided by reformist public intellectuals in Chapter Four, civil society actors also 
held different understandings of the concept and its role.  Some had worked in the 
field of civil society long before Khatami’s election, particularly those involved in 
apolitical organisations and causes, such as those dealing with the environment, 
education, and women’s rights.  However, the term ‘civil society’ was new for many 
of them.  As described by the editor of a reformist newspaper, J8, Khatami’s slogans, 
such as civil society and rule of law, were a ‘remedy’ (darman) for the problems of 
censure he faced in his personal and political life.  Whether following a trend or 
seeking a solution, the concept of civil society was picked up by individual actors 
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who wanted to take advantage of the political and social opportunities afforded by 
the Khatami administration.        
 
For some, such as a young reporter for a reformist newspaper, who was interviewed 
for this thesis and identified as J6, the meaning of civil society was never clear.  The 
informant “…Did not have a real definition of civil society and only slowly realised 
what an NGO is”.  With this statement, we first observe the elusiveness of civil 
society for individuals can be observed, even by some who worked in the field of 
journalism, which served as a platform for the reform movement and its ideals.  
Second, in the absence of a clear definition, we see that in looking for a meaning, this 
individual reached an organisation-based understanding of civil society.  J6 went on 
to explain, “The real responsibility of an NGO is to inform citizens”.  With this 
explanation, it becomes increasingly evident that the ideas of civil society and NGOs 
are being conflated.   Although what the interviewee meant by ‘inform’ remained 
vague, the implication was that NGOs, which he equated with civil society, were 
responsible for enhancing awareness and openness in society.  It is interesting to note 
here that when discussing his background, J6 mentioned his brother, a prominent 
NGO activist who has been arrested on numerous occasions due to the sensitive 
nature of his work.  Without a clear definition of civil society provided from other 
sources (i.e. reformists who touted the concept), J6 reached his own conclusions, 
most likely based on his personal experiences with the subject.  It should be noted 
that it was the political openings (i.e. relaxation of political restrictions) provided by 
the Khatami administration that allowed his brother to pursue and establish his NGO.  
Overall, the example is evidence of how the meaning of civil society was fostered 
and the reciprocal relationship between the meaning of a concept (i.e. civil society) 
and how that concept is enacted (for example, establishment of NGOs).                 
  
Another case is that of R2, a journalist, NGO activist, PhD candidate, former 
electoral supervisor for the state (ostan) of Tehran and expert at a government 
research centre at the time of the interview.  Her husband is a physician and member 
of the Revolutionary Guards, or Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.  She considers 
herself a child of the Revolution who had come to believe in the need for reform.  As 
a religious woman, R2 wore her scarf in a markedly conservative manner and 
explained how she took on the hijab by choice in her early teens.  Her background is 
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a myriad of complexity that typifies the crossover between the politics of the reform 
movement and the growth of civil society.  For example, her role as a journalist and 
NGO activist is in contrast to her many political positions.  She exemplifies the 
actors who had once been ardent revolutionaries but then broke away from 
traditionalists in the state by seeking reform.  The contrast between her activities and 
her announcement of having a ‘sepahi’ husband (husband belonging to the ICRG), is 
also telling, particularly as there exists the assumption that the ICRG are supporters 
of the Supreme Leader (i.e. a conservative).  A stereotypical male member of the 
ICRG would not be expected to have a blatantly pro-reform wife.  Nonetheless, R2 
was a distinct representative of the reformist movement, someone who straddled the 
line between political and civil society.     
 
Though she was a social science student, R2 claimed she had not come across the 
topic of civil society, even in her academic work, until Khatami’s presidency.  
Without having a definition of civil society to work with, she said she had created a 
meaning of civil society for herself, where civil society “…was freedom, freedom of 
the press, rights, etc.  It was the intangible element of democracy (badan-e malmoos 
democracy)”.  She stated, “Civil society was not internally understood (darooni) for 
everyone, even myself”.  She believed that even the people who introduced these 
concepts within Iranian society did not fully understand their meaning.  Women she 
worked with would say ‘I have an NGO’, something she too would say.  This, she 
found, reflects on the misconception of civil society that fails to take in the 
cooperative nature of NGO activity.  A similar sentiment was expressed by J7, 
another young reporter, who said of Khatami’s administration time and after, “There 
are civil society organisations but no civil society space”.   In other words, J7 implied 
that organisations with the structural features of civil society exist but the spirit of 
civil society as an independent space, the definition of which remained vague for 
him, was not created.        
 
Overall, civil society is an elusive concept that was introduced to society but left for 
individuals to define.  This view was supported in other interviews.  For example, 
S8, a member of the reformist student movement and leader of a political group’s 
youth branch, stated, “At the time [when reformists first came to power] Khatami’s 
words were important.  People didn’t know exactly what civil society meant but 
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would talk about it in the streets.  The rule of law was also important.  People would 
try to cross the street at crosswalks and stop at red lights.  The view of civil society 
then was of a free and open society”.  Again, the definition provided is abstract and 
the idea of civil society is used to frame a vision of the good life, linking it to notions 
such as rule of law.  In Iran, where rules and regulations, such as traffic laws, are 
often ignored or rejected, the reform movement’s language was used as an inspiring 
force.  However, this was an informal and tenuous change in perspective addressing 
people’s attitudes rather than a formal change in policy.  In a way, it represented how 
civil society was used to create change by reformists.  What can be extrapolated from 
other statements in S8’s interview though is that once people noticed that their 
expectations of Khatami, in terms of changing society, were not realised, they began 
to retract their support for the reform movement.   
 
For others, civil society represented a more active and politically charged sphere.  
According to a student activist and leading figure of the Islamic Association of 
Students, S2, civil society is “the intermediary (vaset) between people and the 
government”.  In this sense, civil society makes it possible for citizens to have a say 
in how the state governs its people.  While he did not explain how the role of civil 
society as an intermediary works, similar accounts were given by other interviewees, 
such as R4, the head of the youth branch of a major reformist political party and 
former student activist.  R4 stated, “Civil society is a society where people actually 
play a role in constructing and managing government”.  In other words, civil society 
refers to the inclusion of citizens who are not selected or elected as agents of the state 
in how the state governs.         
 
According to S6, a student activist, a robust selection of books on the subject of civil 
society from a theoretical stance did not exist and instead the term was employed 
politically by individuals such as Khatami and Hajjarian.  He felt that political 
activists were too focused on using civil society as a political tool and were void of a 
theoretical understanding of civil society as a concept.  Ten years ago, he claims to 
have had a different view of civil society.  At the time when reformists entered the 
stage, he stated that his view and that of other student activists was that civil society 
is the space or activity that leads to democracy, and democracy means putting 
whomever you want in power without the existence of an all-powerful leader.  
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However, he now considers this to be a raw or inexperienced understanding; what 
resulted from his original view was that the student movement as part of civil society 
became attached to the state in a system where the state had more power.  In return, 
the state trounced civil society due to the student movement’s misunderstanding of 
civil society.  In his view, civil society is the space where individuals try to create a 
counter-hegemony using soft tactics against power so that the state is not obliged to 
use force against you.  This can be linked back to Gramsci’s notion of civil society as 
the sphere where dominant groups can construct hegemony and subordinated social 
groups can construct a counter hegemony (Simon, 1982, p. 30).  Overall, they had a 
wrong impression of the meaning of the state or government.  For them, the state was 
synonymous with government leadership.  In reality, he stated, they should have seen 
the role of power in schools, universities, streets and even in the family.  He believes 
that in addition to organizing political activities such as rallies, the student movement 
should have also debated broader issues such as why Islam is taught the way that it 
is; he said challenging issues such as this would have been a great accomplishment, 
but students preferred to discuss about what they considered to be more pressing 
issues, such as the Supreme Leader.   
 
The reform movement’s promotion of civil society provided an outlet for individuals 
and groups, such as student activists who represented a generation brought up on the 
propaganda of a post-Revolutionary regime but had come to feel critical of its 
actions.  These individuals saw an opportunity to voice their opinions in the public 
space that opened during the Khatami administration.  However, they came to realise 
that they were not able to channel their voice in a coordinated or effectual manner.  
According to S2, who continued his studies in the UK, the topic of civil society was 
a fad.  S2 entered the University of Tehran in the year 2001 and was a leader within 
the Islamic Student Association.  According to him, civil society as a theory or idea 
had an impact on a minimal amount of people. Regardless of the terminology or 
debates on the issue of civil society, people would have carried on the same activities 
because the social setting was conducive to such behaviour.  For example, he argued 
that even if individuals in the political spotlight, such as Hajarian, were not talking 
about civil society, other people would have acted upon the same ideals.  In other 
words, the field was open for these activities.  However, if Khatami had not been 
elected, this space may not have been used.  Society, according to the interviewee, is 
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more developed than government.  He stated that Islamic student associations had a 
history of activity, though it was after Khatami’s election that their activity turned 
towards reform; up to that point, their work was based on the regime’s current 
ideology.     
 
The interviewee credits Khatami with increasing the speed with which civil society 
activity was able to move forward in Iran and for creating the space in which to carry 
out this activity.  With regard to the use of the civil society platform, the former 
student leader considered the topic to have been chosen ‘accidently’ rather than the 
result of a well thought out plan.  This statement is another indication of the 
haphazard way in which civil society came to the forefront of Iran’s political and 
social scene in the twentieth century.  However, once civil society was established as 
a key component of Khatami’s campaign and the reform movement, the interviewee 
explained that Khatami’s speeches were integral to the spread of the slogan.  In 
practice, significant strides were made in the areas of political parties, the media, 
associations, NGOs and the cultural sphere, which included theatre, cinema and the 
publication of numerous books by new publishers.  Overall, there existed a diverse 
and unsystematic understanding of civil society as a concept amongst those who 
worked in its space.  The following section will examine how this space grew with 
the onset of Khatami’s presidency. 
 
5.4  Opening Up of Space for Civil Society and its Actors 
 
Making it easier for NGOs to operate 
 
Activities in the field of development, such as poverty reduction, environmental 
protection and education, already existed in the civil society sector.  However, they 
did not necessarily operate in the form of modern NGOs.  While they were active, 
the entrance of the Khatami government provided them a much more open field in 
which to operate.  For those who had an idea, but not the necessary paperwork, the 
administration began quickly issuing permits. At the same time, both state and non-
state organisations began providing capacity-building programmes to help this new 
sector that blossomed during the Khatami administration.  The results of the 
following interview provide further insight.  
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CS2 is a university professor interested in expanding innovative educational 
programmes in primary and secondary schools throughout the country.  His work in 
the field began before Khatami’s election, but it was not until after the election that 
he was able to undertake his most substantial activities.  He believes that Khatami 
impacted the political state in which civil organizations could develop and provided 
the following example.  CS2 had applied for a license to develop a youth magazine 
in the field of mathematics several years before Khatami entered power.  For three to 
four years he did not receive an answer from the authorities.  In the beginning, he 
sought information on the status of his permit every day until his enthusiasm 
wavered.  When Khatami came to power, he was immediately notified that his 
license had been granted. The news came without any attempts by him to pursue the 
issue.  This example shows how the political structure of the state can directly impact 
civil society regardless of actual legislative changes.  In this example, the 
infrastructure was already in place for the interviewee to seek a license in this field 
and he was not even in a position where the state had rejected his application.  
Rather, the state was not concerned with empowering the sector, regardless of a 
specific case’s political nature (in the case of the mathematics magazine, there were 
no blatant political implications).     
 
CS2 was also a key player in another NGO that was registered in the late 1990s, after 
Khatami came to power.  He stated that if Khatami were not there, this registered 
NGO would not have existed.  This particular NGO’s objective was to introduce 
information and communication technologies to schools and was of a more sensitive 
nature than the magazine indicated above. As such, it required direct access to school 
administrators, teachers and students.  In this case, the presence of reformists played 
a key role in allowing the NGO’s work to proceed.  The organisation still exists, 
despite the following presidential administration’s sensitivities towards it.  The 
difference is that they are now more cautious.  CS2 states that Khatami’s time in 
office helped by getting the NGO into schools by allowing them to directly contact 
school principals.  Now, school principals do not have the courage to directly work 
with them and refer them to authorities in higher positions of power.  During 
Khatami’s time NGO administrators did not have to ask permission for every activity 
or action, while the Ministry of Intelligence under the new President questions them 
at every step.  CS2 claims the new administration wants the NGO to work, but under 
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the control of the government, as evidenced by the sending of government observers 
with the NGO when they go abroad to conferences.   
 
The above cases show how the attitude of different governments towards civil 
society impacts the sector.  In the case of Khatami, actors who were already engaged, 
albeit in a limited way in some cases, were able expand their scope of work due to 
the supportive nature of the state.  On the other hand, when a new government took 
power that did not have civil society promotion on its agenda, and in some cases 
impeded such work, the administration was unable to completely undermine the 
sector.    
 
5.5  The Women’s Movement  
 
This section is based on interviews with women’s rights activists, including women 
who worked on the issue of increasing women’s rights from within the reformist 
government.  Support for the public sphere occupied by women’s rights actors was a 
significant contribution of the reform movement.  While not all achievements made 
during the period from 1997-2005 were sustainable, the breakthroughs made during 
Khatami’s administration created an important legacy.     
 
Women have historically played an intrinsic role in the development of Iranian 
society.  In fact, scholars such as Janet Afary consider the Constitutional Revolution 
of the early 20th century to mark the beginning of the modern Iranian women’s 
movement. Women fought alongside men in battle and established societies in 
support of the constitution (Namazi, 2000; Poulson, 2005, p. 272).  Afterward, 
women continued to be active participants in economic, political and social life up to 
and continuing through the Revolution of 1979.  While not high compared to 
Western standards, the overall percentage of female labour force participation, 30 per 
cent in 200048, is competitive at the regional level.  Moreover, women have played 
significant roles in social and political development (for a more detailed account of 
women’s roles in Iranian society, see for example Afary, 2009; Halper, 2005; 
Moghadam, 1988; Osanloo, 2009).   In terms of traditional civil society, referring to 
the more informal groups, charities and local CBOs, women have always played a 
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key role.  This role was particularly prominent among women who, as a result of 
cultural restrictions preserved by the family or the economic environment in general, 
were not in full time or formal paid employment outside the home.   
 
Women’s rights advocates have long questioned and tried to bring about change with 
regard to the Islamic government’s ‘equal but different’ vision of the law as 
enshrined in law and practice.  It was the Islamic women’s movement that raised the 
issue of discrimination against women with regard to child custody, leading to a 
ruling that allowed the courts to give physical custody (though not legal) of a child to 
her mother, in contrast to Sharia law which gives all custodial rights to the paternal 
family.  Later, women’s groups were among the first to bring the concept of modern 
civil society organizations, including nongovernmental organizations, into Iran 
starting in the mid-1990s.   
 
There was an increase in the number of women’s NGOs by the early 2000s as a 
result of “the women's movement in the 1990s, when women's issues became an 
integral part of the politics of the Islamic state and society” (Povey, 2004, pp. 257-
258).  The opening of space and resources provided by Khatami’s administration 
were key factors in the massive growth of the scope and extent of their activity.  A 
well-known women’s rights activist, W1, explained how the women’s rights 
movement began before it was addressed by the reformist movement and continued 
to fight, even after losing political power. According to W1, what was important was 
‘how’ the activists operate.  She began by explaining that the first NGOs to be 
recognised in Iran were those working on the issue of women’s rights and came 
about in the lead up to the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which was 
held in Beijing.  At the time, there was no government body available in which 
NGOs could be registered.  Therefore, a special government office was created that 
would recognise NGOs that wanted to send representatives to the Beijing conference.  
R3 and W3 also pointed to the Beijing conference as a key moment in the 
recognition of NGOs by the state and the promotion of government backing for some 
women’s groups.  However, it was the Khatami administration that made dramatic 
changes in this space.     
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The following information is based on a female faculty member from the University 
of Tehran, W2, who has also been a leading figure in the field of women’s studies 
both in practice and in research.  As an exact description of her activities would 
reveal her identity, comments and references to her specific activities have been 
withheld.  However, her general views and experiences are described.  She states that 
although she and her colleagues had been working on expanding the field of 
women’s studies in Iran, particularly during the Rafsanjani administration, it was 
during Khatami’s presidency that they were able to implement these programmes and 
projects.  She gives credit to Rafsanjani for having the courage to work on women’s 
issues along with his daughters.  However, while they were able to achieve some 
preliminary work and certain agreements on proposals during that period, it was 
when requests were made from within Khatami’s cabinet that W2 and her colleagues 
were able to make progress.  She states, that while her efforts from below did not get 
anywhere, requests from above worked.  In fact, they received some funding from 
the President’s office and received projects from the government as well.  As part of 
their work in the field of women’s studies, they had what she calls an ‘academic’ 
relationship with NGOs.  However, there was no sense of security in the work they 
carried out, meaning that they felt their work could be shut down at any time.  
During discussions with the interviewee, the significance of personal relationships 
was highlighted.  For example, she cited how her relationship with the wife of a key 
minister helped turn her ideas into reality.   
 
What comes across in the interview is that it was not policy changes that 
significantly altered the landscape of the women’s studies field.  Rather, it was 
personal relationships and general support from the President’s office that were 
significant to advancing work for women’s rights.  W2 goes on to state that with the 
end of Khatami’s presidency, the ability of women’s rights actors to carry out the 
same work was substantially hindered.  One area that was particularly subject to 
attack was the work she and her university colleagues were carrying out in 
collaboration with NGOs.  She states that she had tried to overcome the criticism that 
had existed regarding the limited relationship between academia and civil society by 
establishing an ‘academic relationship with civil society’.  However, the new 
government chastised her and her colleagues for this work and they were told there is 
no reason for a connection between NGOs and the university.  The government also 
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took control and made changes to a number of the programmes in women’s studies 
she and her colleagues had initiated.  Furthermore, they were forced to abandon most 
of their foreign contacts with development, women’s rights and academic 
organisations and institutions.  She states that the new government also wanted to 
eliminate the entire field of women’s studies as being ‘too Western’ but this was not 
accepted within the ranks of the university.  She compares what happened with her 
work in the field of women’s studies to what happened within society at large.  
Namely, the new government took on a negative view of civil society and 
nongovernmental entities, particularly those that developed international connections 
and collaborations.                 
 
With regard to what happened during the Khatami administration itself, W2 provides 
the following criticism.  She states that the individuals and organisations that 
suddenly faced a more open and tolerant arena began their activities in earnest 
without planning or preparation.  For example, when international travel became 
feasible for academics and civil society activists, everyone started to attend 
international events; some people would work with several NGOs and attend every 
event to which they were invited.  Ahmadinejad took office at a time (summer of 
2005) when the civil society sphere had no real order and NGOs were asked to re-
register with the Ministry of Interior.  On the one hand, she states that it makes sense 
for the new government to try and make sense of these new organisations by giving 
them some order and structure, but the organisations were also scrutinised by the 
state.  Some organisations were given permission to continue their activity by the 
Ministry, some were shut down and to some, the Ministry simply failed to respond.  
She compares civil society in Iran during the Khatami period to ‘a balloon that kept 
on getting air’.  W2’s account of civil society and the rise of women’s groups links to 
the notion of political opportunities opening the way for civil society that was 
countered to a degree by structural impediments and interference from opposing state 
factions. 
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5.6  Blurring the Boundaries between Civil Society, Political Society 
and the State 
 
Tying civil society to the state: The women’s movement and funding  
 
Reformist intellectuals in the state used their positions to provide resources for civil 
society activists so as to support the concept of civil society they were pushing for in 
their political discourse.  This was made particularly clear in the women’s 
movement.  Women within Khatami’s cabinet (such as Masoumeh Ebtekar, first 
female vice-president, and Zahra Shojaei) and in the sixth Parliament played a large 
role in bringing women’s issues to the forefront of social activism in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran.  Not only did Khatami have the first women cabinet members, his 
choice of advisors on the issue of women’s rights made a significant impression on 
the work that took place by the government and outside the government. 
 
I9 is a women’s rights activist and a member of Khatami’s cabinet.  A devout 
Muslim woman, dressed in a traditional black cloak, I9 has been working in the field 
of women’s right for twenty-five years.  She was a key player in the Centre for 
Women’s Participation, markaz omoor mosharekat zanan, which was created early 
in Khatami’s presidency (the organization was renamed the Centre for Women and 
Family Affairs, markaz omoor zanan va khanevadeh, by Ahmadinejad).  She 
believed that the view on women’s issues during the reform movement was ‘shoari’, 
meaning it was based on slogans rather than actions.  In the first year of Khatami’s 
presidency, her work included support for various publications related to women and 
active participation in the creation of the first library dedicated to women.  She states 
that work on the establishment of such a library began in the previous government, 
namely that of Rafsanjani, however the vision was not realized until after Khatami’s 
election.  Other interviewees also pointed out the pattern of ideas forming but not 
turning into reality until the reformist period. I9 and her colleagues also established a 
centre for women’s studies at Tehran University.  The idea for this was formed 
during a trip she took to the United States.   
 
One of the issues she discussed was the distinction between including women in the 
workforce versus the social participation of women.  What she and her colleagues 
planned for was creating the groundwork for using women’s social capabilities in 
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civil society, seeing work, or participation in the economy, as separate entities.  For 
her, “Reform is the inner desire of part of society and a logical government looks at 
reform as a way to prevent a revolution”.  Khatami, she states was a ‘mohebat elahi’ 
or ‘divine gift’.  He had asked them, his advisors on women’s affairs, to resolve the 
paradox between high levels of social development and the family responsibilities  
assigned to women in Eastern societies.  Their solution was to develop and enrich 
NGOs.  According to I9, she and her colleagues felt that if they could develop a 
foundation for NGOs, they would have helped with the social development of 
women, the growth of civil society and tackled the issue of unemployment.  In other 
words, they attempted to bring women into the public sphere, reconciling the public 
and private without engaging with the economic sector and therefore the potential for 
financial independence of women.      
  
She and her colleagues felt there was a need to use the productivity and energy of an 
active female workforce in nongovernmental organizations.  She states that logically, 
in order to reach the goals of development, all sources of power must be used, half of 
which belong to women in any given society.  The issue was that while some women 
contributed to the country’s development by joining the work force, she and her 
colleagues were concerned with the ‘social participation’ of women.  They sought to 
create a foundation for the use of women’s social capabilities in civil society, which 
is separate from the regular workforce.  In 1997, she cites the existence of 
approximately 55 NGOs for women.  By 2004, that number had multiplied nine 
times and reached some 450 NGOs, with numbers continuing to grow to a current (at 
the time of this interview in 2008) 530 NGOs related to women’s issues.  The work 
they carried out during her time in President Khatami’s government was the 
development of training packages that detailed how to establish and run NGOs.  
Their goal was to create the foundation for these NGOs rather than establish the 
NGOs themselves.  The work included regional meetings and public forums in which 
they encouraged women to create NGOs.  As budget is usually a key concern, they 
secured financial support from the government for these NGOs by granting funds on 
a project by project basis.  After some time had passed and a number of NGOs were 
operational, they held specialized meetings for NGOs in various fields, such as 
associations or unions, social/cultural groups as well as political groups (which she 
admits are not actually NGOs).  She states that she and her government colleagues 
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had a ‘motherly’ role towards these NGOs; they knew they did not belong to them 
and were in reality there to overlook government activity, but in those first years, 
they wanted to help them.  This last sentence is critical and corresponds to the 
argument that reformists saw civil society as a project to cultivate rather than an 
organic sphere that needed to develop on its own.      
 
With regard to the inclusion of women in the financial sector, I9 and her colleagues 
also made some strides.  She referenced the issue of ‘ta’avoni’ or manufacturing and 
consumer cooperatives formed by groups of individuals working in particular 
economic areas.  In order to form these cooperatives, an initial amount of investment 
is needed.  Women’s rights activists encouraged the participation of women in these 
cooperatives by establishing a decree that if a cooperative is formed by at least 70 per 
cent women, it can be exempt from the initial investment amount.  The two outcomes 
of this decision were the increase of men inviting women to join their cooperatives 
and the ability of women who had the initial idea but lacked the necessary seed 
money, to independently form cooperatives. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine the merits and results of this decision.  However, it is presented as a case of 
different ways in which the government encouraged women to participate in Iranian 
society.   
        
When asked about the criticism extended to reformists and women’s rights activists, 
that only certain wealthy women participated in these newly established NGOs, the 
interviewee responded with the following statements.  As an indication to counter 
this argument, she cited statistics on NGOs in economically disadvantaged cities and 
provinces that showed a high level of activity in those areas.  She stated that the 
activity taking place across the country showed the responsibility that people felt 
towards their communities and that without government support, these individuals 
would not have been able to “stand on their own feet”.  To conclude, the reformist 
faction of the state was actively trying to cultivate civil society, though it was unable 
to fully realise its goals.    
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The politicization of student activists  
 
Above, we see how the state attempted to intervene in the development of civil 
society.  In the following section, the reverse will be examined, where the civil 
society sphere became intertwined with the political sphere.  The ‘politicisation’ of 
civil society was a major issue, particularly with regards to students.  Civil society, as 
a component of any community, is political in nature, if politics is meant to refer to a 
system of power.  However, a distinction can be made between those activities that 
attempt to influence power as it impacts a particular arena versus those that want to 
alter the entire system itself, without focus on a particular issue.  In other words, civil 
society activity should be differentiated between its two possible forms. The first is 
that which creates a channel between a group and the state, such that the state meets 
the demands or needs of that group. The second is that which uses the forum of civil 
society as a source of power that will change the state itself.  These two types of 
actions are not mutually exclusive and do overlap in some cases.  Over-politicisation 
in this instance refers to the actions of civil society organisations or forums that 
initially take shape based on a common platform of needs for that particular group 
but soon shift their stance and demands for a more universal change in the state.  By 
doing so, the boundary between civil and political society becomes further blurred 
and, more importantly, the original demands that directly impact the particular 
audience of the civil society forum are lost.  This blurring of boundaries between 
civil society and political society was a dominant feature of what took place in Iran 
from the onset of reform.  It is not surprising, as it was in fact some reformist 
intellectuals themselves who stated that civil society was used as a tool to bring 
reformists back into state power, as seen in Chapter Four.    
 
The best way to illustrate how this happened is by looking at the student movement.  
Students, and youth in general, comprised one of the largest factions of supporters 
for reform as visible in their campaign efforts for Khatami, particularly in 1997, and 
activism in civil protests.  While students, like members of the women’s rights 
movement, have traditionally played an important role in contemporary Iranian 
history (for examples, see (Mahdi, 1999; Mashayekhi, 2001), the level of consistency 
in their activism, though it has dropped and peaked, gained momentum after the 1997 
election campaign.   
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From 1977 to 1979, university students actively participated in making the 
revolution happen.  After the revolution, apart from a short period between 
1979 and 1981, during which universities became the centre of the political 
activities of all political organizations, there was little independent political 
activity from the university students until 1997.  (Razavi, 2009, p. 1)    
 
The following section includes data and analysis of interviews with a number of 
student leaders and activists as well as interviews with leaders of the youth faction of 
two key reformist political parties.  Again, it is beyond the scope of this research to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive account of varied student activities in Iran.  
Rather, what is provided is a snapshot of the university activists and youth involved 
in political and social organizations during the height of reform up to the present, 
which show the over-politicisation of student activism that stemmed from the reform 
movement.  This argument is not meant to diminish the actions of the numerous 
groups and individuals who worked diligently and successfully on issues directly 
relevant to students, from housing to academics.  However, the argument is meant to 
show how civil society promotion can transform into a space for political contention, 
becoming another arm of the power struggle for state control.   
 
In terms of opening space and creating opportunity, students, who comprised a 
substantial level of the activism witnessed during the Khatami presidency, witnessed 
similar trends to that witnessed by NGOs and women’s rights activists (Mashayekhi, 
2001; Poulson, 2005).  The interview with S4 provides first-hand evidence on how 
this space emerged.  S4 provides the example of the ‘sotoon-e azad’, translated as the 
free or open pillar, in universities, which was a focal point for all students.  This was 
a space in the university where individuals were able to post messages and articles on 
all topics.  She states that even if you were not ‘political’ or active in social and 
political activism, you would still take notice of this space; there were twenty or 
thirty people around the pillar reading the items posted at any given time.  This 
example provides evidence of how an opening for such activity (i.e. allowing greater 
freedom of expression) paved the way for a more active public sphere, though not all 
of that developed into organised civil society action.  According to S4, translations of 
social science books and articles were much more readily available during Khatami’s 
presidency.  She specifically mentions the ‘Kiyan Circle’49 as well as public 
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meetings of the Islamic Student Association that served as platforms for the 
exchange of ideas.  For example, she states that if you attended a public meeting of 
the Association in the early years of Khatami’s presidency, you would have felt out 
of place had you not read Abdolkarim Soroush’s latest work.  Moreover, in the years 
between 1997 and 2001, newspapers publishing articles on topics from current 
events to philosophy were abundantly available and in high demand.  Further details 
about student activism will be provided in later sections of this chapter       
 
How students moved towards political activism 
 
S6 was unique amongst the interviewed student activists in that he was not officially 
a member of the Islamic Student Organisation but had established an independent 
publication at the faculty in which he studied.  Approximately 800 to 1,000 issues 
were sold per week.  When he headed this publication, the main topics covered were 
issues related to student life, i.e. instructors, situation of higher education, the 
meaning of a democratic university as well as topics such as cafeterias and 
dormitories.  He found that students responded positively to these topics and he was 
of the opinion that this vantage point attracted more students than direct discussions 
of politics.  His method was to approach the issues of the reform movement 
indirectly, showing the role of ideas like democracy and civil action as they played 
out in everyday life.  Despite this indirect approach, in 2003, he was arrested for his 
activities and spent 90 days in solitary confinement, after which time he passed-on 
the responsibility of the publication to another student.  From then on, the publication 
focused directly on politics (though it is no longer published).  The shift in focus that 
took place at the publication is reminiscent of how the concept of civil society was 
treated on a larger scale.  The publication went from addressing and attempting to 
implement the ideals of civil society at the university as a microcosm, to leaving 
behind the problems of the university as an institution in need of change and directly 
addressing and attempting to influence the political sphere.      
      
In terms of student activism during the reform era, the former student leader, S2, 
claims the idea of a student ‘movement’ is an exaggeration of the level of activism in 
this arena.  Rather, while students played an active role in the social and political 
spheres, the collective strength and influence of their activity did not indicate a 
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unified or organized movement.  He states that though students backed Khatami, 
they cannot claim to have created him, “Khatami was the one who helped them 
[students]; even though I shouldn’t say this, the student movement was taken too 
seriously.  They expected the President to be a student and saw themselves as 
President.”  According to S2, two significant events that not only generated student 
activism but also embellished the notion of a student movement as part of a larger 
reform movement were the ‘Kooye Daneshgah’50 dormitory confrontation and the 
death sentence handed to Hashem Aghajari51.  He explains that the ‘Kooye 
Daneshgah’ incident was initially the result of a controversy over dormitory catering.  
It was after this issue was raised that someone mentioned the closure of Salaam 
newspaper, adding fuel to an already tense atmosphere.  S2 went on to say that the 
case shows how the conservatives, referring to those opposed to reform and in 
support of the Supreme Leader, used the conflict to inflict revenge on reformists as a 
whole.  The case of the 1999 student protests actually having been instigated over 
dormitory catering reveals how political allegiance and disputes became so easily 
intertwined with everyday welfare concerns.  With regard to the protests that 
followed the announcement of Aghajari’s death sentence, he states that it was in fact 
a handful of students who organized and consciously sought a platform to voice their 
dissent.  The protest gathered force as people walking by stopped and joined the 
crowds for reasons including basic curiosity.  Overall, he stated that these were 
‘enjoyable’ experiences as students were given an opportunity to mingle amongst 
one another while classes were cancelled.  With the start of Khatami’s second term, 
these types of protests and activism died down, particularly as a result of 
punishments for the more confrontational and committed student activists.  In other 
words, student activism was a reflection of the political developments taking place 
amongst reformists in the political sphere rather than students representing an 
independent voice as part of an autonomous civil society.  
 
                                                 
50
 Kooye Daneshgah is the name of a set of University of Tehran dormitories.  In this context, it refers 
to a bloody July 1999 attack on students at their dormitory in the middle of the night by plainclothes 
police, most likely linked with the basij, following a day of peaceful protests by students.  The 
catalyst for the protest is generally reported as frustration with the shutting down of reformist 
newspapers, capped by the closure of the popular Salaam daily.   
51
 Iranian university professor sentenced to death in 2002 for questioning the role of religious leaders.  
His death sentence was ultimately overturned.   
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5.7  Changing Trends 
 
It was, in the end, the ability of new and emerging civil society organisations and 
actors to be flexible in reaction to their surrounding context that determined how they 
fared.  The reformist agenda helped open the sphere for collaboration and make it 
possible for controversial ideas to be put forward.  However, the groups that survived 
the end of Khatami’s regime were the ones that had already existed in some form 
before his presidency.  The reform movement helped them make some progress, 
empowered them and made them bolder to a degree.  However, as they had existed 
before, they were able to continue their work according to their willingness to take 
risks and, at times, change their mode of operation.   
 
The women’s movement: From associations to organisations to networks          
 
As the crackdown on NGO activity and the limitations placed on women’s rights 
activists increased, a shift took place within women’s rights activity from NGOs to a 
network framework with a less visible basis.  These networks maintained an online 
presence but were dependent on localized activity in smaller groups working on the 
ground, albeit maintaining some contact with the larger network.  On the one hand, 
this type of activity is reminiscent of the community based activism that took place 
before the emergence of the NGO concept.  However, there are several distinctions.  
First, the activity is based on meeting what these particular women’s rights actors 
consider ‘universal’ values of women’s rights rather than focusing on material well-
being, though contributions to material-wellbeing are included.  Second, religion is 
not a driving factor within the network, though it may be a driving force on a 
personal level.  Finally, the networks maintain and sometimes benefit from certain 
organizational aspects of NGO activity.    
 
Although the number of NGOs multiplied several fold between 1997 and 2005, the 
onset of the Ahmadinejad administration and increased pressure on civil society 
actors resulted in activists turning to new and less formal types of activity.  In the 
case of one women’s rights actor, W1, she and her colleagues established informal 
networks that she described as being less bureaucratic, more self-sustainable, value-
based volunteer actions in which participants really believed in feminism and 
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democracy.  For example, the network they established has no office but meets in 
people’s homes and has a website.  Their work is mostly on changing the laws 
related to women.     
 
Student view: Shifting away from politics 
 
The following section reveals how the reformists’ loss pushed some students away 
from the political activities that prevailed when Khatami was in power.  In 2003, S5 
became a leader of the Islamic Student Association and during his time at university 
was active in all divisions of the association.  Before he entered university, around 
1995, the Islamic Associations at universities became places for critical thought 
under the influence of Abdolkarim Soroush.  This tendency gained further 
momentum after the 2nd of Khordad elections and after students began participating 
in university elections in greater numbers.  His political thoughts were instigated 
with Salaam newspaper.  Other influences included the Jame-e newspaper after the 
2nd of Khordad and the Kiyan and Rah-e No journals.  Mohsen Kadivar and 
Abdolkarim Soroush were influential intellectuals and Hajjarian and Ganji helped 
shape his political thoughts.   
 
S5 believes two issues were influential in eliminating the power of the reform 
movement.  The first is the political position of the United States with respect to Iran 
and the second is society’s move towards individualism.  Moreover, Khatami’s 
inability to achieve his stated goals led to a lack of trust by society in politics, 
regardless of political stance.  Several years after Khatami’s electoral loss, other 
individuals such as actors and sports figures gained the fame previously held by 
political figures.  With regard to the Islamic Association of universities, they lost 
their budgets with the election of Ahmadinejad.  Furthermore, since 2005, these 
student associations have been told to shut down their elections.  Before 2005, 
anyone could become a candidate and up to 2007, the associations held their own 
elections even though the universities did not officially recognize them.  However, 
now they have decided to abide by the new rules and hold closed elections.  On the 
whole, the same types of associations existed during the presidencies of Rafsanjani, 
Khatami and Ahmadinejad, however, the difference is the strength of the Association 
during Khatami’s time.  With regard to numbers of active members, or members who 
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consider themselves to be ‘Anjomani’ (referring to a person who is part of Anjoman, 
the main student association), there were under 100 members during the 1990s.  
During Khatami’s presidency, there were approximately 100-200 members.  By 
2008, the numbers had decreased to 70-100 individuals.  The split within the Islamic 
Student Association was not strong until the university administration became 
involved.  Previous to this, the Association had members with ideologies ranging 
from liberal to Marxist and only a limited number of people would be against the 
group simply because the name included the word Islamic.  However, with 
Ahmadinejad’s election, two significant sources created friction.  The first was that 
some members of the Association said they should be more ‘Islamic’ to avoid the 
pressure of elimination from the government, which made the existence of secular 
students more difficult.  The second issue was direct pressure from the government, 
monitoring and regulating their actions to thwart opposition activity.   
 
S6 states that at the height of the reform movement, he felt that student activism 
around him was a movement, but now he believes it may not have been an actual 
movement.  Regardless, he does not think such labels are relevant or important; at 
least he claims, at the time a call would have gathered hundreds of people but now it 
is difficult to even attract the attention of ten individuals.  This change in space is due 
to the downturn of the reform movement.  The student movement could only exist so 
long as there was a larger movement within society; the student movement became 
important when a reform movement began with Khatami.  He believes that what 
separates him from his friends is a belief that organizations such as Tahkim Vahdat 
were important because of Khatami.   In other words, the student movement was a 
subsidiary of the main reformist movement rather than an independent movement on 
its own.  This can be contrasted with the women’s rights movement that was helped 
but not directly born out of the reform movement.  Since Ahmadinejad’s victory, 
however, issues such as political reform have taken a back seat to economic well-
being.  In one sense, the women’s movement was more successful than the student 
movement because they focused less on higher order, general political issues than the 
student movement and therefore managed to sustain themselves even today. 
 
Similar to the rest of society, S5 claims there is an anti-political or apolitical feel in 
the university.  He describes his own experiences of interrogation by various groups, 
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including the legal courts, the intelligence services and a university disciplinary body 
that he claims is intended to scare students. Other students face similar experiences, 
which serve as a strong deterrent against future political activities that could cause 
them further trouble.  In effect, the punitive reaction of conservatives is a strong 
contrast to the opportunities and encouragement of participation by reformists.  Last 
year [2007], he stated, a seminar was held on ‘modern government’.  However, the 
people and issues covered by the seminar “…were not important for students 
anymore and not many participated.  They welcome Namjoo52 and students are more 
interested in cultural and social activities”.  The students’ base of interest has become 
less overtly political, with interest in figures such as Namjoo, whose work is socially 
and politically provocative but lacks any direct involvement in the struggle for 
political power.  In a sense, the reformists’ civil society frame that was based on the 
interests of the reform movement has been rejected and redefined.     
 
It was during this time of high hopes and interest, namely Khatami’s administration, 
when students realized that their expectations were not being met.  S4 considered the 
events that followed the ‘Kooye Daneshgah’ incident as a turning point that changed 
her outlook on the regime and led to a loss of hope with regard to the possibilities of 
creating change. A general shift in intellectual pursuits by students began to occur by 
the middle of Khatami’s presidency. The focus on social issues moved to an interest 
in ‘erfan’, or spirituality, in the early 2000s.  This interest, that included ideas like 
meditation and yoga, was also later abandoned in favour of fiction.  Based on a 
research study which she helped conduct close to the time of the interview [in 2008], 
the book most borrowed from the student library was a love story.  At the same time, 
the number of students in universities increased and the status of being a student, 
particularly at a prestigious institution such as the University of Tehran, no longer 
carried the same cache.  Moreover, future generations of social and political leaders 
did not emerge, nor were cultivated, from among student activists.  She states that 
political parties should have taken this opportunity to engage students as future 
leaders. 
 
                                                 
52
 Mohsen Namjoo is a singer and song-writer who was criticised by the Iranian government for his 
use of religious phrases and references in music.  He has a large following amongst Iranian youth and 
students. 
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Students, who represented a considerable section of the reformist audience, have 
changed as a result of the brief openings that took place during the Khatami 
administration.  According to S5, “One of the best things that came out of those eight 
years [Khatami’s presidency, 1997-2005] is that we now understand repression 
(sarkoob).  For example, gozinesh [a selection process based on a person’s religious 
beliefs and practices that one has to take for many public sector jobs, university 
placements or other activities that require a government permit] was eliminated in 
some cases during Khatami’s time, though it was prevalent before Khatami and 
accepted.  Now that it’s back [it was reinstated in many cases] it is not as easily 
accepted… Now people argue.”  S5 laments that many of the students who received 
their bachelor’s degrees during the Khatami administration and were socially or 
politically active now have trouble being accepted for Master’s programmes.  Many 
of them say they hope that if they stay quiet and resist getting involved in activism, 
their problems will be solved.  However, according to the interviewee, people will 
soon realize that going home and sitting out of politics will not help.  “The students 
who jeered Khatami in 2004 returned two years later to clap for him.  The people 
who called Khatami incompetent (bi-orzeh) now see that he is better than a 
competent individual who does bad things [an implied reference to the current 
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad].  The mood will change and people will return to 
politics” (S6).  The student movement reflects a broader political trend with a 
dynamic interplay between those in, or seeking, political power and the citizen base.  
The different sectors of civil society, whether structured as a group or movement, are 
not static entities.  Rather, they change and develop as a result of context and 
encounters with the different forces of the state.  In the case of students, their level of 
activity transformed as a result of these experiences.  To examine their relationship 
with the reform movement, a complete look must be given to both the time period in 
question and to the fluctuations in their activities over a longer period of time.       
 
5.8  Conclusion 
 
As revealed above, a consideration of civil society during the Khatami administration 
cannot be completed in a vacuum.  To understand Iranian civil society, particularly 
during a time when the language of civil society was framing an entire movement, it 
is critical to look at the actors occupying that space and how they utilised the 
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concept.  The student movement displayed how the boundary between political and 
civil society can be blurred in practice.  Activity in the voluntary sector, student-
based groups and fields such as women’s rights, poverty reduction and social 
equality, have a long established history preceding the emergence of the reform 
movement.  Moreover, the activity did not come to a standstill after reformists lost 
their authority in the state.  However, during the period that reformists were in 
power, the civil society sector became much more receptive and conducive to 
activities that had previously faced more challenging hurdles. As the public space in 
which they operated was opened, they were afforded political opportunities that were 
not available in the period before or after the reform movement.   
 
While reformist intellectuals were using the language of civil society to craft their 
vision of social and political life, civil society actors were using the resulting 
openings to achieve their own goals.  The public image of civil society that emerged 
was often a magnification of the larger, political reform movement, exemplified by 
the student movement.  The result was a gradual weakening of the energy and 
capability of student activists, who soon changed the course of their activism, 
focusing on less overtly political issues and to a large extent carrying out their 
activities independent of organised groups.  The women’s movement, on the other 
hand, represents the endurance of movements containing their own socio-political 
frame (i.e. having an independent cause not directly tied to a political movement).  
The opening of space afforded to the women’s movement allowed them to increase 
the scope and volume of activity that predated the reform movement; once this space 
was restricted by the opposing conservative factions of the state, the women’s 
movement modified their modus operandi, shifting to formal and informal networks, 
some virtually based, to continue pursuing their goals.  Civil society organisations 
with apolitical agendas (i.e. organisations without direct political agendas or 
affiliation with the reform movement) were given an opportunity with the favourable 
environment provided by the Khatami administration (for example, issuing of 
permits and funding), which they used to sustain themselves in the post-reform era.  
The experiences gained by civil society actors during the period of reform generated 
an assertive group of individuals more willing to engage with and defy limitations 
imposed by the state.  What is more, conservative factions of the state adopted 
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pertinent facets of civil society touted by reformists to promote their own agendas, as 
will be examined in the next chapter.                      
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Chapter 6: Adopting and Adapting a Liberal Concept – 
Conservatives and Civil Society 
 
In October 2010, the Deputy Interior Minister for Cultural and Social Affairs of Iran 
stated that “People-based organisations should not engage in political activities.  
They can criticise the administration organisations in their private sessions, but they 
should not undermine the administration in their media outlets” ("NGOs should shun 
politics: Deputy minister," 2010).  His statement was made during a meeting for 
‘people-based organisations’ at which time he also proclaimed that the country’s 
voluntary militia force, the Basij, is the country’s largest NGO.   
 
This final substantive chapter provides a glimpse into the workings of the dominant 
conservative faction, which controls Iran’s main socio-political and economic 
institutions, and the capitalisation of ‘civil society’ language and structures by the 
faction’s leading figures.  The aim is to show how the use of civil society language 
and structures can be adopted and adapted by opposition forces. Specifically, how 
the collective referred to as the conservative faction in Iran has come to use the tools 
and structures of a civil society that emerged since the late 1980s while 
simultaneously challenging the ideas associated with the Reformist vision of civil 
society as a Western model that is detrimental to the Islamic Republic.  The ultimate 
argument is that individuals and groups opposed to the notion of reform have 
managed to modify the language and structures of civil society based on their own 
values, in order to enhance their positions of power and realise their agenda of 
preserving conservative dominance in the Islamic Republic.  The civil society 
concept that reformist intellectuals spoke of and actors pursued, discussed in 
Chapters Four and Five, respectively, was based on a different set of values, and 
therefore detached from the social sphere in which conservatives operated.  In other 
words, rather than creating a dialogue within a single domain, reformists and 
conservatives attempted to influence parallel, non-intersecting spaces.        
 
In this chapter, the Iranian system of government will be introduced, as it is 
necessary to appreciate the intricacies of this system to locate the role of the 
conservative, against whom reformists stand as opposition.   The conservative 
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coalition, as it emerged following the split of reformists, will be introduced.  Second, 
it will be shown how a benign, organisation-based definition of civil society has had 
a long-standing history in Iran, including the existence of traditional community 
based organisations (CBOs).  More importantly, however, the post-Revolution state, 
during the 1980s, consolidated such institutions under its own control, effectively 
blurring the boundaries between their rendering of civil society and the state.  This 
chapter illustrates how conservative factions use the tools of civil society, in 
particular the notion of social capital discussed in Chapter Two, to develop a loyal 
base while at the same time dismissing reformists whose language of civil society 
they associate with an agenda of Western imperialism.  It is for this reason that an 
organisational approach to civil society does not provide a complete view of Iranian 
society and exemplifies the importance of taking a broader approach to the concept, 
which looks at the values underpinning the concept of civil society and 
acknowledges its interdependence with the pursuit of political power.  From a 
theoretical viewpoint, the chapter shows how concepts associated with liberalism and 
democracy can be appropriated and used to reach illiberal objectives.      
 
In the final section, the view of conservative intellectuals, based on in-depth 
interviews with two of these individuals, will be presented and analysed.  The 
purpose is to show how pragmatic conservative intellectuals can grapple with liberal 
values, countering the perception that the country’s conservative ideology is based 
purely on dogmatic, illiberal views.  The contentious conclusion drawn from these 
interviews hints at the possibility of reform stemming from within a pragmatic core 
of individuals who have come to engage with and adapt the notions previously taken 
up by reformists or other individuals opposing the regime. 
 
6.1  Deconstructing the Conservative Camp  
 
First, it should be recognised that the conservative faction of the Iranian political 
system, similar to the reformist camp, is not a cohesive unit with a uniform set of 
political, social and religious ideals.  Rather, it is a loose coalition of individual 
actors and political groupings adhering to a general set of principles, including firm 
backing of the post-Revolution political system.  From the time of the reformist rise 
in political power from the mid to late 1990s, political rivalry has largely been 
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between two poles, one representing the reformists and the other conservatives, 
though this is not to deny complex internal dynamics.  Both political camps were 
dedicated to maintaining the fundamental structure of the state, including the role of 
the Supreme Leader.53  However, conservatives had a strong standing with the 
Supreme Leader with whom reformists had a more contentious relationship.54 When 
the reformist camp began to emerge, individuals within the state-endorsed political 
sphere could be separated into groups: those who voiced dissatisfaction with the 
current regime’s modus operandi, reformists, and those who maintained their loyalty 
to the status quo, conservatives.  However, as the reformists gained momentum, 
long-standing divisions within the conservative camp became sharper and more 
visible from the outside. Although they were able to establish practical coalitions by 
the end of the Khatami administration for electoral gains, by the end of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s first term as President and the 2009 elections, infighting amongst 
conservatives has gained renewed momentum, most likely due to political rather than 
ideological reasons.  This current stream of fragmentation will not be pursued any 
further as it does not have significant bearing on the overall arguments made here.      
 
Broadly speaking, conservatives can be divided into three camps, the traditionalists, 
the pragmatists (who have been known to overlap with reformists) and principlists 
(Thaler, 2010).  Traditionalist conservatives strongly back a clerically dominated 
system that adheres to the values set out by Islamists in the early days of the 
Revolution; they control the Guardian Council, giving them the most political clout 
within the system.  The pragmatists are associated with individuals such as Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Larijani, the current Speaker of Parliament.  Defining 
features of pragmatic conservatives include limited concessions towards social 
liberties for the sake of political cohesion, economic growth through privatisation 
and a more cordial relationship with the West.  Affiliates of this branch of 
conservatives are more likely to express discontent with the regime.  During one 
interview, a conservative intellectual, C1, stated, “I can do more.  Some regimes use 
                                                 
53
 Within the reformist camp debates emerged regarding the authority of the Supreme Leader, 
however there was no direct attack or call for eradication of the role from reformists.  The stance of 
reformists towards the Supreme Leader after the Khatami left office is more complicated and not 
discussed in this thesis.   
54
 The conflict that arose between the Supreme Leader and President Ahmadinejad in 2011 is 
representative of increasing divisions among conservatives but is not of direct relevance to an 
explanation of the initial stages of the reformist rise in prominence.     
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people to their best potential but some regimes don’t”.  Despite his connection with 
and support of the conservative political faction, he still expressed dissatisfaction 
with the ways in which control was exercised at the expense of capacity building.         
 
In contrast, principlists are regarded as ultra-conservative, right wing politicians with 
a populist approach.  Their political ideology is closely aligned with that of 
Khomeini, and their ambition is to run the country based on the values set out during 
the early days of the Revolution.  While the traditional conservatives advocate 
clerical rule and primarily consist of clerical figures, the principlist faction is largely 
composed of devout laypeople  who “…have challenged (through, for example, their 
use of messianic imagery and their denunciations of corruption and the enrichment of 
some clerics) the dominance of the clerical elite among the traditional conservatives” 
(Thaler, 2010, pp. 70-71).  With the rise of Ahmadinejad to power, principlists have 
gradually pulled away from the traditionalist clergy.  Despite the differences among 
conservatives, political figures bearing the conservative label are commonly united in 
their traditional interpretations of Shia Islam and their views of the governing role of 
religion.   
 
Conservative partisanship 
 
Party politics is not a defining feature of the conservative faction and was not an 
issue until well after the reformist emergence on the political scene and gained 
further momentum with the election of Ahmadinejad.  Conservatives, as has been the 
case in Iran’s political history, are driven more by loyalties to personalities than to 
specific ideological differences.  In the early years of the Revolution, Khomeini’s 
position as the founding father of the regime limited internal infighting.  Upon 
Khomeini’s passing in the late 1980s, followed by the opening-up of political space 
with the entrance of reformists nearly a decade later, an increasing level of partisan 
politics emerged within conservative ranks.  What is also important to note is that 
these organisations are not unified and formal political parties as seen in the West.  
Rather, they are associations with cross-cutting interests.  Often, leading members of 
these associations or parties serve in high-level institutions of the state through 
appointments by the Supreme Leader.  Membership does not limit or necessarily 
ensure support from the political association.  For example, Ahmadinejad is a 
member of the Islamic Society of Engineers, which was formed in the late 1980s, but 
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provided backing for Ali Larijani, Speaker of Parliament, in the 2005 presidential 
elections.  The fact that Larijani, also a principlist conservative, took part in that 
election shows how individual identity takes precedence over parties and factions.  
Currently, the most significant association among conservatives is the ‘e’telaf-e 
abadgaran-e Iran-e eslami’, or the Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran, which was 
formed in 2003.  The most prominent figure is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  It is an 
umbrella organisation with membership of different conservative political 
organisations.  
 
Analysis for this chapter will consider the whole of the conservative faction, while 
noting instances when a particular subdivision is addressed.  The decision to look at 
conservatives as a whole stems from the fact that this entirety has stood collectively 
against the reform movement and, while there are internal divisions amongst 
conservatives, they are united in their opposition to major changes in the structure of 
the Islamic Republic.  In terms of the role of public intellectuals vis-à-vis the 
conservative political realm, there are several sources of power.  Key political figures 
have their own ideology, rather than the party having an ideology and politicians 
being civil servants. This structure stems from the dominance of personalities in 
Iranian politics.  Moreover, clerics play a dominant role in conservative politics and 
are themselves scholars of religion.  There are conservative or, more aptly labelled 
traditionalist clerics, who are not directly involved in politics, but they are not of 
relevance here.  Although the entire political system is based on religion, only 
religious scholarship that is sanctioned by the state has an opportunity to play a role 
in politics.   
 
6.2  Conservative Theory on Civil Society 
 
The following section provides a succinct look at the theoretical foundations of the 
conservative faction.  As with the reformists, there are variations and nuances within 
theoretical beliefs of different actors, such as political figures and intellectuals.  
Political figures refer to those who have political posts, either elected or appointed; 
intellectual refers to those who advise or provide the philosophical foundations for 
the political actors. At times, an individual’s official government role may overlap 
with her role in the political faction’s ideological strategy. 
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The goal of conservative ideology is the preservation of the Islamic Republic, or the 
political system that emerged under the leadership of Khomeini in the aftermath of 
the 1979 Revolution.  The central component of this regime is the notion of velayat-e 
faqih, or Rule of the Supreme Jurist, which is embodied by the vali-e faqih, the 
Supreme Leader.  As described earlier, this post is based on Shia doctrine that 
requires clerical authority to serve as guardians of Islam during the occultation of the 
12th Imam.  Conservative can be identified as such based on their strong support for 
the position of the Supreme leader and a particular interpretation of Shi’ism that is 
not receptive to pluralist constructions of religion.   
 
A compelling argument for the ideological incompatibility of Islam and civil society 
is found in a short book written by Dr Ahmad Vaezi, a cleric and scholar active in 
Iranian seminaries and universities.  Vaezi’s philosophy has been influenced by 
clerics such as Mesbah Yazdi and Hassanzadeh Amoli.55  Mesbah Yazdi is a hard-
line cleric who opposes any Western influences in the country and follows a strict 
interpretation of Islamic guidelines; he has been considered one of Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s mentors.  Hassanzadeh Amoli is another influential hard-line scholar 
with close ties to the office of the Supreme Leader.  In his book, Civil Society, 
Religious Society (2001), Vaezi identifies the features of civil society, and religious 
civil society in particular, and explains the paradox with Islam.  The main 
incompatibility is based on civil society’s assertion that final authority rests with the 
individual (citizen) whereas in Islam this authority is based on the will of God.  He 
states scholars who claim compatibility between religion and civil society are failing 
to take account of civil society’s features in their entirety.  Some individuals are able 
to connect civil society with the civil associations established by the Prophet 
Mohammad.  However, thinkers, like Vaezi (2001, p. 152), point out that this 
suggestion is not convincing as it has no relevance to what Vaezi calls the ‘common’ 
definition of civil society.  Presumably by the ‘common’ definition, he means to 
imply liberal classifications of civil society.  Therefore, in the case of Iran, the role of 
                                                 
55
 In his biographical description on the website for Hawzah Elmieh Masjid Soleiman, where he has 
taught, Vaezi indicates the main sources of his philosophical learning: http://hawzah-
almahdi.org/portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=NEWS&ID=60fb1195-2332-4684-8ab3-
6d89aae68bb5&WebPartID=76bd32df-ff4c-4b7f-ba8d-acd30d39f352&CategoryID=356d00e5-83fe-
4b17-9203-918b878a71fc    
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the Supreme Leader as guardian of religion cannot be over-ruled by citizens whose 
opinions may be based purely on personal desires.  What conservatives appear to do 
is use the organisational frameworks attributed to benign perceptions of civil society 
(for example, religious and volunteer organisations).  However, they do not embrace 
the ideological principles attached to liberal perceptions of civil society (for example, 
individual liberty).  The following sections will outline a number of key 
organisations that blur the boundaries between the civil and political as well as 
provide evidence and analysis of how intellectuals deal with civil society on a 
practical level.  
 
6.3  Conservative Civil Society Organisations: Blurring the boundaries  
 
Though civil society was a mantra invoked by reformists starting in the 1990s, civil 
society institutions as volunteer entities not under the direct control of the state or 
private sector already existed in Iranian society, as discussed in Chapter Two.  Of 
particular interest to this section is the introduction and analysis of traditional and 
modern civil society organisations with ties to the conservative political faction.  
While these organisations may not refer to themselves as civil society organisations, 
their characteristics fit CSO definitions that focus on organisations, as is common in 
the field of development.  Definitions associated with the third sector that emphasise 
the benign service delivery approach of volunteer organisations, which are not a 
direct part of political institutions or the market, can be applied to volunteer 
charitable and social organisations that were in operation before the Revolution and 
formed close ties to conservative political factions after the Revolution.  There are 
also several organisations formed under the direct order of the state in the aftermath 
of the Revolution. As they have some characteristics of civil society groups, these 
organisations will be referred to as quasi-state organisations, similar to government 
organised NGOs (GONGOS).  The most recognisable of these is the social service 
branches of the basij paramilitary organisation, which will be discussed below.  
These organisations take on roles traditionally ascribed to civil society groups 
through both official and unofficial channels, made more complex as a result of the 
state’s position of religious authority.  Through both law and the bodies of these 
quasi-civil society institutions, conservatives restrict the political opportunities 
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reformists attempted to extend.  Overall, their role in welfare provision sustains 
conservative power while providing them with additional legitimacy. 
         
Religious charities 
 
Based on its strong Shia Muslim identity, the role of charity has historically played a 
large role in Iran.  Charities are often based on the religious principles of believers 
and focus on serving the underprivileged.  They are generally tied to local 
communities and based on informal networks of both men and women.  Local 
mosques and clerics have traditionally had links with these charity groups.  Over 
three decades after the 1979 Revolution, local religious charities continue to provide 
services and goods to disadvantaged individuals and communities without any 
political affiliation or agenda.  However, there are two instances when conservative 
politics are linked with these charities.  First, there are charities that have been 
absorbed by the state under the patronage of the Supreme Leader, some of which will 
be described below.  Second, and less obvious, are individuals involved in religiously 
based charities who may not receive direct financial or organisational backing from 
the state but who support conservative politics due to the populist language used by 
conservative actors, including traditionalist and principlist conservatives.   
 
One prime example of the religiously-motivated charitable endeavour is the 
Sandogh-e Qarz-ol-Hassaneh, which are interest-free loan funds (similar to 
microcredit organisations) based on Islamic beliefs.  Before the Revolution, these 
funds “were established, initially, as a safety net for opponents of the Shah who were 
dismissed from their work. These grew from the first in 1970 to 3,000 in 1988 and 
10,000 in 200556. Often run from the mosque, the sandogh loans are guaranteed by 
businessmen in the bazaar” (AKDN & INTRAC, 2007, p. 33).  The number and 
power of the funds grew soon after the Revolution with support from the 
government; however, many were closed, “As the so called Islamic financial 
institutions began to wield political clout and disregarded Government’s fiscal and 
monetary policies…” (Motee & Namazi, 2000, p. 9).  On the whole, the larger funds 
emerged from inside the bazaar, independent of the government and mosques (Motee 
& Namazi, 2000, p. 9).  The case of these funds exemplifies the functional 
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 As mentioned in Chapter Five, the exact number of these organisations is difficult to establish. 
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relationship between the mosque, bazaar and post-Revolutionary state.  Though 
there are fissures in the relationship between the state, bazaar and religious 
institutions, the conservative camp has historically been based upon a ‘bazaar-
mosque alliance’ (Ashraf, 1994).            
 
Why is the link between traditional charities and conservatives important? 
 
As discussed in earlier chapters, the civil society advocated by reformists was not 
merely a call for an increase in civic action or community participation (along the 
lines of Putman) but a promotion of broader liberal democratic ideals.  Therefore, the 
link between traditional charities and conservatives can be significant in a discussion 
of civil society.  If civil society is supposed to play a link between the populace and 
the government, as described in literature and expressed by reformist figures, 
conservatives have been successful in establishing a link with these charities.   
 
The most basic criticism of this link is that it does not necessarily represent an 
interactive and reciprocal relationship whereby members of the charity organisations 
are able to voice their opinions and make demands on the state institution.  Though 
valid on some level, namely that conservatives will maintain their stance on key 
issues regardless of voices from below, conservatives do provide benefits for their 
supporters and make concessions within certain boundaries.  In particular, this can be 
seen in economic reforms made to address the dispossessed.  It is through local 
charities and mosques that conservatives reach out to their base and the charities in 
turn gain access to political figures.  Friday prayers represent one example of 
interaction between local charities and conservative political figures.  The 
appointment of Friday prayer leaders is under the command of the Supreme Leader.  
In fact, the Islamic state controls and has complete oversight over all mosques.  
Many of the local Basij organisations, expanded upon below, operate from within 
mosques. 
 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij  
 
The Basij forces, translated as mobilisation forces, are a paramilitary volunteer 
militia established in 1979 and are under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary 
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Guard Corps (IRGC) also known as the Revolutionary Guards or Pasdaran (meaning 
Guard).  The IRGC was itself established after the Revolution by a decree from 
Khomeini.  The IRGC has managed to influence almost all aspects of the country’s 
socio-political framework based on a populist and authoritarian understanding of the 
Revolution’s principles (Wehrey, 2009, p. xi).  It was conceived as a counterpart to 
the regular military and consolidated its power with service during the Iran-Iraq War.  
Since 1997, the IRGC has expanded its reach in the economy and its “…commanders 
are ubiquitous in decision-making circles, control the police, the national radio and 
television, and Ministries of Defence and Intelligence, and are responsible for the 
security of the clerical leadership”. Former Guard members constitute one-third of 
the conservative parliament that was elected in early 2004…” (Gheissari & Nasr, 
2005, pp. 180-181).  In other words, the IRGC represents the economic and political 
powerhouse of the conservative base and the quasi-militarisation of the economy and 
society.   
 
During the Khatami administration, the IRGC mobilised its members in an attempt to 
curtail the impact of the reform movement.  Their fear was that reform, even if not 
intentional, could potentially destroy the political system. As a result, the chief of the 
IRGC at the time, took on a directly interventionist approach (Alfoneh, 2008).  In 
addition to mobilising their paramilitary forces, the IRGC also used the courts to 
attack reformist intellectuals and publications (Alfoneh, 2008).  In essence, the IRGC 
had and continues to hold the economic and political means to control any attempts 
to change the Islamic Republic.       
 
The Basij forces, short for sazman- basij-e mostazafan, or Organisation for the 
Mobilisation of the Oppressed, are a paramilitary volunteer militia established by 
Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and a component of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps.  The Basij were created in the aftermath of the Revolution as a security force 
that was first responsible for neutralising domestic insurgency. With the start of the 
Iran-Iraq War, they came to play a key role in national defence.  The Basij have 
branches responsible for domestic security but also an extensive programme of social 
service delivery made up of locally organised volunteer forces.   According to one 
estimate, in 2010 there were approximately 4 million members of the Basij (Golkar, 
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2010a).  A majority of its members consist of men, though there are dedicated 
women’s and girls’ groups as well.     
 
Organisationally, the Basij are a network of local organizations largely based in 
mosques with additional branches in institutions such as universities.  During the war 
with Iraq, members of the Basij fought on the front lines, with young members even 
accepting to martyr themselves by clearing minefields with their bodies.  As a result, 
members of the Basij are, to this day, considered loyal to the Revolution and given 
special privileges, such as university places.  From the end of the war until the 
writing of this thesis, they continue to provide national security roles and serve as a 
type of ‘morality’ police that ensures ‘Islamic’ behaviour among citizens. In the 
public domain they have taken initiatives to monitor women’s clothing (to ensure 
they meet their standards of modest clothing), established check points on the street 
to detain drivers with illegal substances in their cars (including alcohol or restricted 
music) or prevent unmarried couples from riding in cars together and other such 
measures.  They are also routinely mobilized in times of political unrest on behalf of 
the Revolutionary Guard and the office of the Supreme Leader.  Membership is also 
a means of obtaining civil servant positions and other roles within the government.   
 
However, it is interesting to note that the ideological base of the Basij is permeable.  
For example, in 1997, 73 per cent of Basijis voted for Khatami in the Presidential 
election (Golkar, 2010a), an act that appears to directly defy Khamenei, the Supreme 
Leader, who supported Khatami’s opponent.  As a result, ‘…the Basij intensified its 
ideological training for its members.  A new series of IPT [Ideological-Political 
Training] courses was added to the Basij program: velayat (guardianship) in 1997, 
basirat (insight) in 1998, and marefat (awareness) in 2001’ (Golkar, 2010a)57.  These 
training courses are an indication of how the conservative faction of the state reacts 
in a systematic manner to potential deviance from within using the authority of the 
Supreme Leader over this organization.  The fact that 73 per cent were willing to 
vote in defiance towards the Supreme Leader shows that the ideology of the Islamic 
Republic is less rigid than often presumed.         
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 According to Golkar, further adjustments have been made in the Basij and IRGC IPT programmes.    
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Though the official organization of the Basij brands it an entity of the state, certain 
factors, including its role in the community, make it a quasi-civil society 
organization.  In addition to security roles, members of the Basij also provide 
services to the community and the organisation serves as a basis for community 
cohesion.  Members participate in social activities such as sports, extracurricular 
academic classes for students and regular outings and travels.  Common in low-
income neighbourhoods, the mosque-based Basij organisation provides a safe and 
acceptable space for socialising, which would not have otherwise been possible.  
Participation in these activities is voluntary and does not necessarily have a political 
dimension.  Community building, therefore, becomes a strong focus as a result of the 
relationships formed, which fall outside the realm of the family.  The Basij have been 
a prominent fixture in disaster relief efforts acting in conjunction with official state 
aid as opposed to acting as the state’s official representatives.  It is this aspect of the 
Basij that blurs the boundary between the state and civil society.      
 
Of particular importance to this thesis is the Student Basij Organisation, or SBO.  
Established in 1990, with its first bureau at University of Tehran, the SBO was not 
focused on political activism until after Khatami’s election, when individuals 
including the Supreme Leaders encouraged members to counteract reformist 
students. “This call to action was backed up on the legislative side by a new law to 
strengthen the SBO, which was passed with an absolute majority on December 13, 
1998, by the fifth Majlis” (Golkar, 2010b, p. 23)58.  Though the SBO was a student 
run organisation similar to the Islamic Student Association that came to support 
reform, referred to in Chapter Five, its financial and ideological ties to are to the 
office of the Supreme Leader.  In an interview with a reformist student, S4, she 
explained how in her view, the Basij in universities had tried to transform their 
image, particularly as an entity connected with the IRGC, by holding cultural events.  
Cultural and artistic events were activities generally associated with reformist 
students and groups.  The Basij’s attempts to use forums similar to reformists, is an 
indicator of how they attempted to reframe their position from a paramilitary organ 
into a civil one.  The contrast in political outlook of the two student groups is a 
mirror of the broader battle between reformists and conservatives during Khatami’s 
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 The Fifth Majlis was dominated by the conservative faction. 
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presidency.  On the whole, the IRGC and Basij represent how similar organisations 
and actors can be labelled as civil society or the state based on their underlying 
power base.       
 
Para-statal Foundations (Bonyads) 
 
One of the key aspects of Khomeini’s appeal during the Revolution was his advocacy 
on behalf of the ‘downtrodden’ or ‘dispossessed’ and calls for egalitarian rule.  With 
rapid urbanisation taking place, overcrowding and poverty in city centres became an 
issue by the 1970s.  Though the concept of charity and community-led support for 
the poor was part of the population’s cultural fabric, the state also played a role both 
before and after the Revolution.  Mohammad Reza Shah originally established the 
Foundations, commonly referred to as Bonyads, as royal foundations characterized as 
charitable organisations.  In reality, they served as profit-making entities with 
commercial interests that benefited patrons loyal to the monarchy.  In the aftermath 
of the 1979 Revolution, the Foundations were nationalised and reformatted with the 
objective of redistributing income to the poor.  With the onset of the war, the 
Foundations were assigned the task of supporting the families of war veterans.  
However, it did not take long for the Foundations to transform back into the 
commercial conglomerates that existed prior to the Revolution.  “Under Rafsanjani, 
the bonyads controlled and disbursed billions of dollars and greatly enriched those 
associated with them, using their own wealth to gain patronage, invest in a wide 
array of business interests, and generally advance their power and influence” (Thaler, 
2010, p. 57).  Their vast commercial interests range in diverse fields that include 
agriculture, textiles and automobiles and are a major employer.  According to a 2009 
report, they controlled an estimated 10-20 per cent of Iran’s gross domestic product 
(Thaler, 2010, p. 58).   
The foundations consist of large religious endowments such as the 
Endowment of the Shrine of Imam Reza (with approximately $25 billion in 
net assets), or several umbrella corporations, such as the Foundation of the 
Downtrodden ($15bn in assets) or the Martyr’s Foundation ($20bn in assets), 
that manage vast and diverse financial holdings, and own real estate, 
construction, manufacturing, retail and infrastructure development companies 
in both the public and private sectors.  The foundations exercise extensive 
monopoly powers in the economy, employ large numbers, and serve as 
source of revenue for the ruling regime and many of its leaders.  
 (Gheissari & Nasr, 2005, p. 181) 
218 
 
In addition to the growing role of the IRGC, the foundations are a significant source 
of the conservative base’s economic power. 
 
Despite a generally centralised structure under the control of the Supreme Leader, the 
Foundations also have local and thematic branches.  They are tax-exempt entities that 
receive large contributions from the public, particularly religious donations and are 
also subsidized by the government.  In return, they provide welfare services to the 
community.  In addition to providing for families of war veterans, they also provide 
services for economically disadvantaged families and the disabled.  The workings of 
each individual Foundation are independent and in many cases there is no 
government oversight.   
Oftentimes, they operate parallel to the formal institutions of the government, 
but very infrequently do they coordinate their activities with the executive.  
For example, although there is a Housing Ministry, the Housing Foundation 
(Bonyad-e Maskan) remains both active and influential in providing housing 
to needy families. The Literacy Movement (Nehzat-e Savad-amoozi) operates 
side-by-side with the Ministry of Education. The Supreme Council of 
Cultural Revolution (Shoura-ye Aali-ye Enqelab-e Farhangi), which sets 
overall cultural policy on behalf of the Leader, competes with the Ministry of 
Culture and Islamic Guidance.  
(Kamrava & Hassan-Yari, 2004, p. 509) 
The welfare services provided by the Foundations are an indirect component of the 
state’s welfare system since the state has a separate entity that deals with social 
security and welfare.  Therefore, the work of braches of the foundations is somewhat 
autonomous and, similar to the basij, can be considered quasi-civil society 
organisations.  In fact, the Foundations are even more multifaceted as their activities 
blur the boundaries between the roles of the state, market and civil society.         
 
The resulting ‘conservative’ civil society  
 
The conservative political faction in Iranian politics is not homogenous, with 
considerable discord emerging each day.  However, there are several distinct features 
that set this group apart from reformists.  While reformists did not explicitly or even 
implicitly attack the role of the Supreme Leader, conservatives have had a close 
relationship with Khamenei since he took the post after Khomeini’s death.  When it 
comes to civil society, conservatives have a close link with traditional civil society, 
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such as local religiously-based charities and the bazar.  In addition, due to their 
connection with the office of the Supreme Leader, conservatives have generally 
controlled quasi-state institutions, such as the basij and bonyads.  Although they are 
state sponsored, these organisations run social service provisions that are often the 
domain of civil society, as described below.   
 
The following statement by the head of the judiciary and member of a prominent 
conservative political family summarises the general ideological stance of the 
conservatives: 
In a nutshell, civil society and liberalism are twin brothers, and one of the 
main theses of liberalism, and therefore of the [sic] civil society, is the 
neutrality of the state.  This is not consistent with pure Islamic doctrines, 
unless one is so infatuated with liberalism, that one does not care about such 
an inconsistency, and that is another matter. 
 
Contrary to the views of a number of myopic intellectuals, liberalism is not 
only incompatible with the fundamentals of religious belief in general, and 
with Islamic thought in particular, but also poses grave philosophical 
problems for the individual.  A necessary consequence of the liberal doctrine 
is that every immoral law, provided that it is endorsed by all and sundry, is 
then enactable and it is the duty of the state to pave the way for its 
implementation.  This is because the state has no criterion for distinguishing 
wrong and right.  Its only obligation is to safeguard the liberties.  If people 
decided that abortion or homosexual life style should be allowed, then the 
state must follow suit and modify its laws to accommodate these demands. … 
 
Such ideas are not only untenable from an Islamic point of view, because 
among other things, Islam does not endorse moral pluralism, but are also 
faced with irresolvable philosophical difficulties. 
S. Larijani59 (quoted in Paya, 2011, pp. 298-299)  
The main ideas encapsulated by the above statement are that of the incompatibility of 
what he considers a religious or ‘moral’ society with ideological pluralism.  Based on 
this belief, the notion of an unfettered democratic system is unacceptable.  It is for 
this reason that even the ‘civil society’, organisations and spheres of interaction 
outside the state and market, instituted by the conservative state, is strictly controlled.  
Here, ‘civil society’ is used so far as it denotes an organisational concept, namely an 
organisation that falls outside the state structure and the marketplace, and not an 
ideological one.  In general, for conservatives, the state (presumably one overseen by 
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 Sadeq Larijani is a lecturer in Qom seminary, former member of the Council of Guardians and 
current head of the judiciary.  This quote was written in a paper entitled ‘Religion and Civil Society’. 
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the Supreme Leader) is sufficiently capable of guiding citizens.  However, despite 
this seemingly stringent idea of what is right and wrong, there are in fact clear 
differences amongst conservatives.  Particularly amongst pragmatic and principlist 
conservatives, there are signs of weakened support for, and submission to, the 
Supreme Leader.  This has to do with political as well as religious disagreements.  
What connects them is the fact that religious ideals (which are not necessarily 
defined) should guide society rather than a democratic process stemming from 
negotiations amongst members of civil society.   There are also members of this 
faction who not only accede to, but even demand the precursors to pluralism, namely 
discourse and the questioning of norms.  This last notion is part of a growing 
contradiction in the ideological base of pragmatic and principlist conservatives that 
grants final authority to the will of God as opposed to the individual.  The following 
section is based on interviews with two key conservative thinkers who appeal for a 
greater space for dialogue.  They find that the closed, top down decision-making at 
all levels of society has impeded the country’s development.           
 
6.4  ‘Reformist’ Conservatives? Interviews with two intellectuals 
 
Due to the political situation of the country and my position as a researcher from a 
Western institution, arranging interviews with intellectuals and political figures 
affiliated with conservative factions was more challenging than those with 
reformists.  In fact, such interviews were largely discouraged by contacts that I 
consulted on this topic.  Moreover, conservative members of the state or individuals 
affiliated with it, often attempt to present a different public image, particularly to the 
West, as exemplified in the softened tone of interviews provided by individuals like 
President Ahmadinejad.  The focus is on individuals who fit the definition of a public 
intellectual, as a critical thinker who contributes to public debate.  On the whole, the 
interviewees can be identified as ‘secondary’ intellectuals who interpreted 
conservative political stances based on their own individual views.  It leaves out 
individuals in the conservative faction who seek to return to their understanding of 
Khomeini’s goals for the Islamic Republic at its inception without concessions to the 
changes resulting over time.  They are faithful to the office of the Supreme Leader in 
their political stance and therefore ideologically favour a state and society that 
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adheres to their particular interpretation of Islam, even if it must be enforced from 
above.   
 
I was able to secure a limited number of interviews with conservatives, and the 
following section stems from those discussions.  As critical thinkers, the individuals 
who were interviewed fall into a distinct category of moderate conservatives, 
irrespective of affiliation to the political factions outlined above, as they are willing 
to question the theoretical underpinning of the state, albeit judiciously, and take the 
impact of modernisation into account.   Nonetheless, they can be most closely 
identified with the traditionalist or principlist conservative factions.  C1 is a leading 
conservative intellectual who serves as a strategist for a faction of the conservative 
camp.  He is a university lecturer and political editor of a conservative daily 
newspaper.  He has been credited by others, and confirmed by him during the 
interview, for being the first person to challenge Khatami in a scholarly manner.  
Within conservative politics, he stands in opposition to Ahmadinejad.  During his 
interview, an individual whose affiliation was not provided sat in the room from 
beginning to end. His mannerisms and lines of questioning addressed to me after the 
interview indicated his affiliation with an intelligence unit of the state, often directly 
affiliated with the office of the Supreme Leader.  C2 is a prominent academic and 
public intellectual affiliated with conservative thought.  He holds advanced degrees, 
including a PhD in Philosophy from an Iranian university.  In addition to university 
posts, he is the president of a government institution, which is officially headed by 
the Iranian president, dedicated to research and development in the field of science.  
A philosopher by training, he has held this post since the late 1990s.  In political and 
intellectual circles, he is known as a staunch supporter of the Iranian political system 
and the Supreme Leader.  One of the most noteworthy discoveries from this 
interview is the commonality between these moderate conservative intellectuals and 
reformist intellectuals.  In addition, their critiques of the reform movement are not 
overtly rooted in its conceptual basis but focus instead on the method of delivery and 
the reformist understanding of Iranian society.     
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Shedding the hard-line image 
 
An unexpected element of the interview with C2 was his open criticism of both 
political and social development in modern Iran.  His words were in stark contrast to 
the dogmatic views one might expect of someone so closely affiliated with 
conservative politics.  On the one hand, this can partly be attributed to the difference 
between what is said, particularly as it may be part of a larger propaganda agenda, 
and what is actually supported through action.  On the other hand, the very fact that 
these statements were made, particularly ones criticising how the state operates, 
indicate at least some willingness to engage in dialogue and pluralism.  The 
interviewee has published his views on the topic of science and Islam himself.  
However, these are not included in analysis as it is not the nature of his academic and 
philosophical theories per se that are of relevance to the thesis.  Rather, it is about 
how an intellectual and political figure from the conservative spectrum speaks about 
the contemporary discourse around civil society that took shape during the reformist 
period and his engagement with these ideas at the practical level.  
 
Based on the content of the interview, it would not be immediately obvious that C2 
belongs to the conservative camp.  Early on in the interview, he clarified that he was 
not speaking with me as a journalist but as an academic, a statement that can be 
construed to indicate the interview was not being used as a public forum for political 
statements.  In addition to this declaration, the content of the interview is the 
strongest evidence that he was not interested in defending or promoting the 
conservative agenda.  In a similar manner, C1 was openly critical of particular 
features of how the Islamic Republic has developed, particularly with regard to the 
education system.  Each section depicts key findings from the interviews that 
contribute to analysis earlier in the chapter.   
      
Questioning the basis of reformist civil society language  
 
One of C1’s key criticisms was against the theoretical basis of the reform movement.  
C1 stated, “Every social movement needs a theoretical basis.  The 2nd of Khordad 
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movement60 had the Kiyan journal where they discussed civil society.  What they 
discussed was the rights of citizens and that the government is not holy 
(moghaddas)…But where are the roots of the civil society you [reformists] talk 
about?  Is it Hobbes and fear or Locke and benefit?”  He further commented that he 
realised Khatami himself did not have a specific understanding of the concept.  The 
crux of C1’s argument was to emphasize the reformists’ ambiguity on the complex 
issues they presented and question their roots at a theoretical level.  Drawing on this 
line of argument, it can be asserted that conservative opposition to the reform 
movement was not a shallow condemnation based on any concepts with Western or 
liberal connotations, but rather a questioning of the theoretical underpinning of a 
vague reformist agenda.  Based on this evidence and other issues revealed in the 
interview, it can be reasoned that at least this conservative figure saw reformists as a 
group that challenged the conservative base but without a clear conceptual agenda.  
C1 mentioned that at one point Khatami discusses madinat-al nabi (City of the 
Prophet) but C1 believes it was only said for political reasons.  This last statement 
shows how Khatami’s linking of civil society with religion not only failed to attract 
his own followers but was similarly disregarded as a political ploy by conservative 
figures.   
 
C2 made a similar argument with regard to the reform movement’s weak conceptual 
foundations.  He stated, “Khatami mentioned civil society but this had not reached 
the ears of journalists.  Even now if you ask them what it is they will say isn’t every 
society civil?”  Here, C2 raises the issue of Khatami’s language being out of sync 
with that of the people and the ambiguous connotations of civil society.  This schism 
between reformist language and the understanding by agents of civil society was also 
addressed in Chapter Five.  Its acknowledgment by a conservative figure is an 
indication of a material weakness in the reformist civil society frame and the 
conservative ability to use this as a political opportunity to attack their opponents.   
 
C2 explained in the interview that there are no civil institutions (nahad-haye madani) 
in Iranian society and if they exist, it is a formality (tashrifati).  By formality he 
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 The 2nd of Khordad refers to the date of Khatami’s first election as President in the Iranian calendar, 
23 May 1997.  From that point forward, the reformist faction was commonly referred to as the 2nd of 
Khordad movement.    
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refers to an organisation that may carry the name or superficial structure of a civil 
society organisation, but not the substance (the substance or underlying values of 
such an organisation was as yet unclear).  The claim sheds light on a contradiction 
with his statement that the institution that he leads can be considered a civil society 
organisation.  Again, the issue is raised of the many ways civil society can be defined 
and its uncertain place in Iranian society. He claims that civil society became a 
political issue and moved away from social and economic concerns.  His statements 
indicated a development-oriented interpretation of civil society and appeared to 
disregard or even challenge the ideological implications of civil society.  In other 
words, in this instance it appears that the meaning of civil society for him (before 
being politicised) is the seemingly benign one emphasising basic social and 
economic development (for example, poverty reduction and access to education and 
health care).  C2’s observation in one sense does not identify whether civil society as 
a space for dialogue and critical debate can or should have a place in Iranian society.  
For him, civil society appears to refer to uncontentious academic organisations rather 
than a sphere for controversial debate.  This point shows an inner conflict within 
conservative thought as one of the country’s needs is to train its citizens as critical 
beings, as discussed below.  He stated that reformists used Western models of civil 
society because it was the easiest way, “They did not have time to localise civil 
society as its translation was easier and most of their support came from the West; 
the language of intellectuals was different from that of the people”. 
 
Blurring the boundaries between civil society and the state 
 
However, in spite of the interviewees’ criticisms of reformists and their use of the 
civil society concept, they also acknowledged the potential of a more ‘localised’ civil 
society.  In other words, they, in particular C2, acknowledged the necessity of civil 
society organisations as well as space for critical dialogue.  The issue of civil society 
organisations will be addressed in this section, with the argument that even more 
than reformists, the interviewed conservative figures attempted to mould existing 
state-dominated institutions into a civil society frame, with clear contradictions 
resulting.  Much of the interview with C2 was focused on cultural and structural 
problems that prevent academic and development projects from succeeding rather 
than arguing for or against the theoretical underpinning of civil society.  He 
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understood civil society organisations in Iran to lack any organic foundation in 
Iranian society while at the same time considering a broad spectrum of organisations 
in the country as belonging to the civil society category.  In fact, he considered the 
institution that he led, and where the interview took place, to be part of civil society, 
even though it was in reality a government entity.  This perception of civil society is 
interesting given that the official head of the institution is the country’s president.     
 
One of the first insights into C2’s viewpoint on politics was his remark that the most 
powerful scene in the book Le Petit Prince is one where the Little Prince meets the 
King61.  Here, we can interpret C2’s reflection on the extent to which a ruler can 
impose his own will on those around him.  Translated into the Iranian context, he is 
in fact implying that a conservative domination can only be effective to a certain 
extent; beyond that, it is an illusion of authority without a real basis.  Analogies were 
spread throughout C2’s interview.  In one instance, he stated the civil society 
organisations have good members but are without roots, “…similar to a beautiful 
flower that is held in a vase rather than planted in the ground”.  On the one hand, the 
state can control society just so far.  On the other, the power of non-state actors and 
institutions are imports that have not become imbedded into the local social order.  
He noted that it is in security regimes62 where these organisations do not exist.  
However, he also stated, “if we don’t want civil society then we don’t want 
development”.  His comments are further validated by his statement that in Iran there 
has been a failure to solve problems with home-grown solutions.  Within the 
education system, he states that structures and methods were imported without 
insight into how the concept would be localised.  He offers examples such as 
educational plans that were taken from abroad and translated and the start of 
academic research. He refers to the Sorbonne, Cambridge and Oxford, which began 
as schools of religion but gradually transformed into independent universities.  
Comparing this to Iran, “We created a university next to a ‘hawze’ (seminary); they 
each took their own separate place.  But we have to consider the relationship between 
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 This particular chapter in The Little Prince refers to a scene where the Little Prince meets a King 
who claims to have authority over everyone and everything around him; the reality is that he sets his 
parameters of expectation to what he knows will take place regardless of his wish (for example, he 
claims that he is able to command the sun to set at a certain time but does so based on his knowledge 
of natural cycles of the earth).   
62
 C1 does not provide a definition of security regimes.   However, based on the context, the following 
understanding of security regime can be inferred: states focused on preventing outside interference 
while controlling all domestic activity.     
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the two”.  The idea is that Iran has been dependent on foreign exports rather than 
allowing its own indigenous social structures to emerge.   
 
De-politicising the civil society concept 
 
Following from the discussion above of conservatives blurring the boundaries 
between the state and civil society, is the notion of de-politicising civil society to fit 
their perception of the state under the Islamic Republic.  According to C1, Shias have 
historically organised independent civil society organisations, as they considered the 
state to be the oppressor.  “After the Islamic revolution, the state is no longer the 
oppressor, but does this mean an end of civil organisations?  Post-revolution Iran 
shows that this does not occur.  The Islamic republic tried to keep traditional Shi’a 
organisations under its wing though most of the funding comes from the people 
(tudeh mardom)”.  For C1, civil society has traditionally existed in Iran as a necessity 
to offset a repressive state.  The Islamic Republic, it can be assumed from his 
commentary, rectified this situation by liberating the country and absorbed this vague 
notion of civil society that had protected citizens against the state.  However, he 
believes the Islamic Republic is faced with a paradox since from an economic 
perspective, the government must become smaller, while in the social sphere the 
government wants to maintain absolute control.  He places greater emphasis on the 
economic structure than the public sphere of civil society.  It was evident from the 
interview that C1 opposes both the Western import of civil society by reformists as 
well as the populist system of governance implemented by Ahmadinejad.  Most 
important, he placed civil society as a component of traditional Shi’a life only 
necessary to serve as a space for organised opposition when facing an oppressive 
state, resonating with the Western liberal conception of civil society as an overseer of 
the state.  However, he sees civil society as a source of opposition, as advocated by 
reformists, having little relevance to contemporary Iranian society, which he believes 
to have defeated and replaced the ‘oppressive’ state.  This vision of civil society is a 
relativist one that manipulates the role of civil society contingent upon how society 
‘should’ look.  Here, we have another example of the way in which the concept of 
civil society can be adapted to fit a particular vision of the good life.  However, 
despite the criticisms of reformists and manipulation of civil society to fit the system 
of the Islamic Republic, the interviewee made a surprising appeal for more critical 
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thought in Iranian society.  He exemplifies the inherent contradiction in the 
conservative intellectual: simultaneously appealing for critical thought while 
politically supporting a government that demands its citizens conform to particular 
political, social and religious interpretations that leave little room for pluralism.   
 
A call for critical analysis: An unexpected perspective 
 
During the interviews, there was an unexpected call for an increase in critical thought 
amongst members of Iranian society.  In this regard, both interviewees emphasised 
the need for advancing the education system as a way to promote critical analysis, as 
opposed to rote learning mechanisms.  According to C1, “We haven’t had logical, 
philosophical questions and the answers do not fit the question…the education 
system does not fit our society because it is not our own system.  It doesn’t allow 
creativity; individuality is what gets the high grades (fardgarahi nomreh miyare).  In 
this system you have to accept what you’re told… You don’t have permission to 
question your teacher here.  We should have continued with the old system of 
education”.  The result of what has just been mentioned, he states, was 
Ahmadinejad’s election.  He continues, “The youth who had not been involved in the 
activities of reformists were no longer teenagers and were ready for life and 
marriage; their need became economic.  The NGOs dealing with the economy had 
not matured and the dominant discourse was no longer about freedom but equality 
and economics”.  He goes on to criticise the Ahmadinejad administration in turn, 
saying that “The government is paying people rather than the people working and 
paying the government, a move that would have made the government responsive to 
them [referring to the monetary hand-outs Ahmadinejad has been popular for since 
before his election].  Ahmadinejad’s method though is a shot rather than a cure.  
Ahmadinejad led to an expansion of government instead of the economy as the 
money he gave to people did not circulate financial system but was directly 
injected”.     
 
Moreover, C1 claims that reformists failed, where individuals such as Khomeini did 
not, in reaching out to society.  He described Khomeini as a high-ranking cleric, a 
source of religious emulation, who not only had a strong understanding of 
philosophy but could also speak with the people.  The problem was the “laziness” of 
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reformist intellectuals and the simplicity of translation.  “What Iran needs is 
philosophers; we have ‘falsafekhan’ (people who study philosophy) but no 
philosophers and this has been a result of the power of religion”.  The last statement 
implies a shortcoming of religion, or at least its influence, in society, which is a 
curious statement coming from a conservative figure.  First, this serves as a common 
point with reformist intellectuals, who based much of their thought on reformulating 
or questioning religious doctrine.  Second, the interviewee serves as an example of 
an intellectual commenting on how critical thought has failed to take a stronghold in 
the country, charging such criticism against reformists themselves and ascribing the 
problem to power and religion.       
 
It should be noted that during the interview with C1, as can be expected, his tone was 
tempered.  However, his statements do not stand in sharp contrast to his overall 
views expressed through his public sources of literature.  The general views that 
emerge from his interview can be taken as representative of his moderate 
conservative stance on the topic of civil society and the country’s social 
development.  Most importantly, he emphasises a need for educational reform.  
While he does not provide detail, the issue of allowing freedom of thought, through 
questioning of material, and promotion of creativity are highlighted.  This is striking 
as conservatives are often considered to discourage freedom of expression.  
However, taking into account his emphasis of the role religion plays in the life of the 
ordinary Iranian citizen, it appears that the expectation is that people’s wants will not 
step far from the traditional views of conservatives.  Moreover, his advocacy for a 
return to a home-grown system of education is vague and the idea of going ‘back’ to 
the system of education in place before the import of Western education systems 
does not give hope for a modern and progressive system of education. 
 
C2 states that we have to think of what we need and what we can do and then look at 
how we can cooperate with the outside.  According to him “We [in Iran] always just 
look at others and emulate.  We shouldn’t just repeat what the teacher says.  We take 
our education system from other countries because we have no other choice.  We 
don’t look at what a university can do.  We created universities so we could have 
white collars and ties”.  He further elucidates “There is a need to look at the question 
of “why”! We don’t THINK (emphasis in speech)!”  He recalls a scene from 101 
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Dalmatians and states that sometimes a sentence by one person can have more 
meaning than what a person can say in a book.  In the story, “one of the thieves says: 
‘I think’ but the other says ‘I had warned you about thinking!’”.  C2 states that “they 
have warned us about thinking”, though he does not elaborate to whom ‘they’ refers.  
He states that when science (elm) and thought is not present, everything disappears.  
“We need to try and listen to others.  Today politics has taken over everything and is 
interpreting philosophy, arts, religion and is turning society ‘uni-dimensional’”.  It is 
also interesting to note C2’s penchant for using Western literary and cultural 
references, two of which are mentioned here (i.e. Le Petit Prince and 101 
Dalmations).  In essence, he is showing a ‘modern’ image of the conservative, one 
who has not relegated himself only to traditional folklore and religious studies.   
 
During the interview, C2 focused on the lack of planning for projects in Iran.  He 
described a plan as having two parts: the first is making the decision of what money 
to give and then how to spend that money.  In Iran, he claims, there is no planning.  
For example, the members of his research institution are the best scientists in the 
world but their work has not reached such high levels.  He believes he can do more 
but is unable to do so.  He states that some regimes use people to their best potential 
but some regimes do not.  It can be presumed that he is speaking about his own 
situation.  One example he provides is with a technical malfunction in a popular car 
model assembled in Iran.  Even though the biggest group in his institution is 
engineering, no one asked for their support.  This assertion reflects on the lack of 
cooperation between different sectors of society, whether academic, government or 
private, which is also one of the obstacles civil society institutions face.   
 
According to C2, “We are disabling the abled (darim tavanmandha ra na-tavan 
mikonim)”.  He states, engineers are the best when you ask them about schoolwork, 
but then they cannot work beyond that.  Iran has engineers who go to become leaders 
and heads of organizations but have no training for this. Electrical engineers start 
talking about history rather than a historian, instead of working in their own industry.  
In a sarcastic tone, C2 states that the most important role today is ‘engineer’.  “The 
head of Culture and Art of Qom is an engineer! You might as well close down other 
departments!  This is the problem of an underdeveloped society”.  Ultimately, the 
two individuals criticise the import of foreign concepts, including civil society, but 
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simultaneously call for an increase in independent critical thought and localised, 
independent institutions.  They are, in a sense, calling for the same objectives 
reformists had demanded through the language of civil society.      
 
6.5  Conclusion 
 
On the whole, in order to counteract the rise of the reformist power base, 
conservative leaders used the same social tools as pro-reform factions to mobilise a 
sympathetic base to show their support.  However, the underlying values for the civil 
society they aimed to mobilise are far from those of reformists.  A look at the more 
pragmatic or moderate conservative voices, as done through interviews with 
conservative intellectuals for this thesis, reveals a call for change, comparable to 
reformist demands.  Even conservatives, particularly pragmatists, seek to find ways 
in which the country can develop and compete globally.  However, the interviews 
also revealed an inconsistency between the desires to inspire a populace capable of 
critical thought with the reality of maintaining the current inflexible political 
structure.  Given the current struggles within the conservative faction, the time may 
come when pragmatists find the opportunity to gain influence.  However, the strong 
economic and political authority entrenched in institutions such as the Foundations 
and, in particular, the IRGC, make it difficult for balanced, multi-polar power 
struggles to take place.  A stalemate amongst conservatives is the most likely 
condition for the time being.       
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7.1  Iran and the Wider Global Context 
 
The Iranian reform movement can provide a valuable theoretical and practical case 
study relevant to the events unfolding in the wider Middle East and North Africa.  
While each instance has its own particular circumstances and nuances, parallels can 
be drawn.  In particular, the language and concept of civil society is a common 
denominator, whereby analysts and strategists from domestic and international 
government and nongovernmental organisations place a heavy burden on the power 
of civil society.  In these cases, the power of civil society is considered a vital 
component in the fight against oppressive regimes.  There is an assumption that civil 
society, in contrast to the state, is a just representative of the ‘people’s voice’.  
However, this assumption does not take into account the existence of power politics 
in all spheres of human interaction.  Moreover, civil society is not a homogenous 
entity with a singular goal.  Rather, it is an amalgamation of different ideas, people 
and organisations with different viewpoints and agendas.   
 
The research concludes that while civil society promotion can contribute to social 
and political change in non-liberal contexts, it is not a clear-cut case of increasing the 
number of civil society organisations and expanding capacity building programmes.  
The case of Iran shows that the language of civil society was able to inspire a 
movement that questioned the conservative control of the Islamic regime.  Moreover, 
the research findings emphasise the significance of agency in social movements, as 
found in the role of public intellectuals in Iran and their power to extend the language 
and concept of civil society into public discourse.  The next section of this 
conclusion will summarise the research findings as empirical and theoretical 
contributions, overall and by chapter; the third and fourth sections discuss the 
theoretical and practical implications of the research, respectively.  The final section 
offers areas for further research. 
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7.2  Empirical and Theoretical Contributions 
 
Reform may be weak, but it will not be destroyed.  Political literature in Iran 
has always belonged to reformists.  People mistake elections with social 
movements.  If this error is resolved, it is not accurate to say that reform is 
dead.  (INT6) 
 
This statement was made by a reformist intellectual during an interview in reference 
to the electoral loss of reformists in the 2005 presidential elections and was largely 
vindicated by the seminal events surrounding the summer 2009 elections.  When I 
first began research for this thesis in the autumn of 2006, popular opinion considered 
reform a failed endeavour by former revolutionaries.  Reformists’ abstract 
discussions about civil society, rule of law and freedom of expression were deemed 
bankrupt in the face of a conservative powerbase entrenched in the state (i.e. the 
Supreme Leader and his office’s subsidiary entities), reformists’ inability to address 
popular needs of the citizens (for example, income inequality and autonomy from 
state control) and the incompetence of the reform movement to organise as a unified 
socio-political force.  However, the issue I was concerned with was that the results of 
the reform movement were more complex and far-reaching.  In large part, this issue 
played out in the 2009 elections where reformists mobilised large sections of the 
population with an organised and powerful platform, reminiscent of Khatami’s 
elections.  Once the contested election results declared Ahmadinejad the victor over 
two strong reformist challengers, Mir-Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karrubi, masses 
of people supporting the latter two candidates took to the streets in peaceful protest.  
Led by Moussavi and Karrubi, young and old supporters voiced their objections to 
conservative domination of the state and the way the election process was carried 
out.  As these events post-dated fieldwork and the main research period, they are 
addressed in a separate epilogue following this chapter. 
 
Research for this thesis began by asking: Does civil society promotion (i.e. discourse 
and action endorsing the language and concept of civil society as a public good) by 
public intellectuals (i.e. elite voices) contribute to social and political change in non-
liberal states?  In other words, does it make sense from a practical point of view, and 
from the viewpoint of external agencies or governments, to prioritise civil society 
capacity building and development programmes as a way to create changes in states 
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where liberal democratic values are not the norm?  Specifically, the question asked 
was: In the context of Iran, why and how was the language and concept of civil 
society used to enhance positions of power during the period of reform, circa 1997-
2005, by political and social actors?  Public intellectuals take centre stage in this 
thesis as they were significant actors of the reform movement, while so far little is 
known about their explicit role in the characterisation and implementation of civil 
society.  What this thesis concludes is that even when civil society is used for narrow 
political purposes, the discourse and practices it engenders leave a legacy that 
endures beyond immediate power struggles.  The objective has been to gain a better 
understanding of how civil society language and structures can be used to achieve a 
particular vision of society.   
 
Three months of in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out in Tehran with 
high level reformist intellectuals, civil society activists and other individuals deemed 
relevant to the thesis.  In the autumn of 2008, when I carried out fieldwork, the 
reform movement was largely deemed to have run its course.  Individuals, who had 
once held high level government posts, been proactive writers and public speakers 
and looked upon as sources of inspiration for dramatic reform of the Iranian state and 
society, were now sitting on the side-lines.  Those who had not fled the country or 
been barred from writing or engaging in politics held academic or research posts in 
universities and research centres where they were still strictly monitored.  The 
political parties and organisations that were still operating saw little activity in their 
offices.  When prompted about the upcoming presidential elections in a year’s time, 
those who had once been the minds behind the reform movement expressed major 
doubts as to whether reformists would or could play a significant role.  When I asked 
specifically whether they saw a case for the return of Mohammad Khatami, the 
former president who represented the movement for eight years, more than once I 
heard the expression ‘boz del’, meaning ‘coward’ or ‘weak-hearted’, used.  Those 
who used this term felt Khatami had not maintained his ground in promoting the 
reformist vision, a concept that was itself not well defined.   
 
However, it is too crude and unrealistic to blame one person for the failure of the 
reform movement to maintain political power.  Looking back at the viewpoints of the 
actors who played key roles during the eight years that comprised the height of 
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reform, it becomes apparent that the ideas that formed the reformist vision itself were 
ambiguous and under constant transition.  A look at how the concept of civil society 
entered the political arena and was enacted provides an example of this.   The data 
captured during this research was then analysed based on its bearing to the research 
questions.  As raised in the introduction, politically loaded terms such as civil society 
do not only motivate but also have the potential to hinder the realisation of objectives 
aimed at liberalisation and democratic transition.  If civil society is defined as 
associations and organisations outside the direct control of the state or market, then it 
has traditionally existed in non-Western contexts such as Iran.  To use this definition, 
one would have to include traditional and conservative factions of society as well.  
However, this does not imply that all of these organizations meet the historical 
characterisation of civil society emerging in the West that associates it with ideas 
such as individualism, autonomy and liberal democracy.  Civil society has broader 
implications, as it is more useful to think of as a space for challenging dominant 
ideas and practices, similar to Gramsci’s notion of civil society as a space for 
hegemony and counter-hegemony to challenge one another.  However, it is still 
unclear how to transform this notion of civil society into practice.  The politics of 
civil society are much more complex than implied by organisational interpretations.  
In fact, non-liberal actors have come to use the tools of civil society (for example, 
organizational capacity building) while at the same time dismissing the liberal ideas 
of democracy and human rights associated with civil society language.  This is in 
direct contrast to international and local actors and agencies that attempt to use civil 
society development as a means for fostering transition from authoritarian rule to 
liberal democracy.   
 
During the 1990s, Iranian reformists targeted a particular segment of the population, 
namely the secular middle class and proponents of a pluralistic Islam, a segment of 
the population that had felt alienated by the ruling elite once power was consolidated 
in the hands of a conservative force after the 1979 Revolution.  The height of 
reformist political control was during the Presidency of Mohammad Khatami from 
1997-2005.  Reformists used the concept of civil society, the language of which did 
not have a history in the country’s discourse.  However, the discourse and activity 
that took place during this time were not sufficient to change the country’s power 
structure, which continues to be dominated by the Supreme Leader and his 
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conservative allies.  Moreover, conservative factions of the state continue to have 
well-established links with a majority of the population as they have absorbed sectors 
that are generally the domain of civil society in non-theocratic systems of 
governance.  Individuals from these sectors of society joined organisations such as 
the Basij, or became their patrons, such as those who were beneficiaries of payments 
made by Foundations.  As a result, these semi-governmental organisations formed 
arms of the state which were able to counter actions by the emerging reformist civil 
society actors, in effect forming an alternative, illiberal civil society. 
 
Chapter Two explored the theoretical concepts addressed in this thesis.  The case was 
made that a majority of civil society literature focuses on an organisational 
perspective of civil society and fails to capture its other significant aspects, in 
particular those associated with social movements.  Tarrow’s theory of contentious 
politics and collective actions is introduced in this chapter, highlighting the 
significance of political opportunities.  Chapter Three set the empirical stage of the 
thesis, explaining key elements of Iran’s 20th century history as they relate to the role 
of public intellectuals and highlighted gaps in literature on the development of civil 
society during the period of reform.  The main gap recognised is with regard to 
literature that takes a comprehensive approach to civil society, going beyond an 
organisational definition, and looks at how the concept and practices were adopted 
and adapted by different groups of individuals, highlighting the role of agency, 
during the period of reform.     
 
Chapter Four, one of three substantive chapters, explored the reasoning behind 
reformist public intellectuals’ use of civil society language as part of a broader 
reformist political vision.  Facets of social movement theories, in particular the 
concept of framing, were used to better understand how reformist public intellectuals 
incorporated ‘civil society’ as part of the reform movement.  Agency and the role of 
positioned individuals in affecting change takes centre stage in this chapter.  The 
main finding was that figures of the reform movement, specifically the intellectuals 
who developed the movement’s platform, chose the concept of civil society as a way 
to disable the monopolisation of power by a select group within the Islamic regime.  
Ultimately, it was the opening up of the public sphere that took place with Khatami’s 
election that emboldened the reform movement and made the call for civil society to 
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gather momentum.  From the perspective of intellectuals, civil society and political 
society became intertwined, an issue that permeated groups such as students.  
However, the ideas they associated with civil society were too abstract to 
operationalize effectively and communicate with a wider section of the population.  
Moreover, alongside the political opportunities afforded reformists there coincided a 
set of political constraints entrenched in the conservative basis of the Islamic regime.  
These constraints were also instrumental in thwarting reformist efforts for political 
dominance.  A point of significance is that the idea of ‘Islam’ was of little 
consequence in interviews with public intellectuals.  In fact, what was regularly cited 
is that the idea of civil society these intellectuals were discussing had little relevance 
to Islam or the “city of the prophet”, as used in Khatami’s rhetoric.         
 
Chapter Five studied another set of actors entitled ‘practitioners’ of civil society, who 
were in effect the consumers of the civil society language touted by reformist 
intellectuals63.  To facilitate data collection and analysis within the confines of this 
research, focus was placed on student activists and women’s rights actors in addition 
to several leading figures in the NGO community and beyond.  Individuals from 
these groups represented those who were most associated with the reform movement.  
The impact of reformist intellectuals’ ideas on Khatami’s presidency was the creation 
of political opportunities, which civil society actors discussed in this research, used 
to their advantage.  The idea of civil society mobilised individuals and groups en 
masse.  The experiences gained by civil society actors during the period of reform 
generated an assertive group of individuals more willing to engage with and defy 
limitations imposed by the state.  However, civil society, as presented by reformists, 
remained an elusive concept.  Moreover, when it came to practice, in addition to 
political opportunities afforded by the Khatami administration, the conservative 
factions of the state created almost as many structural constraints.  Civil society 
actors had to navigate in this fluctuating intersection of political opportunities and 
constraints.   
 
                                                 
63
 Of course, reformist intellectuals can also be considered civil society actors.  However, what 
separates them from the actors discussed in Chapter Five is that these agents are engaged in activities 
that support a particular collective (for example, women or students) rather than seeking general 
political change or power.   
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Finally, Chapter Six examined the conservative take on civil society, to show the 
way in which a concept with liberal, or at the very least seemingly benign, 
connotations can be appropriated and used by forces couched in different values.  
Two main issues emerged in this chapter: first, conservatives have appropriated the 
organisational components of civil society and embedded them within the state 
through direct control and funding.  An interesting observation here is that when 
reformists supported civil society, they too provided funding for organisations, an act 
that could have, in effect, reduced the new organisations into semi-state agencies 
akin to those under conservative control.  The second case made in Chapter Six is 
that conservatives are far from homogenous as a group.  Though pragmatic 
conservatives may disapprove of reformist actions or their use of the term civil 
society, they are more amenable to other changes related to liberal thought, for 
example supporting critical analysis by intellectuals and restructuring the education 
system.  
 
7.3  Implications for Theory  
 
The value of civil society is in providing a framework for analysing and building 
broad-based social movements that emphasize pluralism and liberty at their core.  
The efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to strengthen civil society can still prove useful if 
they are preserved in the long term.  Furthermore, language and theory are a 
necessary part of any society. Though turning theory into practice is difficult, efforts 
to do so are a significant starting point.  The language of civil society introduced by 
Iranian reformist public intellectuals who had close ties to the 1979 Revolution and 
the state played a significant role in initiating a movement for change in Iran.  This 
movement has had a lasting impact as witnessed in the activity that surrounded the 
2009 elections. 
 
The thesis case-study sheds light on the importance of studying agency and the 
particular role of public intellectuals in socio-political development.  Current 
literature on this issue is inadequate in addressing the versatile and cross-boundary 
roles of actors.  More research is needed on the role of agency.  For example, David 
Lewis’s recent work analysing life histories of public and nongovernmental sector 
workers in Bangladesh shows how the boundary between governmental and 
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nongovernmental activity is ambiguous, constructed and maintained (2011, p. 2).  
The boundaries between positions in different sectors are ambiguous, with 
individuals holding multiple identities and crossing over roles.  Looking at 
individuals as agents of social change, rather than occupants of particular roles 
within a given structure, adds weight to the influence of individual actors.  In the 
case of Iran, we see how public intellectuals, who held different roles inside and 
outside of government, were influential in shaping the political and civil society 
sectors.  On the whole, there exists the need for an approach to civil society that 
focuses on public intellectuals and how their ideas frame the way civil society is 
located in politics and wider society.  This approach would allow for a better 
understanding of the political dynamics of civil society.                   
 
7.4  Implications for Practice 
 
In the past two decades, civil society as a social concept has lost some of its value as 
an analytic and policy making tool or even as an emancipatory idea.  The 
bureaucracy of funding and interaction between donor agencies and recipients has 
led to practices that favour certain structures and projects.  As a result, many organic 
movements have been lost in the fray.  There is a clear need to move beyond 
standard views of civil society and recognise the power of ideas by donors, civil 
society actors and political figures.  In the case of Iran, where international donor 
agencies were not a significant factor, reformist intellectuals used the concept for the 
sake of political reform.  Here we see the role of public intellectuals introducing a 
theoretical concept to the public domain.  Political stakeholders, whether domestic or 
international, should re-examine their perspective on civil society, particularly in 
newly established Arab regimes.  Simplified assumptions about the power of support 
for civil society bringing about pluralistic, secular societies need to be re-evaluated.     
 
With regard to Iran, advocates of civil society need to be much more vigilant in the 
types of activities they support and realise that general support for standard 
community NGOs does not necessarily lead to democratization or liberalization of 
societies.  This is particularly important as international actors are increasingly 
cognisant of the domestic situation in Iran and consider ways to circumvent state 
powers.  Civil society actors themselves need to be more aware of how their 
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activities and organisations can be framed and used as part of a political agenda, 
calling for greater self-reflection on their part.  This is similar to the inadequately 
contextualised “…use of blueprints for strengthening civil society…” referred to by 
Howell and Lind in the case of Afghanistan, whereby the international aid giving 
programmes have provided large sums of money to promote a liberal vision of civil 
society (2009b, pp. 727-728).  In turn, the use of this funding by local civil society 
actors and organisations has “…undermined the legitimacy of civil society…” by 
having them appear as agents of the state or donor body (Howell & Lind, 2009b, p. 
732).  Whether by international or domestic actors, the language and concept of civil 
society can be used to manoeuvre activity in social and political spaces.  Civil society 
actors need to realise that they are stakeholders in a political space, of which civil 
society is a part.  On the whole, more emphasis must be placed on the diverse and 
dynamic nature of the language and concept of civil society.  
 
7.5 Future Work 
 
As mentioned in Chapter One, one of the limitations of this research has been its 
focus on individuals living in the capital city of Tehran, leaving out voices of those 
based in other major cities and regions.  There is space for future work to examine 
the role of individuals (reformist political figures, public intellectuals, students, 
women’s rights activists, journalists, conservatives, etc.) living and working outside 
of Tehran.  A comparative view can be taken between the centre (Tehran) and 
periphery (other cities) as well as between regions, which are the bases for a variety 
of ethnicities, cultures and economies. 
        
Another area of future research is the topic of ‘elite bias’.  On the whole, this thesis 
focused on the role and beliefs of elites in Iranian society, namely public intellectuals 
and leading figures of civil society.  Individuals not included in this research are, for 
example, less well-known civil society actors (for example, NGO practitioners from 
smaller organisations) or intellectual figures and politicians who were not part of 
Khatami’s inner circle, both inside and outside of Tehran.  Looking to non-elite 
actors will contribute to a deeper understanding of the frame construction process.  
“In order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of various frame 
construction, frame alignment, and frame resonance processes discussed above, we 
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need to design more studies which include the interactions, understandings, talk and 
the like of non-elites as well as of elites” (Benford, 1997, p. 421).  The new data can 
then be compared with the analysis done for this thesis in order to better understand 
the interaction between the two.  In particular, further research can help determine if 
there are differences in the impact of reformists on leaders in the civil society sector 
versus those who do not have as far-reaching a voice.   
 
The role of new media, including the effect of modern information and 
communication technologies, is another area that can be explored.  The number of 
internet users rose exponentially during Khatami’s presidency, with figures estimated 
at: 2,000 in 1996, 22,000 in 1998, 130,000 in 2000 and 1.3 million in 2002 
(Ehteshami & Zweiri, 2007, p. 12).  The internet became the home of bloggers and 
websites of underground organisations, potentially providing a platform to balance 
the reach of non-elites versus the elite.  However, the Internet can also be, and indeed 
has been, used as a tool for conservative voices.  Moreover, the state has ultimate 
control over the physical infrastructure of the technology, although it is much easier 
to circumvent these controls than previously possible with traditional media.  A 
constant battle is in place between the state’s forces placing restrictions on the 
internet through bandwidth limitations and filters to block websites and users 
employing a variety of methods to overcome those restrictions, for example by 
employing proxy servers and VPNs (Virtual Private Networks).  Thus far, some 
work has been carried out on the content of Iran’s online spaces (for example 
Sreberny & Khiabany, 2010).  There is an opening for in-depth research on the use of 
new technologies by reformist intellectuals and the role of changing communication 
platforms in affecting public opinion.             
 
Another area that can be further developed is that of civil society’s role in Iran’s 
social and political development since the controversial 2009 elections.  The 
empirical evidence for this thesis was obtained before the disputed elections.  Since 
the elections, reformists have come under increasing pressure by conservative 
factions who accuse them of plotting a velvet revolution.  Future research can focus 
on how the language and practice of civil society has been employed by reformists 
since that time in order to determine if any dramatic changes or developments have 
occurred.    
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Finally, there is room for a comparative study between case of Iran and both Islamic 
and non-Islamic countries undergoing political transition, including regime change.  
Although some thought on this topic was given throughout research for this thesis, it 
is beyond its scope to conduct in-depth analysis.  While Iran is unique in certain 
respects, the findings from this research show that it offers a valuable perspective 
from which to examine the role of public intellectuals and civil society in other 
nations; a comparative study can confirm and expand on this angle.  With regard to 
the role of Islam, it was observed in this thesis that the particularities of religion were 
less significant than the role of agency and power.  This point was substantiated in 
Chapters Four and Six, where Islam was a tangential issue for both reformist and 
conservative public intellectuals.  Religion was brought in by political actors to make 
justifications for their ideas at certain times, but power politics, on the whole, 
remained dominant in discourse.  This point can be verified by a study of other 
countries where Islam is a central component of politics, for example, contemporary 
Iraq.  These studies can counter arguments of Islamic exceptionalism64, which 
maintain that Muslim societies, due to the inherent nature of Islam, need to be 
viewed based on different standards than their non-Muslim counterparts. 
 
Subsequently, a comparison with countries undergoing economic, social and political 
development in other parts of the world can provide additional evidence of how the 
language and concept of civil society can be appropriated by different sectors of 
society to enhance positions of power, regardless of religious or political basis.  As a 
closed system of government, referring to restrictions by the state and limited formal 
intervention by the outside (such as foreign aid), Iran’s case can be compared with 
the growth of civil society and the role of public intellectuals in countries such as 
Cuba or China.  This can then be contrasted with cases in which direct foreign aid for 
civil society has been a critical element, such as in Eastern Europe.  These studies 
will show how civil society is translated and transformed at the local level and the 
role played by different stakeholders.                  
  
                                                 
64
 Claims of Islamic exceptionalism can be linked back to thinkers such as Ernest Gellner, discussed 
earlier in this thesis.   
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Epilogue 
In autumn 2008, when I conducted fieldwork, the response to questions about the 
role of reformists in the next presidential elections, to be held in June 2009, were 
dominated by scepticism or resigned failure.  Khatami was widely seen as a spent 
force.  However, by late 2008, reformists gained a surprising momentum.  There was 
in fact an entire campaign run by young reformists entitled Mowj-e Sevom (Third 
Wave) aimed at inviting Khatami to run for a third term as president in late Autumn 
and Winter 2008.  Initially, this momentum was marred by tentative and shifting 
stances by reformists, such as Khatami’s vacillation over running.  Khatami had 
originally said he would not stand for election if Mir Hossein Mousavi, a former 
Prime Minister, was to run, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty in the reformist 
camp.  In February 2009, Khatami announced that he would run.  However, a little 
over a month later, Khatami withdrew his candidacy in favour of Mousavi who had 
declared his candidacy earlier in March 2009.  Many of the young individuals 
involved in campaigning for reformists were student activists during the reform 
movement or children of reformist actors.  While reformists might not have used the 
slogan of civil society, the spirit of the campaign was clearly one of reform.  Karrubi 
ran under a banner of “change”, while Mousavi’s campaign slogan was for “a 
progressive Iran with law, justice and freedom”.  Despite the drama that unfolded in 
the upper echelons of the political sphere (e.g. the disorder over who would represent 
reformists), what is of relevance to this thesis is the action at the lower levels, 
including those by social and political campaigners and the wider public, because 
that is what shows the development and resilience of civil society.  The final race 
was between four candidates: conservatives Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohsen 
Rezai and reformists Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi. 
 
A comprehensive study of the 2009 elections was beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, an overview and analysis is provided as it supports the finding of Iranian 
civil society’s strength and fervour following the reform movement.  In order to 
provide meaningful consideration concisely, several key issues have been selected 
for their relevance and significance to the development of Iranian civil society.   
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Between Mousavi and Karrubi, the latter’s position was the more liberal amongst 
reformists as he held a tougher stance for change in Iranian society, such as greater 
rights for women.  Karrubi was also the only candidate affiliated with a political 
party, namely the National Trust Party, that included its own newspaper and 
membership list (Ansari, 2010, p. 32).  However, Mousavi was the figure who 
emerged as the stronger contender.  Although attempting to originally appeal to both 
Reformists and Principlists, Mousavi ultimately went toward a reformist agenda; 
“Seasoned observers recognized that his political managers were drawn almost 
entirely from the Islamic Iran Participation Front (the main Reformist Party) and 
from the Servants of Construction, the centrist group of technocrats who were 
supportive of Rafsanjani” (Ansari, 2010, p. 33).  One of his key strengths was his 
wife, Zahra Rahnavard, a former university chancellor, who campaigned alongside 
him; images of him with his wife by his side were commonplace.  It was rare to see a 
woman so directly involved in her husband’s campaign.  She also made bold claims 
regarding the benefits for women if her husband were to be elected (for example of 
her comments at a press conference, see Fletcher, 2009).  She represented a more 
modern approach to marriage – that of partnership.  This is a prime example of how 
the role of women, as social agents, has risen to the forefront of politics.  The colour 
green, representative of Islam alongside other possible connotations, was adopted as 
Mousavi’s campaign colour.  Green wristbands and women wearing green 
headscarves began appearing everywhere.  In the month leading up to the election, 
Mousavi’s campaign gained momentum, with large crowds, consisting of young and 
old, religious and secular, wealthy and poor, gathering for rallies across the country, 
especially Tehran.  These actions by people from across the social, economic and 
religious spectrum was reminiscent of Khatami’s presidential campaign.  People’s 
actions may have even been emboldened by experiences of the reform movement.  
Mousavi’s campaign was also pushed along with publications, such as the newspaper 
Kalameh Sabz (The Green Word), and websites, including Kalameh.  As in the past, 
publications continued to play an important role in promoting the reformist 
viewpoint.   
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Television debates 
 
One of the key elements of the election campaign was the televised debased between 
the presidential candidates.  These were one-on-one debates, each lasting 90 minutes, 
between the four rivals and aired on national television.  The establishment of such 
live debates marks an opening for civil society, which had an opportunity to witness 
candidates in a new light.  Though moderated and not open for meaningful public 
participation, the debates allowed candidates the opportunity to present their views 
and challenge one another, in a manner more becoming of a fully democratic regime.  
In the debate between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad, Mousavi “…accused 
[Ahmadinejad] of undermining the nation’s interests by constantly questioning the 
Holocaust and by engaging in an adventurist foreign policy” and went so far as so 
accuse him of moving toward turning the country into a dictatorship (Fathi, 2009).  
Mousavi’s bold claims are notable given the public backing Ahmadinejad received 
from the Supreme Leader.  Khamenei criticised Mousavi’s claims against 
Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy but also, surprisingly, admonished Ahmadinejad for 
asserting corruption charges against his critics during the debate with Mousavi; 
Khamenei stated, “One doesn’t like to see a nominee, for the sake of proving 
himself, seeking to negate somebody else” (Tait, 2009).  The national broadcaster 
also stated that those whom Ahmadinejad accused of fraud will have an opportunity 
to defend themselves ("Iran's national broadcaster to grant airtime to accused 
officials," 2009).  Although it is doubtful that such action actually took place given 
the election outcome, the fact that it was suggested represents a seemingly inclusive 
public media.    
 
The debates were not limited to pitting reformists against conservatives.  In the 
debate between Ahmadinejad and Rezai, Rezai criticised Ahmadinejad’s record on 
the economy and his failure to engage with the expert opinions of the elite65.  While 
the debate between these two candidates was less volatile, it still reflected a sense of 
competition.  This sense of competition of opposing views can be considered a 
manifestation of the discourse espoused by reformists as part of a civil society.  
According to the head of the election desk of Iran’s national broadcaster, Voice and 
                                                 
65
 Information obtained from transcript provided by Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 
3, 8 June 2009 (as supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring). 
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Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, approximately 50 million people watched the 
debate between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi66.  If accurate, this represents a majority 
of the country and, if sustained across the different debates, shows a wide interest 
amongst the population.  On the whole, the debates represent an opening up of 
dialogue, albeit not fully free.                 
 
Public participation 
 
In addition to the debates, public rallies were a crucial feature of the campaigns.  One 
potential concern in the months preceding the elections was that of low voter turnout.  
For those who had witnessed the rise and fall of the reform movement, culminating 
in Ahmadinejad’s victory in the 2005 elections, the idea of bringing about change 
through the electoral process held little appeal.  However, as campaigning gained 
momentum so did the spectre of wide citizen participation.  It was here that we begin 
to see a public revival of civil society.  Individuals and groups began participating in 
pre-election events and, finally, went out to vote on Election Day.  Hasan Yousefi 
Eshkevari, a reformist intellectual, outlined why it would be a mistake to boycott 
elections with an article in the newspaper Etemad Melli, a paper affiliated with 
Mehdi Karrubi’s political party.  In the article, Eshkevari noted that while it was 
possible to be a reformist outside of the government, it was only once you were in 
government that you could be considered a reformer who could bring about change 
(Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, 2009).67  There was once more resurgence in the belief 
that reform has the potential to create change.        
 
It is important to note here that campaigns for Mousavi (and to a lesser degree 
Karrubi) were both in support of these candidates themselves and to a possibly even 
larger degree a campaign against Ahmadinejad and conservative forces in the 
government.  At the same time, this remained a vote for reform and not an overhaul 
of the Islamic Republic.  As one editorial in the newspaper E’temad noted, 
individuals were encouraged to vote for the sake of the Revolution as it was 
                                                 
66
 Jaam-e Jam Newspaper, Tehran, 6 June 2009 (BBC Worldwide Monitoring). 
67
 It should be noted that Eshkevari escaped from Iran in the aftermath of the elections in fear of 
persecution.  He continues to speak for reform and democratisation, albeit from exile.  The crackdown 
on intellectuals such as Eshkevari represents the current government’s continued resistance to 
dialogue within civil society.  However, this pressure does not mean that individuals have fully 
succumbed, as acts of defiance and opposition mentioned below indicate.     
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indicated the revolution belongs to the people (Golabi, 2009).  This is similar to the 
support for Khatami in the early days of the reform movement—this belief, however, 
was challenged given the events that followed the election.      
 
In the weeks and days leading up to the election, popular interest and support for 
Mousavi became clear.  Public displays and rallies organised by Mousavi’s 
supporters gained momentum.  One of the most visually striking stories was that of 
the human chain formed by Mousavi supporters that purportedly covered the 15-mile 
length of a major Tehran street (Black, 2009).  These organic, non-violent 
movements can also be attributed to the growth of civil society as intended by 
reformists.  In contrast, Ahmadinejad’s rallies depended on the bussing in of 
supporters whom they gave goods such as bottled water (Black, 2009).  According to 
researchers and the media, one significant component of the pre-election period (and 
post-election protests) was the use of the internet, namely social media, and mobiles.  
In fact, SMS (Short Message Service), or mobile phone text messaging, played an 
essential role.  Text message campaigns were used by both pro and anti 
Ahmadinehjad campaigns.  Examples include: “If you plan not to vote, just think 
about June 13 when you hear Ahmadinejad has been re-elected” and, conversely, 
“Vote for our brave President Ahmadinejad to help build a stronger Iran” (Hafezi, 
2009).  Another reformist text campaign conveyed the message that four years earlier 
many reformists boycotted and allowed Ahmadinejad to win, therefore this time by 
voting he can be defeated (Dareini & Murphy, 2009).  Mobile phone communication, 
and text messaging in particular, has played a more substantial role than the internet 
in the coordination of the opposition (Ansari, 2010, p. 9).               
 
Women played a key role during and after the 2009 presidential elections (see for 
example: Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2010; Tohidi, 2009).  As mentioned before, Mousavi’s 
wife was a key player in her husband’s campaign, as were countless others, both 
religious and secular.  Dr Rahnavard, an artist and academic, was vital to pro-
Mousavi rallies, where she would challenge the status-quo, asking questions such as, 
“Why are there no women presidential candidates or cabinet ministers?” and “Why 
are students jailed for speaking their minds?” (Sengupta, 2009).  The strong role 
played by women is also both reminiscent and a continuation of what was seen 
during the reform period, as explained in the thesis.         
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Therefore, it was a shock to many that within hours of polls closing, Ahmadinejad 
was declared victor by a wide margin of the vote.  While some maintain that the vote 
results are valid, analysis suggests otherwise.  Irregularities in the final vote tally 
include provinces showing a higher than 100% voter turnout, which cannot be 
accounted for by the claim that some individuals vote outside their home district and 
a new loss of regional variation (Ansari, Berman, & Rintoul, 2009).  Moreover, 
while it may have been “…conceivable for Ahmadinejad to have won the election 
outright, the subsequent mishandling of the election and the desperate attempts by 
the authorities to explain what had happened only added to the perception that the 
election was fraudulent” (Abootalebi, 2009, p. 8).  One particular form of control by 
the state was the banning of public gatherings.  For example, a ban was placed on the 
gathering of political groups and candidate supporters until after the announcement 
of the election results and the need for a government authorisation for gatherings 
after that time ("Political gatherings banned before Iran election results are 
announced ", 2009).  The Green Movement (jonbesh-e sabz), also called the Green 
Wave (mowj-e sabz), emerged as a social and political movement that denounced the 
election results.  The movement consists “…of a number of different civil society 
movements, including the women’s movements, the largely but not entirely 
repressed labor movement, student movements, insistent journalism and blogging 
and Internet activism” (Fischer, 2010, p. 513).  Mousavi and Karroubi serve as its 
public faces.  As indicated in analysis, the crisis following the June 2009 election, 
“…was not principally about the election, but rather that the election was part of a far 
deeper malaise in the structure and ideology of the Islamic Republic” (Ansari, 2010, 
p. x).        
 
Of course, there are writers, from the pro-regime, conservative camp, who deny the 
existence of vote rigging and claim the post-election crisis has occurred as a result of 
factors such as political obstinacy by Mousavi, who failed to accept defeat, and 
Western support (Ismaili, 2010).  One such thinker claims that change in Iranian 
society requires the leadership of clerics over that of lay intellectuals; rather than 
working with clerics to eliminate despotism, intellectuals use incorrect teachings 
from abroad to pursue their goals (Ismaili, 2010, pp. 245-246).  It is from this stream 
of thought that claims emerged of the post-election crisis representing a velvet 
revolution instigated by the West.  Based on these claims, individuals affiliated with 
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the reform movement and those who participated in protests were detained, arrested 
and put on trial. 
 
Post-election crisis protests 
 
In the aftermath of the elections, individuals from across the political and socio-
economic spectrum participated in various forms of protests.  Ultimately, the protests 
and protesters were silenced by state power, either through mass arrests or through 
displays of force.  The following section will describe several forms of protest by 
citizens, originally in objection to the outcome of the elections but ultimately as a 
broader criticism against the government.  Although these protests were eventually 
crushed by the state, their existence and intent are representative of the strength and 
continuity of civil society’s power.  They represent the creativity of civil society 
actors in showing their views as well as their ability to organise.  Ultimately, 
however, civil society action results in gradual change and chipping away of power 
as it does not have use of state resources and access to (or desire for) the means of 
violence.              
       
Members of the Mousavi and Karrubi campaigns continued to voice criticism against 
the outcome of the elections through their writings, whether in print or online.  
Protests were called for in which thousands of people participated despite the fact 
that government permits were not granted for these rallies, even though they should 
have been constitutionally guaranteed.  Green continued to be used as the colour of 
the protestors and pro-reformists, “A key strategy of the reform and protest 
movement in 2009 was to deny the state the control of Islamic terms and symbols, 
and to reappropriate them for Muslims of all ideologies” (Fischer, 2010, p. 519).  
Protest action led to the arrest of both protest participants and organisers.  The most 
public arrests were of the intellectuals and leaders of the Mousavi and Karrubi 
camps.  Many of these individuals appeared in court together, gaunt and dressed in 
prison uniforms.  The arrests and mass public trials allude to the role of intellectuals 
in creating and promoting ideas of civil society, as discussed in the thesis, and as a 
cause of fear for the ruling elite.  Some of the intellectuals and activists arrested 
confessed on television to accusations of having taken part in a reformist conspiracy; 
many received harsh sentences.  Although Mousavi declared that he would challenge 
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the election results through the legal system, potential legal avenues were closed by 
the government and resulted in further public demonstrations (Abootalebi, 2009, p. 
10).     
 
Other tactics of defiance against the state were also used by the general population, 
including the shouting of slogans from rooftops at night.  One of the main slogans 
was Allahu Akbar (God is great), which was a slogan used during the 1979 
revolution, and now used against the government; these protests faded away after 
state forces, including the Basij, began marking buildings from which chants were 
coming from at night in order to make arrests the following day ("How Iran's 
opposition inverts old slogans ", 2009).  Other less blatant measures were taken.  For 
example, anti-regime slogans were written onto currency (Fischer, 2010, p. 520) and 
impromptu shouts in support of Mousavi could (and can still) be heard in certain 
gatherings.  In a sense, although civil society still attempts to promote different 
views, its power can be limited by a state that resists an opposition.     
 
Conclusion 
 
While Ahmadinejad carried on as president and the public protests gradually 
subsided, what can be deduced from the elections and its aftermath is the strength 
and vitality of the public sphere.  A strong public sphere may not necessarily have 
the ability to take down or manifestly transform a political system, which is not 
ultimately the aim of the protests.  The reason for civil society’s limitation is mainly 
due to the state’s control over the means of violence, modes of communication and 
financial institutions; these were the same limitations targeted by reformist 
intellectuals who touted the concept of civil society.  However, despite the stifling 
situation, the public sphere can gradually peel away at the state’s legitimacy and 
provide reason to doubt its durability.  The aftermath of the 2009 elections was 
evidence of this, further supporting the notion of civil society as a dynamic construct 
with blurred boundaries between civil society, political society and the state.  The 
diversity of the individuals involved in the 2009 elections supports the thesis’s 
assertion that civil society should not be looked at as simply a static group of 
organisations.      
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Mousavi and Karrubi are still confined by the state and may no longer represent the 
injustices of the Islamic Republic on a daily basis.  Nonetheless, they have not been 
completely forgotten.  More importantly, the ideas of reform, many of which 
emerged in the 1990s, have become embedded in such a way that they may be able to 
spread through civil society without the need for a dominant leader, with less 
prominent individuals serving as agents of change.  It will be significant to watch 
how the 2013 presidential elections unfold, with noteworthy factors including: the 
candidates, i.e. who chooses to run and who is allowed, and the public’s reaction, i.e. 
the numbers who turn out to vote.  Ultimately, this will be another test of the Islamic 
Republic’s legitimacy in the public eye.  According to Mehran Kamrava, the 
growing rift between society and the state is an outcome of the 2009 elections, and, 
though, it may not destabilise the state’s ability to govern it is also not helpful 
(Kamrava, 2010, p. 401).  While legitimacy may not be the final deciding factor in 
the immediate survival of a non-democratic regime, it remains influential in deciding 
its duration and future action.  The 2009 elections are a manifestation of civil society 
as a process that is in a continuous state of development, fitting with the assertion 
that a more inclusive and integrated approach is needed regarding civil society study 
and practice.  The question, however, remains as to how the ideological trajectory of 
reform will develop and what role civil society’s various parts will play in bringing 
change to Iran.  Moreover, it will be significant to see if and how public intellectuals 
influence this process, particularly as many key figures are now in exile.       
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Appendix 1: Interview List 
 
Reformist Public Intellectuals 
 
Code Occupation/Affiliation Gender 
INT1 Government spokesperson for Khatami administration; academic (social science) M 
INT2 Khatami advisor, leading thinker of the reform movement, 
researcher and academic (social science) M 
INT3 
Female intellectual who held posts in the Ministry of Interior 
during Khatami’s presidency and was a strong advocate for 
nongovernmental organisations 
M 
INT4 Reformist public intellectual; academic (sociology); holds strong 
revolutionary credentials M 
INT5 Female academic (international relations) and former member of 
the parliament during the Khatami presidency F 
INT6 
Key leader of the reform movement who has held posts in the 
government from the early days of the revolution but gained 
prominence in the Khatami administration; principal figure in one 
of the main reformist political parties and has provided strategic 
guidance for the movement 
M 
INT7 
One of the most prominent of the interviewees, he has been 
considered one of the founding fathers of the reform movement; 
an influential thinker, strategist and public figure of the reform 
movement who was also an elected local official for a period 
during Khatami’s presidency 
M 
INT8 Female member of Khatami’s cabinet, active in the field of 
women’s rights for over twenty-five years F 
INT9 Prominent cleric who has publicly challenged the direction of the Islamic Republic; imprisoned for his work M 
INT10 Leading reformist intellectual and Khatami advisor; academic (social science) M 
INT11 Academic: Professor (social science); strong ties to leading 
reformist figures; pragmatist M 
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Other Reformist Figures 
 
R1 
Ministry of Interior employee for department of social welfare, 
civil society activity and city councils; Former deputy to minister 
in Khatami cabinet and leading figure in planning of World Bank 
projects and implementation of city councils  
M 
R2 Government employee and NGO activist in women’s rights; 
trained NGO leaders F 
R3 Khatami advisor/head of women’s section of reformist political party/NGO activist for women’s rights F 
R4 Head of youth section of reformist political party; student activist M 
 
Students 
 
S1 NGO activist working for a women’s rights campaign; also a 
student activist during the reform period M 
S2 Student activist and key leader in Islamic Student Association M 
S3 Student activist (later years of Khatami administration and after) M 
S4 Leading activist from Tehran University’s Islamic Student Association; currently a PhD candidate in the social sciences F 
S5 Student activist M 
S6 Student activist M 
S8 
Head of youth section of political faction that broke away from 
state ideology before reform movement came to prominence; 
faction came to be affiliated with reform movement; student 
activist 
M 
S9 Student: an undergraduate student in the social sciences during 
the reform period, studying international relations F 
 
Women’s Rights Activists 
 
W1 Leading women’s rights activist; imprisoned on numerous 
occasions F 
W2 Civil society activist in the field of women’s rights; academic (sociologist) F 
W3 Civil society activist in women’s rights; academic (sociologist); leading figure in sociology association F 
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Civil Society/Civil Society Organisation Actors 
 
CS1 
NGO activist: has worked with a number of NGOs since the 
1980s to present day in the field of poverty alleviation and 
environmental protection; his work has extended across the 
country; he has been an active member of several associations 
and organizations promoting collaboration and advocacy for 
NGO activity 
M 
CS2 Head of a large NGO working on issues related to education; 
academic (physical sciences) M 
CS3 
Civil society activist with special focus on development of the 
private sector; active in social development through civil society 
activities 
M 
CS4 Civil society activist; film director; developed films about NGOs F 
CS5 Civil Society activist (participated in development projects with international organisations and local entities); journalist M 
CS6 Academic (social science); expert on and active in the field of development M 
CS7 UN staff member involved in civil society/NGO programmes M 
 
Journalists affiliated with the reform movement 
 
J1 Journalist for a major Tehran-based newspaper run by the 
mayor’s office M 
J2 Journalist for a major Tehran-based newspaper run by the 
mayor’s office; conservative leanings M 
J5 
Journalist for a major Tehran-based newspaper run by the 
mayor’s office; during the period of reform he also hosted a 
television programme, interviewing citizens on the street 
regarding their opinions on various social topics 
M 
J6 Journalist at reformist newspaper M 
J7 Journalist at reformist newspaper M 
J8 Editor of reformist newspaper M 
J9 Board member of Association of Newspapers  F 
 
Conservative Public Intellectuals 
 
C1 Academic; government post as head of a public research institute for the social sciences M 
C2 Academic; editor of leading conservative daily newspaper M 
C3 Academic; Strong ties to the revolution M 
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